The consensus view of today's Congress — that its decentralized structure and dispersed power has pushed it to the edge of chaos — is badly in need of correcting. Despite the legacy of decentralization and fragmentation from the 1960's and 1970's reform era, the 1980's have seen a discernible trend toward leadership and order. Leading elements of this “new centralization” in congressional operations are described in this article. These include: contraction of the legislative workload; limitations in the numbers of participants at crucial junctures; resort to omnibus “mega-bills” to enact controversial policies; high levels of partisanship in voting; resurgence of leadership, especially in the House; and subtle shifts in power within the two chambers, primarily away from authorizing committees and toward fiscal committees. Taken together, these developments denote an institution markedly more cohesive and even hierarchical than portrayed in scholarly or journalistic accounts.

Changes in voting behavior and the party system in the three federal elections since 1980 indicate that West German politics have entered a new transitional phase. The periods of CDU hegemony, 1949–1969, and two party competition, 1972–1980, have passed. Both major parties have lost support, turnout has declined, ticket-splitting has increased and New Politics issues such as the environment, disarmament and civil liberties have become salient to increasing numbers of voters. The influence of social class, religion and regional ties on voting behavior has declined. Electoral behavior has become more volatile and uncertain. Four major sources of these changes are identified: the postwar transformation of German social structure; the changing value priorities of mass publics; the introduction of new issues; and the electoral strategies of the parties as determined by their elites and leaders. The study concludes with a discussion of the future of the party system and the prospects for a major dealignment or realignment in West German politics.

As a contribution to scholarly discussion of Lincoln's place in the American political tradition, this article examines his conception of constitutionalism. Controversy has focused recently on whether Lincoln acted in accordance with the purposes and ideas of the framers, or whether as a wartime president he rejected the constitutionalism of the Founding in favor of a pragmatic, instrumentalist style of leadership that in effect created an organic and unwritten constitution. It has also been suggested that Lincoln's conception of fundamental law can be described as a theory of constitutional aspiration. The article rejects the latter two points of view and argues that Lincoln adhered to the written Constitution of the framers — its forms, procedures, principles, and spirit — and was guided by it in political action aimed at achieving the ideals asserted in the Declaration of Independence. Prudent and practical in his statesmanship, Lincoln possessed in himself and inculcated in the people, constitutionalist conviction that regarded the preservation of republican self-government as the nation's defining and paramount purpose.

In contrast to the United States, where there is little or no public financing of parties and candidates below the presidential level, the German “party state” grants generous subsidies in a variety of forms to the political parties, though not to individual candidates. The German Basic Law (constitution), various laws passed by the national and Land (state) parliaments, and the Federal Constitutional Court have been important factors in the development of a complex and costly system of public financing for election campaigns, parliamentary parties and party foundations and for free television and radio time and billboard advertising space. In addition, the federal government incurs large tax expenditures through the encouragement of tax deductible contributions to political parties. In spite of the crucial role which public financing has assumed, recent scandals have occurred involving illegal contributions from business interests. A revised party law of 1984 and a Federal Constitutional Court decision in July 1986 have brought about significant changes, but controversy in Germany over public financing and the impact of recent reforms continues.

This article examines the doctrine of tyrannicide in John of Salisbury's mid-twelfth century political treatise, the Policraticus, in light of recent scholarly skepticism that John never meant to advocate a theoretical defense of slaying the tyrant. It is argued that John's conception of tyrannicide in fact possesses a philosophical foundation derived from his idea of the state as a political organism in which all the members cooperate actively in the realization of the common utility and justice. When the ruler of this body politic behaves tyrannically, failing to perform his characteristic responsibilities, the other limbs and organs are bound by their duty to the public welfare and God to correct and, ultimately, to slay the tyrant. John illustrates this position by reference to the many historical and scriptural instances of tyrants who have legitimately been killed. Thus, John not only proposes a theory of tyrannicide, but also roots it in a strong positive obligation to raise the sword against tyrannical rulers in the name of public benefit and justice.

Most studies of presidential power assume that legitimacy is derived from the Constitution. This essay argues that presidents can become authors of their own legitimacy, whether understood in normative or behavioral terms. Specifically, the thesis is that presidential assertions of power, cloaked in an antipower rhetoric which formally honors the dominant values of the culture, have created an American state that has served as an extraconstitutional source of presidential legitimacy. It is widely believed that American constitutionalism undermined the state by destroying sovereignty. Lincoln's interpretation and use of the war power, however, denned a supreme national authority located in the presidency. In addition, his Gettysburg Address provided a paradigmatic metaphor for concealing presidential power rhetorically. Subsequent presidents have taken advantage of both effects by attempting to assert power as revolutionary principle. Linguistically, these concealments are reflected in tropes which constitute legitimizing defenses for exercise of extraordinary power.

Liberal constitutionalism embodies an aspiration to public moral justification. The practice of liberal politics, on this view, is bound up with an ongoing effort to justify our political arrangements to one another, an effort that must not be collapsed into the mere affirmation of community standards or conventions. This ideal of public justification lends support to judicial review, an institution that helps make constitutional government a publicly principled enterprise. But it also suggests the value of drawing the “political” branches into the interpretive project: the Supreme Court is not the final interpreter of our Constitution's liberal public morality. The “political” branches of the national government, and citizens themselves play a crucial role in the interpretive process. Viewed in this way, the theory and practice of constitutionalism embody ideals of virtue, citizenship, and community that add up to positive rejoinders to liberalism's communitarian and republican critics.

Tyrannicide has traditionally been distinguished from political assassination in terms of the difference between public and private life. Tyrannicide was a self-sacrificing act for public benefit (and so morally esteemed); common assassination, its opposite, namely, a self-serving act for private gain (and correspondingly censured). Terrorist assassinations, though similarly condemned, raise a special problem since they purport to be self-denying acts for the public good. It is argued that a satisfactory distinction between them and tyrannicide cannot be drawn on the basis of historical or behavioral criteria alone, and consequently a supplementary “teleological” criterion is required. This leads to a consideration of the “classical” and “ideological” styles of politics as the respective contexts of tyrannicide and terrorism. In context, terrorism and tyrannicide can be seen as not only categorically different but also antithetical kinds of political violence. Terrorism, in short, is a form of tyranny of which tyrannicide is a negation.

In the 1980's the West Germany party system finds itself in a new stage of development which bodes well for the continued long-term development of the second republic. Drawing on research from the comparative historical development of party systems and democratic regimes as well as from analysis of the recent elections, it is suggested that the concentration process in the party system of 1949–1983 has evolved into a more dispersed pattern with predominantly positive consequences for the Bonn democracy. The rise of the Greens, the gradual decline of the SPD, and the center-right coalition of CDU/CSU/FDP are analyzed from the standpoint of their contribution to stable and effective democracy. The nature of the coalition dynamics on both sides of the right-left spectrum are discussed with the conclusion that while West Germany is predominantly a Parteiendemokratie, the new forms of participation, the further development of pluralism, and the increased competition of ideas make it a democracy governed essentially by parliamentary parties yet more responsive to extraparliamentary forces.

What follows is an attempt to contribute to the renewal of democratic theory. The argument does not offer yet another substantive definition of “genuine” democracy. Nor does it proceed through the usual method of textual exegesis of the texts of democratic thinkers. Instead, it explores the implications for representative government of the set of political and economic practices to which comparativists have attached the label of corporatism. The central proposition of the argument is that corporatism poses a challenge to traditional notions about the core principles of democratic representation. Part one shows that corporatism can be seen as an alternative to the mode of democratic interest articulation known as pluralism. However, part two will show the ways in which the logic of corporatism implies a significant shift from established conventions of representation. The third section tries to build a defense of pluralism as a more democratic mode of representation than either corporatism or neo-Marxism.

This article examines the nature and impact of liberation theology in Latin America and considers prospects for the future. Liberation theology's fundamental ideas are explored, and the reasons for its emergence and appeal are considered in detail. As a system of ideas, liberation theology first appears during a period of great social change, ecclesiological debate, and political upheaval. The convergence of these elements helps explain the theology's appeal within the churches, makes sense of its characteristically activist identification with the poor, and helps account for the popular appeal of the new organizational structures it has inspired. These convergences also suggest possible constraints and the long-term political impact of this theology. Throughout the article I argue that analysis of impacts must go beyond the ideas of liberation theology to ask how and why such ideas are received and acted upon in concrete settings.

Protestant participation in postwar West German peace movements has markedly outstripped Catholic participation, suggesting that age is not the only important cleavage separating participants and nonparticipants. It is argued that because churches interpret collective experience, they have helped shape individual attitudes and political protest across generations throughout the postwar period. In West Germany, church interpretations of fascism, World War Two, and postwar developments have offered interpretive frameworks and defined the parameters of defense issues for their members. In doing so, churches have provided or restricted ideological, as well as organizational, resources to peace protest within their midst. Similar processes are at work in institutions like parties and unions as well. Although younger generations have sometimes adopted more radical views than their elders, the interplay between generations has taken place in the context of a previous institutional framing of issues.

This is a friendly critique of the Liberation Theology being elaborated in Latin America. The preferential option for the poor constricts its attention to economic disadvantage, and ascribes virtually all impoverishment to purposeful oppression. The poor are, simply in virtue of their deprivation, said to be so morally exalted that the gospel has for them no call to conversion. Theirs is a salvation without further ado. Yet their salvation turns out to be predominantly, if not exclusively, economic and political. A predilection for the Exodus displaces the death and resurrection ofJesus as the dominant paradigm for liberation. It is maladapted to a Christian vision of liberation, which must aim at communion with the enemy, not mere triumph. By claiming justice as its goal and fulfillment, liberation theology seems to suffer from a loss of Christian nerve. Looking to the socialist state as the sure guarantor of justice, it seems politically naive, and barren of the Christian hope that both exploiter and victim must be transformed into more than just persons (because prepared to return good for evil) well before the society around them has become a fit home even for justice.

This article deals with the evolving role of the Greens (Die Grünen) in the West German political system. It focuses on the “parliamentarization” of the Greens in the Bundestag (federal parliament) and in the Landtage (state parliaments) of Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, and Hamburg. Utilizing personal interviews, parliamentary archives, opinion polls, and party documents, it considers both the impact of the Greens upon the parliamentary system and the impact of the system upon the Greens. The study finds that, despite serious situational and organizational constraints, the Greens in these parliaments have generally been a “creative” oppositional force. However, parliamentary learning experiences have contributed inevitably to the classical dilemma confronting the Greens: How can the “alternative” party become more influential in parliamentary politics without also becoming more like the established parties?

This article deals with the introduction of strongly fundamental views into the theory and practice of politics. It also concerns the transformation of religion from a concern with religious faith to the creation of political religions. Thus forces have been at work in the past two decades seeking to make a religion of politics and transforming religion into a holy political crusade in the form of a particular version of partisan politics.

Thomas More described how Utopia held no place for criminals, beggars and vagabonds. Marx called these people “the lumpenproletariat,” and, like More, he wished to exclude them from his vision of a communist society. However, the lumpenproletariat stood outside productive society, as such, they also stood outside the dialectic. For them to be excluded from Utopia in a theory of scientific socialism they needed to be reincorporated into the dialectic. This Marx did in his analysis of Louis Napoleon's coup. Marx was simultaneously concerned to distinguish the proletariat from the violent reactionary crowds of 1848 to 1851. He did so by labeling such crowds lumpenproletarian. By focusing on lumpenproletarians as a degenerate mob, Marx precluded consideration of how they might have been victims of capitalist society. He also foreshadowed the tactics of those radical politicians who appealed to the crowd by a similar denigration of a degenerate outgroup.