Recent studies of the Chinese in Southeast Asia have tended to deconstruct the hybrid, transnational, diasporic, and de-territorialized attributes of ‘Chinese-ness’, and theorize the politics thereof. In contrast, earlier scholarship on the politics of Southeast Asia's ethnic Chinese raised many questions over the positions, rights, and roles associated with being ‘overseas Chinese’. Hence, many analyses of Chinese politics, from suppressed quietude to militant contestation, tended to ask, ‘Why and how was that politics Chinese?’ This article asks, instead, ‘Why and how were the Chinese political?’ within the larger rubric of Southeast Asian politics. It argues that posing the first question helped officialdom, academia and media to determine who among the ‘overseas Chinese’ were friends or foes. Asking the second question, it is argued, involves a boundary-crossing shift that sees the immigrant Chinese engaged in a full spectrum of Southeast Asian politics under the impacts of colonialism and nationalism, and capitalism and anti-capitalism. After exploring the shift in perspective from ‘being Chinese’ to ‘being political’, the article suggests that politics beyond China-oriented positions, state-bound stances, or preoccupations of ethnic identity, particularly in Malaysia transformed Southeast Asia to the point of ‘creating’ a ‘largely Chinese’ state out of Singapore.

As ‘emerging donors' push alternative paradigms of development cooperation ‘beyond aid' onto the global agenda, some scholars discuss those from Asia as presenting culturally specific approaches. These observations echo the claims that aid practitioners and policy makers themselves make about, for example, Japanese forms of development. In this article, I caution against scholars repeating these culturally essentialising arguments that promote certain political interests. Instead, I propose that we ‘take seriously' these aid actors’ instrumental culturalist views as ethnographic artefacts—that is, as logics and practices that our interlocutors use. By taking what I call instrumental culturalism as the object of study, rather than the analytical frame, this article shows that the work of comparisons plays a central role in producing culturalist worldviews. In short, culturalism is performative, creating that which it names. If we are to understand the “beyond aid” agenda, we need to attend to the ways that the production of culturalisms through the work of comparisons informs development actors’ understandings of social organisation and global interaction.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Borneo – supposedly one of the most isolated islands on the planet – became a trans-national site of growing importance. Instead of being imagined as a site of endless forests, inaccessible mountains, and undisturbed nature, Borneo became a place to extract and move objects, many of them spinning off into international circuits. The British and Dutch, who became the dual colonial overlords of the island, became the primary actors in facilitating these movements. Yet Asian actors – such as the Chinese, Malays, and various Dayak peoples – also were heavily involved in these transits. The first part of this essay looks at the role of geology and minerals in effecting these transitions. The second part of the paper examines the movement of biota, especially vis-a-vis Chinese networks, in connecting Borneo to other shores. Finally, the third part of the essay looks at contraband cargoes of diverse origins in also facilitating these connections. I argue that far from being an isolated and ‘off-the-beaten-track’ locale, Borneo became central to new ideas of trans-national connection in Southeast Asia, linking people, commodities, and trade circuits into an ever-tightening embrace.

Remittances from the Vietnamese diaspora have played an important role in Vietnam's post-Cold War economic development, providing important inputs to a range of household spending areas, from education to health care. In the case of Vietnam, however, remittances are also caught up with memories and traumas of war, betrayal, separation, and exodus. This article traces that history and illustrates how Vietnam's particular post-war refugee and remittance situations and channels illuminate networks and exacerbate inherent contradictions and comparisons in the mobile flows of finance, people, and goods across borders. Examining genealogies of remittance reception and management offers insight and intervention into analytical assumptions of the distancing and mediating functions inherent to classic conceptions of money, as well as the reciprocity and recognition perceptions mapped onto gift economies.

This article synthesizes and links together evidence published thus far in secondary literature, in order to highlight the contribution of Nusantara to the genesis and circulation of various forms of Sanskritic Buddhism across Asia from the fifth to the fourteenth century. It places particular emphasis on its expansion via maritime routes. Archaeological vestiges and textual sources suggest that Nusantara was not a periphery, but played a constitutive, Asia-wide role as both a crossroads and terminus of Buddhist contacts since the early centuries of the Common Era. Sumatra, Java, and the Malay Peninsula hosted major centres of Buddhist worship and higher learning that were fully integrated into the trans-Asian maritime network of trade, diplomacy, and pilgrimage. Frequented by some of the most eminent Buddhist personalities of their times, who prompted doctrinal and cultic developments in South and East Asia, Nusantara may have exerted an influence on paradigms of Sanskritic Buddhism across Asia, rather than being a passive recipient of ideas and practices.

The conflict between the Thai state and the Malay-Muslim insurgency in the country's Deep South is one of Southeast Asia's most persistent internal security challenges. The start of the current period of violence dates back to the early 2000s, and since then, a significant number of studies exploring the renewed escalation have been published. In this study, we argue that existing scholarship has not adequately accounted for the external environment in which political decisions were taken on how to deal with the southern insurgency. We seek to show how the internationally dominant, hegemonic security agenda of so-called non-traditional security (NTS) influenced the Thai government's approach to the conflict. Building upon the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory, we show how the insurgency became securitised under the dominant NTS narrative, leading to the adoption of harsh measures and alienating discourses that triggered the escalation of violence that continues today. The specific NTS frameworks that ‘distorted’ the Thai state's approach of one that had been informed solely by local facts and conditions were those of anti-narcotics and Islamist terrorism, albeit in different ways. Based on the findings from the case study, the article concludes with a reflection on the role of the hegemonic NTS agenda and its implications for Southeast Asian politics and scholarship.

Indonesia, like many other countries, has encountered a slew of social, political, economic, and public health challenges in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to these challenges, the Indonesian government implemented security measures by instituting large-scale social restrictions (Indonesian: Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar) and, later, micro-scale social restrictions (Pemberlakukan Pembatasan Kegiatan Masyarakat) to restrict people's mobility and virus transmission. Using securitisation theory as a framework, this article examines how the nationwide dilemma between public health and economic security arose. Based on official documents, government papers, and political speeches, this study reveals how the country's COVID-19 responses were largely defined by carefully constructed and flexible measures known as the ‘gas and brake’ policy (Kebijakan Gas dan Rem), which were aimed at resolving the health-economic dilemma. This policy is deemed appropriate given the country's limited public health and economic resources, despite the fact that many argue that such an approach reflects indecisiveness and a lack of coordination among the country's authorities. This article also demonstrates that policymakers in Indonesia use this policy to resolve the securitisation dilemma by reinforcing the hierarchical ordering of security sectors as a readjustment strategy. The policy is used to justify tightening or easing social restrictions by changing the security narrative throughout the pandemic.

The conflicts shaping territorial claims and counter-claims to overlapping areas of the South China Sea threatens to significantly damage Sino-Vietnamese relations, destabilize regional security arrangements, and alter the geopolitical status quo. The governments of both countries routinely invoke historical documents, commission scientific studies, and cite legal principles to justify their competing claims in the maritime region and the resources contained therein. The role different types of energy infrastructure play in the state-level disputes have received little attention, however. This essay addresses this oversight. In it, I foreground the complex ways not yet built infrastructure affect Sino-Vietnamese relations as well as our theoretical understanding of “the state”, especially with regard to Vietnam. Not yet built infrastructure refers to more than the assemblage of things that will be built in the future to power the economy, such as oil rigs, natural gas pipelines, and refineries. The concept also includes the ideological positions that presuppose the materialization of blueprint plans in physical form, i.e., the broader goals such infrastructure is meant to achieve. Towards this end, the article focuses on how state actors and their proxies conceptualize the likely impacts not yet built infrastructure will have upon their respective interests once construction is completed. The case study highlights how the need for energy security strengthens national security at some moments, weakens it at others, and both at still others.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) attracted more than passing interest in the pages of El Renacimiento in the Philippines and Bintang Hindia in the Dutch East Indies. Both publications featured pieces with editorializing tones that indulged in a significant degree of delight at the spectacle of Russian defeats and humiliations at the hands of the Japanese. This article engages in a close reading of this coverage to insert these instances of colonial schadenfreude into the broader trajectories of shaping communities of readers and nationalist awakenings in both colonies. Filipino nationalists in El Renacimiento dropped clear clues likening Russian aggression against Japan, an archipelagic Asian nation like the Philippines, to that which Filipinos experienced under the Americans, thus engaging in a symbolic displacement of that international event into their own historical present. Mocking Russians was part of a nationalist reading of the war that allowed for delight in the spectacle of White humiliation and the prospects of Japanese aid in anti-colonial struggle. The way the Russo-Japanese War was commented on by Bintang Hindia less than ten years before the ‘national awakening’ period was remarkably similar to the reporting in El Renacimiento. This isomorphism between two different historical contexts allows us to examine the role that mockery of Europeans played in forming a community of readers, nationalism, and the gradual undermining of the ideas of White supremacy on which colonialism was predicated.

Local citizens’ perceptions of their own cities are often neglected when assessing cities’ performance. Using the perceived international image and collective pride in Hong Kong as the entry point, this article aims to discover the relationship between citizens’ trust in public authorities and urban technologies. Four angles of investigation are developed: the impact of cities’ promotion of their international image on local pride; the attitudinal and demographic characteristics of proud citizens; the linkage of local pride with public trust, and digital trust. This article uses data from a Hong Kong-based territory-wide survey in 2021 to conduct the analysis. The result suggests that public trust is an elemental factor having a positive relationship with collective pride and digital trust in Hong Kong. This article also identifies the group of citizens with the least pride. Regaining the citizen's trust is the best remedy for facilitating smart city development.

The literature on civility navigates the gravitational pulls of binary camps: civility sceptics tend to emphasize how it operates as an instrument of power; civility optimists tend to emphasize its emancipatory potentials. While some scholarship has attempted to reconcile these perspectives by showing how civility can be both negative and positive, such theorization tends to describe this relation in terms of ambivalence. While these approaches rightly indicate that normative judgments about civility are largely a matter of perspective, the concept of twisted civility developed here focuses on the ways in which actors become trapped by the dynamic shifts of force embedded within civility. Comparisons across seemingly incommensurate examples suggest that such multidirectional dynamics are not culturally specific but rather more generalizable. Building our theoretical conception of twisted civility from a comparative approach based on research in Kuching and Saigon, and then using the concept to consider examples from the United States and Denmark, this article also reverses the direction of theorizing typically employed in scholarship on civility. Using postcolonial Southeast Asia as the source of theory rather than its afterthought, the method here uses anthropological comparison to generate theory and to problematize assumptions that universalize Euro-American trajectories of civility.

In the last decades, demand-side populist policies (DSPPs) have played a significant yet controversial role in Thai politics. Most Thai economists disagree with DSPPs. They have argued that such policies are inefficient and have suggested the Thai government drop short-sighted DSPPs and replace them with supply-side policies that are more effective in the long run. However, Thai politicians have viewed DSPPs as unavoidable for political reasons and turned a deaf ear on economists’ suggestions to stop issuing them. In this paper, we argue that the domination of the neoclassical economics paradigm prevents Thai economists and politicians from understanding the role of DSPPs in shaping the demand and supply sides of the macroeconomy in both the short run and long run. Based on the theory of transformational growth, DSPPs are endogenous phenomena emerging from Thailand's uneven economic development. Therefore, Thailand could implement the policies to facilitate long-run economic growth. We propose three principles for future DSPPs that can positively impact the economy in the long run: boosting productivity, promoting innovation, and addressing income inequality.

Scholarly treatments of the human rights agenda tend to posit civil society organisations (CSOs) as its defender and the state and mainstream political actors as its violators. Even when raising the problem of an ‘uncivil society’, the literature labels these CSOs as reactive and hostile to the human rights agenda they perceive as ‘Western’ and ‘foreign’. I argue that these treatments of the issue overlook another phenomenon: the emergence of CSOs that adopted the language of human rights and participated in its formal processes yet subtly redefined, subverted, and undermined the core commitments of the human rights agenda. This paper discusses such developments by referencing right-wing non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Malaysia that redefined the parameters of the human rights agenda to undercut state commitments to protect religious freedom, sexuality rights, and gender minorities. Through actor and discourse tracing, this paper illustrates how right-wing Islamist NGOs employed a novel two-pronged strategy that no longer openly repudiated the human rights agenda but continued to erode, eviscerate, and reformulate its contents and principles. The first prong involved institutional measures of ‘getting in’ to gain legitimacy by participating as a stakeholder within local and international human rights processes. The second prong encompassed social strategies of ‘pushing out’, whereby actors and their networks mobilised populist pressure to expose, ostracise, and subvert established human rights norms, institutions, and actors.

The peoples who inhabit the states that lie in the direct paths of typhoons in the Western North Pacific share a common history of repeated dislocation, destruction, and death that delimits a zone of comparative enquiry and historiographical interest. The track left by typhoons across ocean and land perfectly outline the dimensions of a more transnational historical region encompassing the Philippines, Vietnam, China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the island states of Micronesia. The peoples of these lands are bound together by a common experience of risk. Wind and water together offer a radical alternative historiography to state-centred master narratives that are revealed by pursuing issues and questions that transcend the spatial and temporal boundaries of any one state or region.

This article examines limitations present in India–Indonesia bilateral trade relations. Since January 2019, India has imposed higher import tariffs on Indonesian refined, bleached, deodorised palm oil (RBDPO) than those imposed on Indonesia's main competitor Malaysia. This tariff policy weakened Indonesia's exports, given that India is Indonesia's third-largest export destination for palm oil. To overcome these tariff disparities, the Indonesian government responded with a trade-off strategy, offering to lower its import tariffs on India's raw sugar in exchange for a reduction in India's import tariffs on Indonesia's RBDPO. However, this strategy has thus far failed to generate a satisfying outcome for Indonesia. This article examines the obstacles in enacting such a strategy from the Indonesian perspective. By mobilising the concept of reluctance in international politics, this article argues that India's reluctance hinders Indonesia's trade-off strategy. This reluctance is evidenced by India's hesitation and recalcitrance, resulting in delays, and reversal of policy as well as ignoring Indonesian requests regarding the trade-off strategy. This could indicate that India does not prioritise Indonesia in its Indo-Pacific vision, particularly in enhancing cooperation with Southeast Asian nations, particularly Indonesia.

In 1913, a new generation of Indonesians asserted their agency by publicly demanding equality in colonial society. Through four case studies—the prohibition of traditional forms of deference, the sudden popularity of Western dress, the adoption of new legal assimilation guidelines for Indonesians, and the discussion of employee rights at a railway company—we argue that this new assertiveness reflected a broad change in mentality that we consider a turning point in Indonesian history. By focusing on Indonesian agency, we challenge the Eurocentric periodization of the Indonesian past that emphasized WWI as a trigger of change.

On September 2015, countries around the world pledged to end poverty, protect the planet, and hit specific developmental targets within fifteen years at the signing of th|e United Nations 2030 Agenda. Within the 2030 Agenda are seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Goal 16 of the SDG contains twelve targets; of these, Target 16.3 is aimed at ensuring equal access to justice for all and Target 16.10 at ensuring public access to information. Malaysia as a signatory has pledged its commitment to fulfilling these SDGs. This paper's primary focus is on the fulfilment of Targets 16.3 and 16.10 within Malaysia's legal environmental framework. At present, there are provisions that ensure equal access to justice and those that ensure public access to information; however, it is suggested that these are insufficient, uncommon, and limited. This paper proposes an amendment to the Federal Constitution to include the express right to a clean environment, and demonstrates, through comparative study, the success similar provisions have had on the environmental protection laws of other countries such as India, the Philippines, South Africa, Nepal, the Netherlands, and Nigeria. It then considers what possible lessons Malaysia could glean from these national experiences in fulfilling its goals for Targets 16.3 and 16.10 before concluding with the proposition that Malaysia should consider an express constitutional right to a clean environment if she intends to meet her SDG goals.

This article investigates whether and how local livelihood issues are linked to international development policy and practices in the Mekong River Basin under a two-level game approach. Based on field research and interviews with villagers, and national and international policy makers associated with two hydroelectric dam projects, four key livelihood issues that are central to local communities, but are not currently considered important in international development policy and practices, are described. Fundamental to these issues is the problem that existing frameworks of international institutions do not consider local communities and citizens as legitimate participants at the international level. It is argued that the linkages between local- and international-layer institutions are not established by considering only policy issues and interests of nation-states; the focus of existing frameworks of international institutions. A major challenge for international development planning in the Mekong River Basin is establishing direct linkages between local livelihood issues and international development institutions.

This study explores and understands transnational activism in Asia, specifically focusing on the crucial role played by individuals, particularly Thai youth activist Netiwit Chotiphatphaisal, in shaping and constructing transnational networks and relations. The study argues that the networks individuals establish with other transnational actors serve as the primary source of inspiration for other individuals to engage in transnational activism. These networks are rooted in everyday life interactions in the era of globalisation, with activism reflecting this embeddedness and interconnectedness. The case study of Netiwit demonstrates how connections between Thai activists and activists in Hong Kong and Taiwan stem from the increased mobility of individuals in the globalised world, facilitating physical interactions. By analysing this dynamic, the study aims to offer a more nuanced explanation of transnational activism, the movement of knowledge, and the concept of globalisation in Asia.