It is my contention that theories of international relations derive from or can be reduced to two basic arenas of discourse, which I term pluralist and structuralist in their central preoccupations.

It is comparatively rare for academics to get together to discuss problems connected with teaching. A lively discussion however developed out of an ad hoc meeting at the 1978 BISA conference on the teaching of courses which could be loosely subsumed under the title of ‘International Organization’ (IO). The discussion made clear that this area of International Relations teaching is in a state of flux, and that considerable uncertainty exists both about what to teach and how to teach it. Many ideas and suggestions emerged at the meeting and the exchange of views was clearly useful.

The last ‘great debate’ in international relations theory occurred in the 1960s, was concerned primarily with matters of method rather than substance, and eventually was called off due to lack of interest. The battle between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘scientists’ was short-lived. The so-called ‘post-behavioural’ revolution in political science conceded some part of the traditionalist case, but the more significant factor in the conclusion of the debate was the prevalence of an attitude of live and let live. Tolerance over method is a virtue in a relatively underdeveloped discipline, for who can predict the shape of future knowledge or the potential sources of insight? Unfortunately, a by-product of tolerance over methodological issues has been the development of such differences over matters of substance that the existence of a coherent discipline is called into question. Perhaps a new ‘great debate’ is called for, this time on matters of substance.

Professor Frankel in his reply to our article ‘A Double Omission’, not only denies the existence of any such omission (let alone double) as we there described, but argues that the perception of such a (non-existent) omission lays the authors open to the charge of being guilty of an omission more glaring than that which we attributed to the more myopic side of Western international theory. Professor Frankel in his rebuttal considers that neither Marx nor the Soviet Marxist-Leninists have anything of import to contribute to Western thinking on international relations and that our article, in other words, had no substance whatsoever. He makes the claim that Marx's writings not only ‘require specialized skills’ in order to be studied but that even when these are brought to bear the intellectual profits are ‘likely to be scanty’. But, in any case, argues Frankel, these (writings) were ‘given full due … in writings on such special areas of international relations as revolution, conflict or imperialism’, — not, that is to say, on international relations in the more general sense.

Over twelve years have passed since the Autumn of 1968, when the gathering momentum of the campaign for civil rights in Northern Ireland forced the re-opening of the unanswered questions and unfinished business of Anglo-Irish relations, on reluctant governments in Dublin, London, and Belfast. The activities of the Civil Rights Movements – especially the march in Derry on October 5, 1968 – and the reactions to them of the Stormont Government, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and groups of protestant ultras, conventionally provide the turning point after which the intractable realities of Northern Ireland's problems showed themselves afresh. A protracted and murderous war of attrition, which continues to this day, was the result.

Recent years have seen governmental concern with international economic issues attain an intensity previously reserved for the great questions of war and peace. Students of international affairs have followed suit with a revival of academic interest in the complex relationship between the economic and the political in the international arena: hence the resurgence of international political economy.

International economic issues are now ‘high politics’. Alarm at the domestic implications of ‘stagflation’ within the advanced industrial countries (AICs) has prompted calls for reflationary stimulants to trade and economic activity. Domestic economic dislocation has, however, also revived protectionist arguments within certain Western economies.

‘The constant intrusion, or potential intrusion, of power renders meaningless any conception of equality between members of the international community.’