The point of this article can be quickly made: it is just that, there is a big difference between the financial power exercised by the United States and that exercised by Japan, and that the difference is partly explained by the role of information in the global financial structure. It also happens that this difference is a rather good illustration of the difference between structural power and relational power.

What I am comparing is the structural power to extend or restrict the range of options open to others which has been, and still is, exercised by the United States in the postwar decades, in this case specifically in the field of finance, with the relational power which Japan exercises in the same field of finance by virtue of its position as the world's major creditor country and aid donor.

If there is a single event since the end of the Second World War that has seriously punctured America's sense of confident invulnerability it is, surely, not the withdrawal from Vietnam—that could always be explained away as a masterful reassessment of the nature of the communist threat—but the taking of American hostages by Islamic fundamentalists in Teheran in 1979. That event, more than any other, showed that America's faith in modernization, foreign aid, and a gradual injection of political liberalism as a means of drawing nations into the western orbit rested on brittle foundations. Until the Shah's overthrow Iran had seemed the perfect ally; despite the anti-libertarian blemishes of the Shah's regime, Iran had a prosperous middle class, a formidable standing in the region, a sound economy based on expensive oil, and was emerging from what was thought to be the constricting effect of Islam.

Have you noticed how academics specializing in British or American foreign policy are considered generalists while specialists on Chinese or Japanese foreign policy are considered 'mere' practitioners of area studies? Is it not curious when supposed journals of International Relations (like this one) have special numbers on balance of power theory and rarely draw examples from East Asia? This myopic mid-Atlanticism among students of International Relations reaches 'down' to the media world: how many realize that the majority of the troop cuts announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1988 are coming from Asia.