During the Third Indochina War (1979-1991), the ideological alignments of involved parties differed from those during the Second Indochina War, also known as the Vietnam War. Whereas the Second Indochina War pitted communists squarely against non-communists and anti-communists, the Third Indochina War was more complicated and less ideological or political, with communists often fighting against other communists due to the Sino-Soviet ideological split. The enemy of one's enemy was frequently viewed as a friend, often leading to unlikely alliances not rooted in ideological or political similarities. In this article, I argue that it is important to consider the unlikely alliances that emerged during the Third Indochina War by focusing on the particular cross-border interactions and conflicts between communists and non-communists that occurred in the Emerald Triangle, the tri-border region between Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. Focusing particularly on the Lao insurgent perspective, I consider how Lao anti-communist insurgents, the Khmer Rouge, the Communist Party of Thailand, other armed groups, and the Thai military participated in transnational collaboration in this region during the Third Indochina War. In particular, based largely on Lao-language interviews with key figures in the Lao insurgency conducted for over a decade, I examine how Lao insurgents interacted with Khmer Rouge to oppose a common enemy, communist Vietnam and their allies, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and how the Thai military supported them, but only insofar as it enabled them to maintain control over security inside Thailand.

In recent years, a number of online outlets aligned with the right has emerged in Thai politics. Though it is often assumed that such actors are merely an extension of the Thai state propaganda apparatus, as the moniker “IO (short for Information Operation)” implies, closer inspection of their contents suggests a more complicated picture. Employing the morphological approach of ideological analysis, this article argues that the Thai Online Right articulates a decidedly conservative worldview, upholding a social order centred around the monarchy, and opposing particular instigators of change, similar to more traditional Thai conservatives. The concepts and ideas they deploy to bolster these core ideas, however, seem to emphasise more materialistic and personalised elements, as well as draw from more contemporaneous “Western” right-wing conspiracy theories, making their conservative expression a strange blend of the old and the new. The findings have implications to the study of conservatisms, both in the Thai context and comparatively.

This article brings film/media theory into Southeast Asian research through a revisionist queer approach. It contains two goals: addressing some recent developments about queer imag(in)ing in Thai media whilst reappraising the fundamental question of spectatorship via screen theory. Taking into account the more general issue of media specificity and the particular textual device of identity/gender-switch in several recent Thai television serials, we propose the notion of wer viewership: a mode of viewing practice that features viewer-text interaction through the perceptual-cognitive processes, and is characterised by wer/excessive aesthetics, multiple meanings, and diverse pleasures. Resonant with camp reading, wer viewership underlines how the viewer actively makes sense of the ambiguities about gender, particularly those along the extra-/diegetic interface. We use Thai soap opera Shadow of Love to illuminate the wer/excessive aesthetics rendered through its identity/gender play bordering on the extra-/diegetic divide, and the enhanced pleasures and meanings thus available to its extradiegetic active viewers. We stress, though, the expanded queer imag(in)ing in Shadow is not of total free interpretation, but is animated in relation to both the evolving discourses about gender/sexuality in Thailand, and the popularising homoerotic Boys Love (BL) media across Asia in recent years.

The international solidarity movement for the East Timorese was developed in Southeast Asian nations during the 1990s as ‘the issue of East Timor’ became a primary concern for the ASEAN countries’ civil society. Proponents of liberal democracy have assumed that international solidarity movements for human rights and democracy during the 1990s resulted from the powerful momentum of liberal democracy that universally linked foreign people. However, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri and their marxist followers have explained these transnational movements as a transnational network that overcomes national borders against the capitalist Empire. Nevertheless, the political history of transnational solidarity movements from East Timor to Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War 1990s makes clear that nationalism has continued to be an ideological driver to link people from different nations.

Focusing on the international solidarity for the East Timorese independence struggle, this paper demonstrates a transnational function of nationalism through which international solidarity movements are created, resonate and function. The East Timor international solidarity struggle successfully created a transnational platform through the APCET conferences held in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand in the 1990s. Socio-historical analysis of APCET reveals that nationalists in Southeast Asia shared collective memories of national struggles beyond their spaces and times to create a transnational force to support self-determination for the East Timorese. Through its analysis, this article extends the theoretical framework of nationalism that has explained nationalist movements to serve as a more powerful tool to explain international solidarity in the age of globalisation. (247 words)

In the past decade, the Vietnamese lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and other sexual orientations and gender identities (LGBT+) movement has succeeded in repositioning this population from the stigmatising label of “social evils” to a more positive social representation. Despite the limited space for civil society in this authoritarian environment, Vietnamese activists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have effectively changed public attitudes, improved visibility, and gained legal recognition for this marginalised community. This study uses qualitative data from interviews with twelve activists and fieldwork observations to explain how activist strategies in this setting align with the “service delivery” function of civil society. By examining how activists have addressed healthcare and education deficits, I demonstrate that activism in authoritarian regimes can be effective when it assists instead of challenges the government. The findings contribute to scholarship on global queer activism by demonstrating how a service delivery approach can achieve social change, highlighting the role of NGOs and international development in this process. Additionally, the findings expose existing challenges that hinder these activists’ efforts, showing how funding dependency and inadequate legal recognition can significantly limit the creativity and autonomy of grassroots activist groups.

This paper examines the habitus of contemporary Thailand based on the concepts developed by Pierre Bourdieu and their operationalisation to Thai society developed by Boike Rehbein's principles, which explain how contemporary habitus is linked to social inequality and mobilisation participation. Thailand has two key social structures: precapitalist and capitalist. Both create and reproduce different types of habitus. The paper used a mixed-methods research approach to analyse social inequality and challenges in Thailand since 2019. Data collection was conducted during the years between 2021 and 2022 from 400 surveys and fifteen qualitative interviews. The paper proposes eight habitus types rooted in Thai social structures with seven characteristics for explaining contemporary Thai society. The pre-capitalist structure generates the following habitus types: subsistential, traditionalist, and powerful (phuyai). The capitalist structure generates the following types: desperate, individualist, aspirant, and content creator. Between these two structures is the conformist. All habitus types share some characteristics. Authoritarianism is the fundamental trait of the predominant habitus types in Thai society, which are interconnected with social structures, thereby reflecting the consequences of social inequality and mobilisations. The demographic most affected by social inequality is the desperate group, but a more significant habitus for mobilisation participation is that of content creator, which is considerably small now but is likely to increase. Traditionalist and conformist groups are less likely to protest and, to a lesser degree, this is true of the subsistential and powerful types. Moreover, rationales of being affected by social inequality and reacting differently are distinct characteristics of each type, and socio-economic positions interplayed with social media influences.

‘Thainess’ [khwam-pen-Thai] or Thai identity has long been a state-constructed ideology linked to nationalist sentiment. However, in the 21st century, internal politics and globalisation have come to challenge its monopoly. Against this backdrop, reinventing classical literature and folklore has emerged as a way to reimagine and rethink ‘Thainess’ in Thai literature. This holds particular relevance since transnational cultures, ranging from classical Indian mythology to the contemporary Korean wave, continue to be hybridised and reconstructed. This paper examines the hybridity of Thainess in contemporary Thai literature, focusing on two different genres: fantasy and fanfiction. Firstly, I explore the fantasy novel series ‘Nawa Himmaphan’ [New Himmaphan] (2013–2018), depicting an apocalypse and creating a new world inspired by the Indian mythical forest named Himavanta. The novel adapts and reinterprets the roles and meanings of Deva (the god) and Asura (the demon) in an upside-down future. Secondly, I examine an adaptation of the Ramakien, the Thai version of the Indian Ramayana, published on the internet and transformed into Boys Love (BL) fanfiction referencing Korean idols called ‘Huachai Thotsakan KAIHUN’ [The Heart of Thotsakan KAIHUN] (2016–2017). It reconstructs the Ramakien, challenging its traditional meaning while asserting the aesthetics of K-pop fans. Through the lens of the hybridity framework, this paper argues that these texts not only illustrate cross-regional cultural hybridisation but also challenge the top-down construction of Thainess. Hybridity creates a ‘liminal space’ for Thainess, establishing a new power structure that highlights the significance of marginalised voices against the backdrop of political polarisation and the influence of transnational flows.