In 1833-1874, Spain suffered 0.7 coups per year. By contrast, the Restoration (1874-1923) saw the eradication of successful coups. This can be partially attributed to the turno pacífico, which allowed the main political parties to alternate in office without dragging the military into politics. We suggest, however, that the reduction in coup risk was also associated with a conscious budget policy. This, though, did not rely on increases in total military expenditure (which actually stagnated during most of the Restoration), but on the steady improvement of officers' remunerations and promotions. This strategy was probably detrimental to Spanish military capacity abroad, but was consistent with the objective of keeping the military out of politics.

This article presents estimates of the financial costs incurred by Portugal with the Colonial War (1961-1974). The results obtained show that, on average, the extraordinary expenses most directly related with the war represented 22% of Portuguese state expenditure, equivalent to 3.1% of GDP. They also show that the total costs incurred by Portugal with the Colonial War amounted to between 21.8 billion euros and 29.8 billion euros, at today's prices and in the present-day currency. By estimating a dynamic model, it was also possible to identify a positive relationship between the extraordinary military expenditure on the defence and security of the overseas provinces—which included the budgetary costs of war—and Portuguese economic growth. The conclusions reached represent a valuable contribution to contemporary economic history.

Socio-natural disasters remain underexplored events in economic history, even though they stress societies in several ways and are known for their relationship with institutional change. In this paper, we explore this issue showing that major earthquakes in Chile have become a window of opportunity for important fiscal reforms. Our findings indicate that there are two mechanisms to explain this relationship: first, reconstruction demands greater state expenditure and intervention; and second, the emergence of narratives that justify these reforms, such as patriotism and solidarity. However, data show that in the case of Chile, changes following disasters have had little impact on the overall tax structure of the country, and the historical preference for indirect taxes has been maintained, with limited power to impose taxes on high-income groups.

This paper revisits the political economy during Spanish rule in America by reappraising the allegedly positive impact that intra-imperial transfers (situados) had on the Caribbean economy. It raises concerns concerning categories such as bargaining and absolutism and their accuracy in accounting for the nature of Spanish imperial rule. Three main findings are reported. Firstly, it seems inaccurate to hold that all remittances were injected into the economy with positive effects. Liquidity apparently provoked a real estate bubble. Secondly, the local market was not necessarily sensitive to the arrival of bullion. Finally, jurisdictional fragmentation allowed the king to issue debt in a disorderly fashion and with no constraints, and local officials and groups of interests to behave as free riders.

This paper explores Alexis de Tocqueville's thought on fiscal political economy as a forerunner of the modern school of preference falsification and rational irrationality in economic decision making. A good part of the literature has misrepresented Tocqueville as an unconditional optimist regarding the future of fiscal moderation under democracy. Yet, although he initially shared the cautious optimism of most classical economists with respect to taxes under extended suffrage, Tocqueville's view turned more pessimistic in the second volume of his Democracy in America. Universal enfranchisement and democratic governments would lead to higher taxes, more intense income redistribution and government control. Under democracy, the continuous search for unconditional equality would eventually jeopardise liberty and economic growth.

The South American Funds National Exchequer was established in 1818 to contribute to the consolidation of the public debt of Buenos Aires. It was the first financial innovation since the revolutionary outbreak in Buenos Aires, and its failure allowed the authorities to understand the limits of the fiscal and financial commitment they proposed by means of that institution. Its suppression, in 1821, offered an antecedent to develop a deep reform of the financial institutional matrix of Buenos Aires, based on the Public Credit office, the Amortization Exchequer and the Bank of Buenos Aires. The South American Funds National Exchequer was, thus, the first movement in the negotiation on the terms of the financial commitment assumed by the nascent State. This paper analyzes the 973 accounting entries of the institution, providing an interpretation of that failure and its importance for the course of public finances in Buenos Aires.