The article provides a critical analysis of the role and function of global civil society within deliberative approaches to global governance. It critiques a common view that global civil society can/should act as an agent for democratising global governance and seeks to explore the importance of global civil society as an arena of deliberation. This more reconstructive aim is supplemented by an empirically focused discussion of the affective dimensions of global civil society, in general, and the increasingly important use of film, in particular. Ultimately, this then yields an image of the deliberative politics of global civil society that is more reflective of the differences, ambiguities and contests that pervade its discourses about global governance. This is presented as a quality that debates about deliberative global governance might learn from as well as speak to.

The article inquires into the conditions of effective leadership of states in international politics, and develops a framework for the study of so-called (new) regional powers such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa in processes of regional institution-building. Various theoretical strands will be discussed as to the requirements of effective leadership in international affairs. Most importantly, the relationship between power, leadership and hegemony will be outlined. It is argued that the connection between leadership and hegemony is one of co-constitution. Leadership is necessarily based on hegemony, while hegemony can only be sustained through leadership. Furthermore, it will be shown that both leadership and hegemony are essentially political in character, whereas power has no such insinuation but has to be translated into leadership and hegemony through discursive means. Finally, the analysis asks for the preconditions of leadership in East Asia, using China's and Japan's roles in East Asian regionalism as an illustration.

For many commentators the lack of success in international statebuilding efforts has been explained through the critical discourse of ‘liberal peace’, where it is assumed that ‘liberal’ Western interests and assumptions have influenced policymaking leading to counterproductive results. At the core of the critique is the assumption that the liberal peace approach has sought to reproduce and impose Western models: the reconstruction of ‘Westphalian’ frameworks of state sovereignty; the liberal framework of individual rights and winner-takes-all elections; and neo-liberal free market economic programmes. This article challenges this view of Western policymaking and suggests that post-Cold War post-conflict intervention and statebuilding can be better understood as a critique of classical liberal assumptions about the autonomous subject – framed in terms of sovereignty, law, democracy and the market. The conflating of discursive forms with their former liberal content creates the danger that critiques of liberal peace can rewrite post-Cold War intervention in ways that exaggerate the liberal nature of the policy frameworks and act as apologia, excusing policy failure on the basis of the self-flattering view of Western policy elites: that non-Western subjects were not ready for ‘Western’ freedoms.

There is virtually no systematic debate on the fundamentals of comparative research in the study of international regionalism. The field of research is very fragmented and there is a lack of interaction between EU studies and regionalism in the rest of the world. There is also a lack of communication between scholars from various theoretical standpoints and research traditions. Related to these two divides is the tension between idiographic and nomothetic methodologies. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the largely neglected debate on how to conduct and address three interrelated problems: a conceptual, a theoretical and a methodological one. Our claim is that the future of comparative regionalism should be one where old divides are bridged. This requires a combination of conceptual rigor, theoretical eclecticism, and sounder empirical research methods.

This article examines the liberalisation of immigration policy in Canada and the US in the post-World War II era. I argue that shifting norms pertaining to race, ethnicity, and human rights cast longstanding discriminatory policies in Canada and the US in a highly critical light. Opponents of racially discriminatory immigration policies exploited this shift in normative contexts to highlight the disjuncture between Canada and the US’ postwar commitments to liberal norms and human rights, on the one hand, and their extant policy regimes, on the other. The resulting pressure set in motion comparable processes of policy stretching and unravelling, which culminated in policy shifting in the mid-1960s. Policy shifting was, however, subject to very different political dynamics. Whereas Canada's institutional configuration granted the executive branch and bureaucracy a high degree of autonomy that enabled experimentation, the greater openness of the American political system led to a more politicised process, marked by compromises and deal-making. Thus while changing norms prompted the liberalisation of immigration policies in both countries, differences in their domestic political contexts resulted in very different admissions regimes.

Despite sustained theoretical and empirical criticism of ‘statism’, a recognisable model of political structure other of hierarchy and anarchy (the models that underpin the state system-model) has long been lacking. Even many proponents of radical transformation of the international system often remain ‘post-international’, describing world politics essentially in terms of complications to the international system. This article agrees that a new point of departure is needed but offers a different model of political structure by redefining the term ‘polity’ – a term which is increasingly used to capture non-territorial political entities neither constituted by hierarchy nor by the lack of it. With the new definition building on Waltz's theory of theory as a ‘picture, mentally formed’ in order to simplify a domain, a  polity is deemed to exist when a set of subjects are oriented towards a common ‘governance-object’. The new polity model is applied illustratively to the idea of a global polity and a new polity research agenda of international relations is suggested.

By what standards ought we to judge politicians? The article addresses the question in the light of the treatment of two controversial issues in contemporary world politics: the implementation of the 1984 UN Convention against Torture; and the post 9/11 rendition of terrorist suspects to US authorities by European governments. Their treatment brings out the way in which the role of political leaders is popularly conceived and understood. This conventional understanding is contrasted with the role recommended by Kant's political philosophy. An answer to the question depends on how we conceive politics in the first place. If politics is seen as a ‘free for all’ where all strategies can be canvassed then the response will be entirely different from a situation where we consider ourselves bound by rules of legitimacy and its attendant problems of morality and law. The article represents a rejection of certain received accounts of politics and approval of a Kantian view. The account of politics which in one respect or another tries to drive a wedge between politics and ordinary morality is seen as inferior to a Kantian concept of politics which is always conditioned by morality.

European Studies in China developed very rapidly in the last twenty years. The reasons for that are not only because of the smooth evolution of EU-China relations and wider and deeper economic interdependence between two economic giants, but also the relevance of the European models to China's domestic political and social development, as well as China's external relations. The article reviews the evolution of the European Studies in China and finds out that more and more research on European affairs relates to China's internal and external development. Two major aspects of the learning process are exploited further. Firstly, European models for China's domestic political and social development, including European party politics and Democratic Socialism, European social policy and social security systems, and European regional policies. Secondly, European models for China's foreign policy and external relations, including European neighbourhood policy, European concept of effective multilateralism, Europe as an example of peaceful rise, and functionalism as the way to East Asian regional integration. The EU or Europe has higher profile in China than any other Asia Pacific country. From the domestic political and social development and China's preference in international affairs we can see the silhouette of the European models. Chinese would like to learn more from Europe than the United States. It also shows clearly that the role of the EU as a social power.

While there is much discussion of the need for democracy in transnational institutions, there is less discussion of the conditions for their democratisation. To address this deficit, a general account of democratisation is necessary. I propose that democratisation is dependent on the joint realisation of two conditions: communicative freedom and communicative power. Democratisation thus requires, first, publics and associations in which communicative freedom is realised on the one hand; and, second, institutions that link such freedom to the exercise of communicative power to decision making on the other. In order for these conditions to be met, civil society must be expanded into the public sphere. The transformation of communicative freedom into communicative power can be promoted only by institutions that recognise the decisional status of publics, which in turn depend on civil society to generate the deliberative benefits of the plurality of perspectives. Communicative power is not merely spontaneously generated through publics, but also through publics expressly formed through democratic institutional design.

Regional powers of the Global South are perceived to be agents of change. But what exactly is the nature of the change that they want? This article argues that there is some continuity between the goals of the current generation of regional leaders and that of their predecessors. The current generation tend to have more confidence in their ability to effect the redistribution of wealth, prestige, and power in the global political economy, though, and tend therefore to be more integrationist than the first generation of post-colonial leaders. The goal of redistribution is premised on a more fundamental unfinished struggle of developing countries, one that Brazil, India, and South Africa in particular have taken up. This is the struggle for recognition of developing countries as full and equal partners in the society of states, but also as states with specific development needs that are too easily ploughed-under in the spurious universality promoted by the developed North. The struggle for recognition focuses on inclusive multilateralism and ‘non-indifference’ towards the development needs of the Global South. Using recent contributions to the theory of recognition, the article interprets these two goals as linked to the unfinished struggle against disrespect and humiliation.

Rather than reading the work of Richard K. Ashley as iconic – as some dead, stable image used to signify the whole of post-modern or post-structural International Relations (IR) in a single swoop – this article considers Ashley's work as an interruption to the discipline of IR (mainstream and critical). In so doing, the article suggests that what is important about Ashley's work is how it creates a thinking space where it is possible to think again about international politics, about international theory, about what Ashley's interruption itself permits and limits and about how this interruption unfolds and sometimes folds back on itself.

Critical cosmopolitan orientation has usually been embedded in a non-geocentric physical (NGP) cosmology that locates the human drama on the surface of planet Earth within wide scales of time and space. Although neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for critical cosmopolitanism, NGP cosmology provides a contrast to the underpinnings of centric cosmologies, such as those of Aristotle, which see the world as revolving around a particular observer, theorist and/or communal identity. NGP cosmology makes it plausible to envisage all humans as part of the same species. The connection works also through homology and analogy. An astronomic theory can be isomorphic with an ethico-political theory, that is, a structure-preserving mapping from one to the other is possible. Key cosmopolitan theorists have situated morality within a cosmic framework. However, the ethico-political implications of the NGP cosmology are ambiguous. Nietzsche was among the first to articulate its sceptical and nihilist implications. Various reactions have encouraged territorial nationalism and geopolitics. I suggest that critical cosmopolitical orientation should now be grounded on the notion of cosmic evolution, which is not only contextual, historical, pluralist and open-ended but also suggests that humanity is not a mere accident of the cosmos.

This article introduces the problem of having to risk one's life for the state in war, asking first why this question is no longer asked in the just war literature and then suggesting five issues that relate to this question: 1) that of individual consent, 2) whether or not any state can be justified in obliging its citizens in this regard and whether or not the type of government is important, 3) whether or not the problem of the obligation differs between conscript and volunteer armies, 4) the problem of political obligation and how any individual could be justifiably obliged to risk his or her life for the state in war, and 5) the question of whether a citizen may be obliged to go into any war. The argument is that these questions are no longer given much attention in the just war literature because of the way that the concept of proper authority has come to be understood. The article concludes by suggesting that the problem of the ‘obligation to die’ should be included in our understanding and use of just war theory and the ethics of war.

The integration of the global economy through the liberalisation of the trade regime, the deregulation of financial markets and the privatisation of state assets has led to what we now commonly call ‘globalisation’. These processes, however, have not been accompanied by a comparable development of the global polity. At the same time, it is increasingly recognised in policy circles that without the development of norms, institutions and processes to manage globalisation many of the advantages it has brought the world could be undone by a failure to mitigate the excesses and negative consequences that emanate from it, especially for large sections of the world's poor. This article addresses two broad questions: what might we understand by global governance in an era of increasingly contested globalisation and what role might international organisations play in making it more (democratically) legitimate? It addresses these questions in three steps. First, it proposes a heuristic definition that identifies two key strands of ‘governance’ in the contemporary debate. It is argued that global governance understood as effective and efficient collective decision-making and problem solving is insufficient for normative reasons and must, in addition, be complemented by global governance understood as the democratic legitimation of policy-making. In a second step, as an example of this latter type of governance, the article develops a deliberative two-track view of transnational legitimacy. It argues that deliberative democracy offers some fruitful theoretical tools in this context since it is equipped to address some of the qualitative problems of international decision-making as well as accommodate a plausible notion of political agency. Thirdly, from the point of view of this two-track view, the article examines the WTO and discusses its strengths and vulnerabilities, not only as a vehicle for trade liberalisation but also as an instrument of better global governance.

Richard Ashley's writings in the 1980s are central to the production of post-structuralist or ‘dissident’ scholarship in International Relations (IR). In this article, I use analysis of the standard dissident view of Ashley's writings to examine the interpretive practices through which the community of dissident scholars was produced textually. Dissident ‘thinking space’ in the discipline was produced in part through the exclusion of Marx, capital and class, despite these being present in Ashley's writings throughout this period. Similar interpretive practices were applied to the writings of Michel Foucault, with similar effects. This exclusion has negative consequences for dissident scholarship, in particular analysis of historicity and the place of capitalism in contemporary world politics. Overcoming these problems requires reading the work of Ashley and other founders of dissident scholarship in a different way are attentive to the silences of thinking space.

There is now significant policy and academic interest in the governance of science and technology for sustainable development. In recent years this has come to include a growing emphasis on issues of public understanding of science and innovative processes of deliberative and inclusive policy-making around controversial technologies such as nuclear power and agricultural biotechnology. Concern with such issues coincides with rising levels of interest in deliberative democracy and its relationship to the structures and processes of global governance. This article connects these two areas through a critical examination of ‘global’ deliberations about agricultural biotechnology and its risks and benefits. It draws on an extensive survey concerned with the diverse ways in which a range of governments are interpreting and implementing their commitments under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety regarding public participation and consultation in order to assess the potential to create forms of deliberation through these means. The article explores both the limitations of public deliberation within global governance institutions as well as of projects whose aim is to impose participation from above through international law by advocating model approaches and policy ‘tool kits’ that are insensitive to vast differences between countries in terms of capacity, resources and political culture.

Research is all about a person's engagement with an issue. But most approaches to International Relations actively discourage personal involvement by the researcher. We question the adequacy of this norm and the related scholarly conventions. Instead, we explore how the personal experience of the researcher can be used as a legitimate and potentially important source of insight into politics. But we also note that simply telling the story of the researcher is inadequate. We engage the ensuing dilemmas by discussing how to both appreciate and evaluate autoethnographic insights. Rather than relying on pre-determined criteria, we argue that methodological uses of the self should be judged within knowledge communities and according to their ability to open up new perspectives on political dilemmas. We then advance two related suggestions: one advocates conceptualising research around puzzles; the other explores the methodological implications of recognising that producing knowledge is an inherently relational activity.

Taking a quote from President Obama as its starting point, this article examines the usages of the word cynicism in politics, business and International Relations. It distinguishes five different forms: accusative; reflexive; projective; cathartic and ancient. When used accusatively, the cynic is an archetype we see in others whose character or actions we wish to reproach. When used reflexively, the cynic is a social archetype we identify with ourselves. Projective cynicism is the means by which an impertinent discourse may be playfully distanced. Cathartic cynicism is a means by which mental conflict is mediated. Ancient cynicism was a utopian attempt to negotiate the contradiction between cosmopolitanism and the overwhelming reality of slavery. The article concludes that it may be worthwhile comparing and contrasting all these forms of cynicism out in the public sphere.