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The New Centralization on Capitol Hill
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Extract
The consensus view of today's Congress — that its decentralized structure and dispersed power has pushed it to the edge of chaos — is badly in need of correcting. Despite the legacy of decentralization and fragmentation from the 1960's and 1970's reform era, the 1980's have seen a discernible trend toward leadership and order. Leading elements of this “new centralization” in congressional operations are described in this article. These include: contraction of the legislative workload; limitations in the numbers of participants at crucial junctures; resort to omnibus “mega-bills” to enact controversial policies; high levels of partisanship in voting; resurgence of leadership, especially in the House; and subtle shifts in power within the two chambers, primarily away from authorizing committees and toward fiscal committees. Taken together, these developments denote an institution markedly more cohesive and even hierarchical than portrayed in scholarly or journalistic accounts.
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- Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1988
References
Notes
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