Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T15:26:24.289Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

FISCAL PESSIMISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: TOCQUEVILLE'S CROSS REVISITED

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 March 2021

Isabel Cepeda Open the ORCID record for Isabel Cepeda [Opens in a new window]  and
Pedro Fraile Balbín
Isabel Cepeda
Affiliation:
Universidad Rey Juan Carlosa
Pedro Fraile Balbín
Affiliation:
Universidad Carlos III de Madridb
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper explores Alexis de Tocqueville's thought on fiscal political economy as a forerunner of the modern school of preference falsification and rational irrationality in economic decision making. A good part of the literature has misrepresented Tocqueville as an unconditional optimist regarding the future of fiscal moderation under democracy. Yet, although he initially shared the cautious optimism of most classical economists with respect to taxes under extended suffrage, Tocqueville's view turned more pessimistic in the second volume of his Democracy in America. Universal enfranchisement and democratic governments would lead to higher taxes, more intense income redistribution and government control. Under democracy, the continuous search for unconditional equality would eventually jeopardise liberty and economic growth.

Resumen

RESUMEN

Este artículo explora el pensamiento de Alexis de Tocqueville sobre la economía política fiscal como precursor de la escuela moderna de falsificación de preferencias e irracionalidad racional en la toma de decisiones económicas. Tradicionalmente, Tocqueville aparece en la literatura como un pensador optimista sobre los efectos de moderación que la democracia política ejercería sobre el aumento de la presión fiscal. Sin embargo, aunque inicialmente compartió el cauteloso optimismo de la mayoría de los economistas clásicos con respecto a los impuestos bajo el sufragio extendido, la opinión de Tocqueville se volvió más pesimista en el segundo volumen de su Democracia en América. El derecho de voto universal y los gobiernos democráticos conducirían a impuestos más altos, una mayor redistribución y más control gubernamental. Bajo la democracia, la búsqueda continua de la igualdad incondicional pondría en peligro la libertad y el crecimiento económico.

Keywords

Alexis de Tocquevilleincome redistributionTocqueville's crossrational irrationalityequalityAlexis de Tocquevilleredistribución de ingresosla Cruz de Tocquevilleirracionalidad racionaligualdadB12D31D91H21D72E62
Type
Articles/Artículos
Information
Revista de Historia Economica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , September 2022 , pp. 349 - 369
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Instituto Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

a

Department of Applied Economics I, Madrid, Spain. [email protected]

b

Getafe, Spain. [email protected]

References

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2012): Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown.Google Scholar
Aidt, T. S., and Jensen, P. S. (2009): «Tax Structure, Size of Government, and the Extension of the Voting Franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938». International Tax and Public Finance, 16 (3), pp. 362-394.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aidt, T. S., Dutta, J., and Loukoianova, E. (2006): «Democracy Comes to Europe: Franchise Extension and Fiscal Outcomes 1830–1938». European Economic Review, 50 (2), pp. 249-283.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Algan, Y., and Cahuc, P. (2010): «Inherited Trust and Growth». American Economic Review, 100 (5), pp. 2060-2092.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ashenfelter, O., and Kelley, S. Jr (1975): «Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections». The Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (3), pp. 695-733.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caplan, B. (2007): The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies-New Edition. Princeton, Nueva Jersey, Estados Unidos: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
De Jasay, A. (1985): The State, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
De Tocqueville, A. (1835). Deuxième Mémoire sur le Pauperism. Available at htto//dx.di.org/doi:10.1522/ 24850019.Google Scholar
De Tocqueville, A. (1965a): [1835]. Democracy in America, vol I, Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.Google Scholar
De Tocqueville, A. (1965b): [1840]. Democracy in America, vol II, Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.Google Scholar
Denzau, A. T., and North, D. C. (1994): «Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions». Kyklos. International Review for Social Sciences 47 (1), pp. 3-31.Google Scholar
Drolet, M. (2003): Tocqueville, Democracy and Social Reform. London: Palgrave MacMillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elazar, D. J. (1999): «Tocqueville and the Cultural Basis of American Democracy». PS: Political Science and Politics 32 (2), pp. 207-210.Google Scholar
Furet, F. (1985): «The Intellectual Origins of Tocqueville's Thought», The Tocqueville's Review 7, pp. 117-129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gannet, R. T. (2003): Tocqueville Unveiled. The Historian and his Sources for the Old Regime and the Revolution. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Grampp, W. D. (1948): «On the Politics of the Classical Economists». The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 62 (5), pp. 714-747.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grondona, M. (1999): Las condiciones culturales del desarrollo económico: hacia una teoría del desarrollo. Buenos Aires: Editorial Planeta.Google Scholar
Harrison, L. E. (1985): Underdevelopment is a State of Mind. The Latin American Case. Boston: Center of International Affairs, Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Harrison, L. E., and Samuel, P. (2000): «Why Culture Matters». in Harrison, L. E. and Huntington, S. P. (eds), Culture Matters. How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books, pp. XVIII-XXXIII.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. (1944): The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Huntington, S. (2000): «Cultures Count», in Harrison, L. E. and Huntington, S. P. (eds), Culture Matters. How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books, pp. 13-16.Google Scholar
Husted, T. A., and Kenny, L. W. (1997): «The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government». Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), 54-82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hutchison, T. W. (1966): Markets and the Franchise. A Review of the Relationships between Economic and Political Choice. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, pp. 7-16.Google Scholar
Jardin, A. (1984): Alexis de Tocqueville, 1805-1859, Mexico: FCE.Google Scholar
Kahan, A. S., and De Tocqueville, A. (2010): Major Conservative and Libertarian Thinkers. New York and London: Continuum.Google Scholar
Kaledin, A. (2005): «Tocqueville's Apocalypse: Culture, Politics and Freedom in Democracy in America», in Guellec, L. (ed.), Tocqueville et L'Esprit de la Démocratie. Paris: Sciences Po Les Pres, pp. 47-102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kalt, J. P., and Zupan, M. A. (1984): «Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics». The American Economic Review 74 (3), pp. 279-300.Google Scholar
Kau, J. B., and Rubin, P. H. (1993): «Ideology, Voting, and Shirking». Public Choice 76, pp. 151-172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kivanc, K., and Pamuk, S. (2013): «Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction between Warfare, Economic Structure and Political Regime». American Political Science Review 107 (3), pp. 603-626.Google Scholar
Leroy, M. (2010): «Tocqueville Pioneer of Fiscal Sociology». European Journal of Sociology 51, pp. 195-239.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lowes, S., Nunn, N., Robinson, J., and Weigel, J. (2015): «The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom». NBER Working Paper, (w21798).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meltzer, A. H., and Richard, S. F. (1978): «Why Government Grows (and Grows) in aDemocracy». The Public interest 52(1), pp. 111-118.Google Scholar
Meltzer, A. H., and Richard, S. F. (1983): «Tests of a Rational Theory of the Size of Government». Public Choice 41, pp. 403-418.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mill, J. S. (1859 [1840]): «Democracy in America». Edinburgh Review, LXIII, October 1840. Reprinted in Mill, J. S. (1859). Dissertations and Discussions. Political, Philosophical, and Historical (Vol. 2). London: John W. Parker and Son.Google Scholar
Nef, J. (1985): «Truth, Belief, and Civilization: Tocqueville and Gobineau». Review of Politics 25(4), pp. 460-482.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nelson, P. (1994): «Voting and Imitative Behavior». Economic Inquiry, 32(1), 92-102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nolla, E. (2012 [1835]): «Editor's Introduction». in de Tocqueville, A. (ed.), Democracy in America, Indianapolis, vol I. Indiana: Liberty Fund, pp. xlvii-cxlix.Google Scholar
Ortega, y Gasset, J. (1983): Ideas y creencias. Obras completas. Madrid: Alianza y Revista de Occidente.Google Scholar
Peacock, A. (1983): «Reducing Government Expenditure Growth: A British View». in Giersch, H. (ed.), Reassessing the Role of Government in the Mixed Economy. Tübingen: Mohr (Paul Siebeck), pp. 1-24.Google Scholar
Peacock, A. (1992): Public Choice in Historical Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peltzman, S. (1980): «The Growth of Government». The Journal of Law and Economics 23 (2), 209-287.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Qualter, T. H. (1960): «John Stuart Mill, Disciple of de Tocqueville». Western Political Quarterly 13 (4), 880-889.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rubin, P. (2001): «Ideology//Elgar Companion to Public Choice/Ed.» Shughart II WF & Razzolini L. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, pp. 328–336.Google Scholar
Schumpeter, J. A. (1991 [1918]): «The Crisis of the Fiscal State», in Swedberg, R. (ed.), Joseph A. Schumpeter. The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 99–140.Google Scholar
Stigler, G. (1986): «Economics or Ethics». in Leube, K. and More, T. G. (eds), The Essence of Stigler. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, pp. 305–336.Google Scholar
Swedberg, R. (2009): Tocqueville's Political Economy. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tabellini, G. (2008): «Presidential Address: Institutions and Culture». Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (2-3), pp. 255–294.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tabellini, G. (2010): «Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe». Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (4), pp. 677-716.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thaler, R. H. (1992): The Winner's Curse. Paradoxes and Anomalies in Economic Life. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Tollison, R. D., and Willet, T. D. (1973): «Some Simple Economics of Voting and Not Voting». Public Choice 16, pp. 59-72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G. (1967): Toward a Mathematics of Politics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Wade, L. L. (1985): «Tocqueville and Public Choice», Public Choice, 47, September.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Winch, D. (1979): Adam Smith's Politics. An Essay in Historiographic Revision. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Young, A. (1892) [1792]: Travels in France. London, United Kingdom: G. Bell and Sons.Google Scholar