This article provides an argument against ethical subjectivism as a normative theory. It highlights how ethical subjectivism does not correspond with the phenomena of how we argue. Ethical subjectivism suggests that ethics is a matter of subjective preferences, but we do not usually enter into a serious debate on such matters. On the contrary, when we argue we believe that what we argue for is objectively true. This may pose a serious problem to an ethical subjectivist who holds that ethical conceptions are neither superior nor inferior to each other. The article also outlines the implications of the position of an ethical subjectivist and how they go against our deepest moral intuition that ‘might is not right’.

In this essay, I introduce an imaginative method for transforming reasoned arguments of specialists into a form that is engaging and accessible to nonspecialists. I begin by reviewing a passage in Plato in which the method is used. I then develop an example of the method for a modern context. I conclude with reasons that philosophy ought to concern itself to engage the general public using imaginative methods of this kind.

According to the fairness argument, same-sex marriage must be permitted because without it there would not be equal treatment for homosexuals and heterosexuals. In (THINK 36), Piers Benn holds that the argument does eventually deliver this conclusion, but not as readily as intuitively appears. He concludes that some conservative points against same-sex marriage achieve at least a stand-off from the point of view of the argument. I argue that he accords the conservative points much more significance than they actually deserve and misconstrues the metaphysical dimension that is an important part of how the fairness argument operates.

In the closing chapters of Book III of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke makes what seems to be an astounding error. What it is and why he appears to do it provides the meat of the tenth Conversation between John Locke and Terence Moore.

This article develops a conception of free will as a type of skill based upon the knowledgeable exercise of cognitive abilities. Critiques of some traditional accounts of free will are advanced; and a view is proposed in which acts of free will are those purposively controlled (caused) by acquired information and the learned ‘know-how’ of deliberation. What makes an act of will free is not that one theoretically could have done otherwise under the specific circumstances, but that one does in fact do otherwise than act in an uninformed, unreflective and thoughtless manner. Implications for moral responsibility are examined.

In his Does God have a Nature, Alvin Plantinga aims to explore three interrelated questions: (i) does God have a nature? (ii) if so, is there a conflict between God's sovereignty and his having a nature? and (iii) how is God related to such abstract objects as properties and propositions? It seems clear from the introduction of the book, however, that his main and primary concern is to support two Divine widely accepted attributes namely God's aseity and sovereignty.

What is art? Marcel Duchamp made this question pertinent when he developed his ‘Readymades’: ordinary, manufactured objects that he presented as art. In this paper, I use pragmatics – the branch of linguistics concerned with language use in context, and which has its historical roots in the philosophy of language – to argue that, if we accept that art is a form of communication, from artist to audience, then Duchamp was correct to claim that anything can be art, so long as it is presented as such.

What would happen if one morning you wake up clumsy, as if your sense of touch were unreliable, arbitrarily on and off? And what would this clumsiness look like if we could transfer it to the moral sense? The article expounds an interesting analogy between the sense of touch, loosely construed, and the moral sense: just as a sort of consistency is necessary for the sense of touch to do its job, so it is for the moral sense to play its part. Touch enables us to navigate the everyday world of coffee pots and staircases; our moral sensibility comes into play when we act or when we judge our actions and those of others, and plays a directive role in what we feel, how we feel it, and how we react to it. Taking the analogy further, I will suggest that inconsistency causes, in both cases, a certain clumsiness, and that clumsiness is linked to arbitrariness – like the person that helps others in dire need, but only does so on some rainy days.

There are good reasons to think that mothers love their children, and love them for who they are. There are also good reasons to think that contingent events can decisively influence who one becomes. This entails, I argue, that your mother does not love you for who you are.

2014 marked the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War. This paper considers whether there are moral reasons to remember wars. It is argued that the most convincing reason for remembering wars is that they provide valuable lessons about human nature. The First World War elucidates several aspects of human nature, including our tribalism, sheepishness, drive for honour and over-confidence. Taking heed of these lessons may help avert future conflict.

Philosophy's role is typically a reflective one. Yet this stance is in peril of being corrupted. Because it is being driven to specialized inquiries, the subdisciplines of which it is comprised may develop into separate fields, whose presence will then need to be justified in the same way the sciences are. This is impossible, however, given their diverging objectives. If this course of action persist, philosophy's end in the sense of its ending is imminent, on account of its no longer having an end in the sense of its objective.

Critical thinking is widely regarded as one of the main objectives of education in general terms, and also of science education. The idea of thinking critically, that is, to evaluate adequately and eventually embrace a certain claim only if there are good reasons for it, however, seems to contradict some popular conceptions about other educational ideal: open-mindedness. The purpose of this essay is to discuss how critical thinking and open-mindedness are not exclusionary ideals, and how those ideas are important for science education.

This paper shows that a recent, simplified version of St. Anselm's proof of the existence of God has its flank open to Gaunilo's ‘Lost Island’ objection. Reformulating Anselm's line of reasoning in terms of the distinction between mediated and unmediated causal powers, as the simplified proof does, makes it harder for Anselm's supporters to refute the objection that the ontological argument absurdly entails the existence of all kinds of fictional entities.

Many highly educated people think religious belief is irrational and unscientific. If you ask a philosopher, however, you'll likely get two answers: most religious belief is rational in some respects and irrational in other respects. In this essay I explain why they think religious belief is rational. In a sequel essay I explain why they think the very same beliefs are irrational.