Although the principles of refrigeration have been understood for thousands of years, the widespread use of mechanical refrigeration in the processing, shipping, and storing of perishable commodities began only in the 1890s. Because refrigeration facilitated the hygienic handling and storage of perishables, it promoted output growth, consumption, and nutrition through the spatial and temporal integration of markets for perishables. We estimate the impact of mechanical refrigeration on output and consumption, and hence on human nutrition, concentrating on the contribution from refrigerated dairy products, an important source of nutrients, particularly proteins and calcium. We conclude that the adoption of refrigeration in the late-nineteenth-century United States increased dairy consumption by 1.7% and overall protein intake by 1.25% annually after the 1890s. The increase in protein consumption was particularly important to the growth of the human organism. According to our lower-bound estimates, refrigeration directly contributed at least 5.1% of the increase in adult stature of the postrefrigeration cohorts, and combined with the indirect effects associated with improvements in the quality of nutrients and the reduction in illness, the overall impact was considerably larger.

Height at young and adult ages reflects the cumulative nutritional experience of the individual both during the growth years and during the fetal period. Hence, mean height in a population is not only an indicator of economic fortune but also a predictor of morbidity and mortality (Waaler 1984; Barker et al. 1990; Fogel, Haines, et al. 1991; Costa 1993). Economic historians have been able to use time series of heights to describe trends in economic well-being and in mortality (Fogel, Engerman, and Trussell 1982; Margo and Steckel 1982; Fogel 1986; Brinkman et al. 1988; Floud et al. 1990). Cross-sectional analyses of the determinants of heights have provided clues to changes in morbidity and mortality trends. Investigations of heights have taken advantage of the significant quantities of military records that are available. The data obtained from military muster rolls for the United States consist of name, age, height, occupation, place and date of enlistment, and place of birth.

The rise of voluntary associations in the late nineteenth century has received significant scholarly attention over the last few decades. Some studies argue that modernization facilitates group formation, but other analyses (e.g., Crowley and Skocpol 2001; Gamm and Putnam 1999) find little support for the argument that modernization caused group formation. Here, we extend this debate to the study of the strength of state-level, voluntary associations with clear political objectives. Using state-level dues paid to national organizations as a measure of group strength, we find evidence that more modernized states typically had the strongest state-level organizations in the 1880s and 1890s. These empirical findings lend support to the modernization thesis but also suggest that group formation and strength may be explained by different processes.

Historians and economists have increasingly identified capitalist patterns of behavior among antebellum slave owners, yet no consensus has emerged about the explanation for this finding. I argue that US slave owners were driven to behave like capitalists in part because of their dependence on credit. The ability of creditors to seize the land and slaves of insolvent debtors generated selection pressures that led to both aggregate patterns of capitalist development and the adaptation of individual slave owners to the logic of capitalist competition. I refer to this process as “credit market discipline.” In a case study of South Carolina in the 1840s, I show that the threat and reality of foreclosure was capable of stimulating recognizably capitalist behaviors among even the most aristocratic and “prebourgeois” slave owners.

The belief that West and Central Africans and their descendants in the New World enjoy an innate immunity or resistance to yellow fever persists in the writings of many historians. They offer three arguments that such a racial immunity actually exists: first, that a consensus on the matter prevailed among historical observers of the disease; second, that patterns of lethality during yellow fever epidemics demonstrate it to be true; and third, because a heritable resistance to malaria is known to have spread within these populations, a similar resistance to yellow fever must have developed as well. But in fact there was never a consensus among medical observers that black immunity to yellow fever actually existed, the evidence from epidemics indicates that in fact it did not, and the analogy to the very real and well-documented evolutionary consequences of endemic malaria is not apt. As there is no evidence supporting the belief of black immunity to yellow fever, it is time for historians to discard it.

Critics of identity politics often wax polemically as they charge contemporary social movements with narrowly and naively engaging in essentialist politics based on perceived differences from the majority. Such essentialism, critics charge, inhibits coalition building (e.g., Phelan 1993; Kimmel 1993), cannot produce meaningful social change, and reinforces hegemonic and restrictive social categories (Seidman 1997). It is even responsible for the decline of the Left (Gitlin 1994, 1995). Social movement scholars similarly view “identity movements” as cultural rather than political movements whose goals, strategies, and forms of mobilization can be explained better by a reliance on static notions of identity than by other factors.

At a ceremony held in 1986 to install a bust of Martin Luther King, Jr., alongside those of other national heroes in the U.S. Capitol, former King associate Vincent Harding reminded the audience that King himself probably would have joined the demonstrators outside the Capitol protesting American policy in Central America (Thelen 1987: 436). Harding’s comment captures the tension between commemoration and dissent, or, better, between state-sponsored remembrance and state-targeted opposition that is the subject of this essay.

Process is a ubiquitous word in social science history. It appears dozens of times in such fundamental texts as Wallace 1969, Hershberg 1969, and Wolf 1982. Social science historians generally use it, as Berkhofer (1969: 169-87, 243-44) observes, to characterize the causes of change and persistence in human communities as organic or mechanical phenomena that are intelligible, general, systematic, repetitive, orderly, and similar in sequence. The concept of process is pivotal to our understanding of the daily flux of human interaction, the workings of institutions, the character of collective action, and the course of social evolution (Turner 1977; Wallace 1970: 165-206).

The rise and fall of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, and the life of its founder and mentor, Paul Lazarsfeld should ideally be presented as a drama by Brecht, accompanied by the dissonant and jazzy music of pre-Nazi Central Europe, and its depression-time equivalent in the United States (from “Brother, Can You Spare a Dime” to “Happy Days are Here Again!”).

The concept of the university applied social research organization (all the adjectives are necessary) was born in the mind of a social activist student in the intellectual hothouse of Vienna between the World Wars. He wanted new methods of research to help bring radical social change; he had to start by studying soap-buying. He created a penniless research center in a near-bankrupt society, and found his friends jobs studying the unemployed.

Although some scholars treat racial residential segregation in northern cities as a twentieth-century phenomenon, recent research on New York and Chicago has shown that black-white segregation was already high and rising by 1880. We draw on data from the Philadelphia Social History Project and other new sources to study trends in this city as far back as 1850 and extending to 1900, a time when DuBois had completed his epic study of The Philadelphia Negro. Segregation of “free negroes” in Philadelphia was high even before the Civil War but did not increase as the total and black populations grew through 1900. Geocoded information from the full-count data from the 1880 Census makes it possible to map the spatial configuration of black residents in fine detail. At the scale of the street segment, segregation in that year was extraordinarily high, reflecting a micropattern in which many blacks lived in alleys and short streets. Although there was considerable class variation in the black community, higher-status black households lived in areas that were little different in racial and class composition than lower-status households.

In 1965 Morris David Morris, by questioning the view that British rule had led to the impoverishment of the Indian people, reopened the debate about the course of Indian economic welfare in the nineteenth century. Aspects of the question continue to concern scholars.

National identity is hegemonic among the population of Jewish descent in Israel. Zionism, modern Jewish nationalism, originated in eastern Europe in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. A national movement without a territory, Zionism naturally adopted the ethnic, or integrative, type of nationalism that prevailed in the region (for a basic typology of nationalism see Smith 1986: 79-84). In Palestine the diasporic Jewish nationalism turned into a settler-colonial nationalism. The state of Israel inherited the ethnic principle of membership and never adopted the alternative liberal-territorial principle. To this day the dominant ethos of the state is Zionist, that is, Jewish nationalist. Though Israeli citizenship is de jure equal to Jews and Arabs, a de facto distinction is easily discernible between the dominated minority and the dominant majority and its state.

A new research agenda within political science and economics has been devoted to elucidating the development of medieval representative institutions. However, if we wish to get a clearer grasp of the birth of representative institutions, much more detailed data are needed. This paper introduces and interrogates a new data set on assemblies in one of the first instances where representative institutions arose: the Crown of Aragon. An analysis of these new data, which cover the period 1100–1327, supports several important conclusions. First, the development of representative institutions took place in a couple of brief “bursts” of activity. Second, factors pertaining to the establishment of public order (land peace and the regulation of succession) feature as more important than “geopolitical” factors (war and taxation) in the early part of the period, but the latter factors become more important after assemblies turn representative; indeed, they turn out to be crucial for understanding how assemblies eventually came to constrain rulers. A comparison with the only other early case of representative institutions on which there are good data, thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century England, supports a third finding: There is a striking, temporal parallelism in the development of representative institutions across the two realms.

Although individual and personal, names take on their significance in social interaction. Since the context of social interaction changes with immigration, names can be expected to change as well. In this paper, we use information from the Public Use Sample of the 1910 U.S. census to compare the patterns of personal (given) names of first- and second-generation Italian and Jewish immigrants and native-born whites of native parentage, and to examine the association of naming patterns of immigrants with several measures indicating interaction with those outside the ethnic group. Because the information from the census is at a single point in time, we also draw on interviews with elderly Italian and Jewish women in order to provide more direct evidence of change and of the contexts in which this change occurred.

There is substantial debate over the colonial origins of divergence within the Americas. In this debate, the French Empire has been largely ignored even though, until 1760, it included Canada. This article uses recent empirical advances in our knowledge of the colonial Canadian economy to introduce the role of French institutions—most notably the institution of seigneurial tenure—into the debate on the colonial origins of divergence. It argues that the institution of seigneurial tenure in Canada when it was under French rule (up to 1760) had predatory features that help to explain why Canada was the poorest of the North American colonies.

The quantity theory of money is applied to the paper money regimes of seven of the nine British North American colonies south of New England. Individual colonies, and regional groupings of contiguous colonies treated as one monetary unit, are tested. Little to no statistical relationship, and little to no magnitude of influence, between the quantities of paper money in circulation and prices are found. The quantity theory of money does not explain the value and performance of colonial paper monies well. This is a general and widespread result, and not a rare and isolated phenomenon.

The societal integration of immigrants is a great concern in many of today’s Western societies, and has been so for a long time. Whether we look at Europe in 2015 or the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, large flows of immigrants pose challenges to receiving societies. While much research has focused on the socioeconomic integration of immigrants there has been less interest in their demographic integration, even though this can tell us as much about the way immigrants fare in their new home country. In this article we study the disparities in infant and child mortality across nativity groups and generations, using new, high-density census data. In addition to describing differentials and trends in child mortality among 14 immigrant groups relative to the native-born white population of native parentage, we focus special attention on the association between child mortality, immigrant assimilation, and the community-level context of where immigrants lived. Our findings indicate substantial nativity differences in child mortality, but also that factors related to the societal integration of immigrants explains a substantial part of these differentials. Our results also point to the importance of spatial patterns and contextual variables in understanding nativity differentials in child mortality.

When African-American workers broke labor strikes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were acting in opposition to established social norms concerning race, class, community, and the state. Imagine platoons of African-American men who ordinarily lacked protection of their most basic civil rights escorted by police into a hostile European-American community to take the jobs of European-American workers who were expressing their working-class consciousness through a labor union that excluded their fellow African-American workers. Scholars have interpreted African-American strikebreaking as an example of the ethnic stratification characteristic of the American working class (Bonacich 1976; Gutman 1962, 1987; Foner and Lewis 1979, 1980; Spero and Harris 1931). What was its political-economic context? That is the central question of this essay.

Historical and social scientific explanations often rely on major happenings and crises to define the topics of our inquiries or to delineate historical periods. But these models often prove limited and problematic. The challenge is to understand how action unfolds in a crisis and, in the process, reconfigures resources, opportunities, and horizons of possibility for new lines of strategic response. These questions are addressed through a comparison of Herbert Hoover and Harry Hopkins as they dealt with the onset of the Great Depression. Both men had the skills, network ties, and reputational resources that figure centrally in models of effective agency, but the contemporary assessments of their efforts differed dramatically. This pair of lives—Hoover and Hopkins—permits a cross-sectional comparison as both men wrestled with the onset of economic collapse and a sequential comparison as Hopkins inherited responsibility for relieving a crisis that had been shaped and reshaped by Hoover's actions.

The Great Migration from the South and the rise of racial residential segregation strongly shaped the twentieth-century experience of African Americans. Yet, little attention has been devoted to how the two phenomena were linked, especially with respect to the individual experiences of the migrants. We address this gap by using novel data that links individual records from the complete-count 1940 Census to those in the 2000 Census long form, in conjunction with information about the level of racial residential segregation in metropolitan areas in 1940 and 2000. We first consider whether migrants from the South and their children experienced higher or lower levels of segregation in 1940 relative to their counterparts who were born in the North or who remained in the South. Next, we extend our analysis to second-generation Great Migration migrants and their segregation outcomes by observing their location in 2000. Additionally, we assess whether second-generation migrants experience larger decreases in their exposure to segregation as their socioeconomic status increases relative to their southern and/or northern stayer counterparts. Our study significantly advances our understanding of the Great Migration and the “segregated century.”