The literature on civility navigates the gravitational pulls of binary camps: civility sceptics tend to emphasize how it operates as an instrument of power; civility optimists tend to emphasize its emancipatory potentials. While some scholarship has attempted to reconcile these perspectives by showing how civility can be both negative and positive, such theorization tends to describe this relation in terms of ambivalence. While these approaches rightly indicate that normative judgments about civility are largely a matter of perspective, the concept of twisted civility developed here focuses on the ways in which actors become trapped by the dynamic shifts of force embedded within civility. Comparisons across seemingly incommensurate examples suggest that such multidirectional dynamics are not culturally specific but rather more generalizable. Building our theoretical conception of twisted civility from a comparative approach based on research in Kuching and Saigon, and then using the concept to consider examples from the United States and Denmark, this article also reverses the direction of theorizing typically employed in scholarship on civility. Using postcolonial Southeast Asia as the source of theory rather than its afterthought, the method here uses anthropological comparison to generate theory and to problematize assumptions that universalize Euro-American trajectories of civility.

Magellan's Malay slave, Enrique, accompanied him on his voyages and may have actually been the first to circumnavigate the world. This paper examines the extent to which the still sporadic and small-scale — but sometimes fierce — online disputes between Indonesian and Malaysian netizens over the “ownership” and “national” origin of Enrique might develop further as part of the long-standing “heritage war” between the two countries. It explains the historical roots of the dispute over Enrique, discusses reactions to it in Indonesia and, to an extent, in Malaysia, and analyses the coverage of and exchanges about Enrique on social media. Set against the backdrop of Lebow's constructivist cultural theory, this paper posits that the mutually reactive national identification process between Indonesians and Malaysians might significantly influence the trajectory of this conflict. If efforts in Indonesia to promote the idea of Enrique Maluku succeed and it becomes truly widely known, what are currently small and irregular skirmishes online over Enrique could develop into another enduring segment of the heritage war between the two countries.

This paper undertakes a comparative study of two rural mountainous areas participating in global agricultural markets while using, as an interpretative grid, the development of the quality of the products and spaces. We draw on contemporary analysis at the interface of food and agriculture systems through the example of coffee cultivation and consumption in two neighbouring countries: China and Vietnam. The purpose is to understand why these two provinces with similar historical dynamics have two radically different productions of coffee. While China produces Arabica coffee in limited volumes, Vietnam has over the past few decades become the world's second largest producer of Robusta coffee in response to the growing appetite for coffee in Asia. This paper adopts a multidimensional analysis of the quality of coffee based on the cultivation of the plant, the collective construction of quality, and the consumption of the beverage.

The article focuses on a comparative analysis of conflict and elite formation in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia; it argues that societal conflicts in Southeast Asia are grounded in the historical formation of elite social structures within differing sociocultures and that major and long-lasting societal conflicts—both violent and non-violent—occur in social spaces between ‘power elite’ groups. Additionally, it shows how up-and-coming elite groups are recruited from the fringes of the old hierarchy, which is why they are—in many respects—social hybrids of old and new sociocultures. Moreover, after those new arrivals were elevated into the ‘power elite’, the window for upward mobility rapidly re-closed.

This article examines limitations present in India–Indonesia bilateral trade relations. Since January 2019, India has imposed higher import tariffs on Indonesian refined, bleached, deodorised palm oil (RBDPO) than those imposed on Indonesia's main competitor Malaysia. This tariff policy weakened Indonesia's exports, given that India is Indonesia's third-largest export destination for palm oil. To overcome these tariff disparities, the Indonesian government responded with a trade-off strategy, offering to lower its import tariffs on India's raw sugar in exchange for a reduction in India's import tariffs on Indonesia's RBDPO. However, this strategy has thus far failed to generate a satisfying outcome for Indonesia. This article examines the obstacles in enacting such a strategy from the Indonesian perspective. By mobilising the concept of reluctance in international politics, this article argues that India's reluctance hinders Indonesia's trade-off strategy. This reluctance is evidenced by India's hesitation and recalcitrance, resulting in delays, and reversal of policy as well as ignoring Indonesian requests regarding the trade-off strategy. This could indicate that India does not prioritise Indonesia in its Indo-Pacific vision, particularly in enhancing cooperation with Southeast Asian nations, particularly Indonesia.

We explored the nexus between the quality of human capital, productivity-enhancing factors, and the quality of institutions in nine Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries using canonical correlation and principal component analysis of country-level data for 2007–2017 from the World Bank, World Economic Forum, and Penn World Tables databases. We found that an unequal development of human capital in the ASEAN countries is clearly linked to their heterogeneous institutional conditions and that the quality of human capital drives technology absorption and innovation. The four transition economies in the region—Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar—are facing particularly difficult challenges in developing institutional environments that stimulate human capital development to reach higher levels of knowledge intensity of their economies and achieve the resulting competitive advantages.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) attracted more than passing interest in the pages of El Renacimiento in the Philippines and Bintang Hindia in the Dutch East Indies. Both publications featured pieces with editorializing tones that indulged in a significant degree of delight at the spectacle of Russian defeats and humiliations at the hands of the Japanese. This article engages in a close reading of this coverage to insert these instances of colonial schadenfreude into the broader trajectories of shaping communities of readers and nationalist awakenings in both colonies. Filipino nationalists in El Renacimiento dropped clear clues likening Russian aggression against Japan, an archipelagic Asian nation like the Philippines, to that which Filipinos experienced under the Americans, thus engaging in a symbolic displacement of that international event into their own historical present. Mocking Russians was part of a nationalist reading of the war that allowed for delight in the spectacle of White humiliation and the prospects of Japanese aid in anti-colonial struggle. The way the Russo-Japanese War was commented on by Bintang Hindia less than ten years before the ‘national awakening’ period was remarkably similar to the reporting in El Renacimiento. This isomorphism between two different historical contexts allows us to examine the role that mockery of Europeans played in forming a community of readers, nationalism, and the gradual undermining of the ideas of White supremacy on which colonialism was predicated.

Growing rapidly before the early 2000s, literature on provincial Thai politics has dwindled in recent years. This article makes a small attempt to redress this trend by highlighting one distinctive yet understudied emerging electoral dynamics in provincial Thailand. Specifically, drawing mainly on Thai-language primary sources, this paper shows that in the majority of Thailand's provinces, the Provincial Administrative Organisation, an electoral institution that has received an unprecedented amount of state funding in the post-1997 age of decentralisation, has enabled influential political families to retain and even increase their power. As political and economic power has been decentralised from Bangkok, it has ironically been centralised in the hands of a limited number of oligarchic provincial elites. This phenomenon is not an historical aberration; rather, it should be viewed as one manifestation or product of Thailand's enduring patrimonial culture, in which public officeholders’ positions are regarded as an extension of their personal or familial property. I conclude by discussing the Thai case theoretically and comparatively.

Debates on the causes of Indonesia's recent democratic decline have mostly focused on institutional, political and attitudinal–behavioural causes. By bringing the rural political economy dimension into this conversation, this article presents another picture of the illiberal turn in Indonesian democracy. Specifically, it examines the implications of elite control over land and coal resources on democratic quality. Based on in-country fieldwork materials and relevant secondary data, it analyses instances of episodic repression, the contraction of democratic spaces and the corrosive effects of coal-fuelled intra-elite clientelism by looking at the elite control of land resources and the influence of political and economic elites benefitting from the coal industry in elections and the broader political arena. Finally, it also discusses the capitulation of key agrarian social movement actors to state interests and its impact on the movement's ability to resist democratic regression. This elaboration shows how the current contour of elite control over rural resources contributes to the declining quality of Indonesian democracy.

Since the end of its absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand has been variously described as a “hybrid regime,” “flawed democracy,” and “failed democracy.” Furthermore, its governance system has been identified as “electoral authoritarianism,” ‘hybrid authoritarianism,” “military domination,” and “Thai-style democracy.” Regardless of the analytic lens applied, the history of Thai politics has involved a continuing struggle for control of government between both authoritarian and democratic forces. Following the 2014 military coup d’état, the first election held in 2019 saw the 2014 military coup leader, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, elected as prime minister. This article assesses the conduct and results of the 2019 election in terms of the general discourse on electoral authoritarianism and as an emerging framing of authoritarian regimes particularly applicable to Southeast Asia—the rise of “sophisticated authoritarianism.” This approach distills and integrates the discourse on electoral authoritarianism to produce a typology that is useful for considering the empirical characteristics of Southeast Asia. The 2019 election offers an opportunity to consider Thailand within this framing and to determine to what extent the military-dominated regime and its holistic manipulation of electoral institutions and processes can be assessed as “sophisticated authoritarianism.” This study demonstrates that Prayuth's election partially demonstrates “sophisticated authoritarianism”; nonetheless, his attempt to depoliticise Thailand and reduce it to a non-political state has met substantial resistance that will likely persist while he remains in power.

While name-calling has been associated with several adverse effects on students’ well-being, it is often overlooked, particularly if understood as harmless teasing. Scholars have stressed that not only the intention of the name-caller but also the perception of the receiver should be considered. Such perceptions can be influenced by cultural value orientations, which remain understudied but gain importance with the increasing internationalisation of education. This study explores name-calling in the context of Thailand, a prototypical collectivist, high power distance society, which has shown a high prevalence of verbal bullying. This study conducted 95 autobiographical written narratives and 20 in-depth interviews of past and current name-calling experiences with Thai university students. Findings revealed that friends, teachers, and parents frequently called students names, which were primarily related to students’ skin colour and weight. Despite its adverse effects, name-calling was often normalised and accepted as part of Thai culture. Values including collectivism, conflict avoidance, social harmony, being considerate and shared enjoyment appeared to discourage students from defending themselves against friends, who were frequently identified as name-callers. Teachers regularly called students hurtful names, particularly when taking attendance, entertaining the class, asking questions, and addressing performance, which seemed to be reinforced by the societal norm of showing respect to people of high status.

As the third decade of the twenty-first century begins, Vietnam embarks on a more advanced phase of national development and international integration, with a greater emphasis on foreign policy as part of the country's overall national defence and development strategy. This informs greater expectations about shifts in Vietnam's foreign policy perception and discourse in pursuit of national interests and the regime's legitimacy amidst major domestic and international developments. This article analyses the making, in terms of processes and actors, and the evolution, in terms of themes and directions, of Vietnam's foreign policy under the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, which was held in early 2021. The article argues that while embedding continuity with what the country has been pursuing since its renovation process (known as Doi Moi) started in the mid-1980s, Vietnam's foreign policy under the Thirteenth Party Congress is crafted on a broader base of domestic consensus and features new dimensions, implying stronger domestic support for Hanoi's conduct of foreign affairs and a Vietnamese nation brand with greater visibility and contribution in the regional and global arenas in the coming years.

Indonesia, like many other countries, has encountered a slew of social, political, economic, and public health challenges in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to these challenges, the Indonesian government implemented security measures by instituting large-scale social restrictions (Indonesian: Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar) and, later, micro-scale social restrictions (Pemberlakukan Pembatasan Kegiatan Masyarakat) to restrict people's mobility and virus transmission. Using securitisation theory as a framework, this article examines how the nationwide dilemma between public health and economic security arose. Based on official documents, government papers, and political speeches, this study reveals how the country's COVID-19 responses were largely defined by carefully constructed and flexible measures known as the ‘gas and brake’ policy (Kebijakan Gas dan Rem), which were aimed at resolving the health-economic dilemma. This policy is deemed appropriate given the country's limited public health and economic resources, despite the fact that many argue that such an approach reflects indecisiveness and a lack of coordination among the country's authorities. This article also demonstrates that policymakers in Indonesia use this policy to resolve the securitisation dilemma by reinforcing the hierarchical ordering of security sectors as a readjustment strategy. The policy is used to justify tightening or easing social restrictions by changing the security narrative throughout the pandemic.