Myths, or sacred narratives, have been underexplored in mainstream philosophy of religion, which has also had little to say about African indigenous religions. These lacunae impoverish the philosophy of religion by diminishing its coverage both of the range of human religious possibilities and of the diverse modes through which religious ideas and world-views are conveyed. With particular attention to Yorùbá religion, this article promotes and exemplifies a pluralistic narrative approach that draws upon mythology to facilitate philosophical reflection upon a wider array of religious traditions, for the dual purpose of doing conceptual justice to those traditions while also furthering the discipline's conceptual enrichment.

William Lane Craig's defence of the so-called ‘Hilbert's Hotel Argument’ for the beginning of the universe seems to be in conflict with his own presentist views, as I argued in my earlier article ‘Heartbreak at Hilbert's Hotel’ (2014). In response, Andrew Loke (2014) has defended a modified version of the argument which avoids this problem, and this defence has been endorsed by Craig (2018). After clarifying the dialectic, I argue in this article that Loke's modification is not as straightforwardly successful as he and Craig seem to think, and that it in fact requires a controversial independent assumption – namely, that creation ex nihilo is possible. I show that some of the more obvious ways of supporting this assumption are either unsuccessful or unavailable to the proponent of the Hilbert's Hotel Argument. Moreover, I show that accepting this assumption conflicts with a key premise in the Hilbert's Hotel Argument. Hence, Loke's modified argument has not successfully established that the universe – including time itself – began to exist.

Disputes over the nature of faith, as understood in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, sometimes focus on whether it is to be identified exclusively with trust in God or with loyalty/fidelity to God. Drawing on recent work on the semantic range of the Hebrew ʾĕmûnâ and Greek pistis lexicons, we argue for a multidimensional account of what it is to be a person of faith that includes trust and loyalty in combination. The Trust-Loyalty account, we maintain, makes better sense of the faith of exemplars, including Abraham, and fits well with the biblical language of faith. Further, a normatively appropriate combination of trust and loyalty towards others is a recognizable social virtue, aimed at promoting flourishing relationships. Finally, we consider how to make sense of ancient and modern exemplars of faith who protest against God, such as Job and Elie Wiesel, and argue that the Trust-Loyalty view is uniquely well suited to accommodate them.

I argue that liturgy is primary to the Christian faith. By ‘liturgy’, however, I do not mean merely what happens on Sunday morning. Instead, I distinguish between ‘intensive’ and ‘extensive’ liturgies, those that occur when the body of Christ meets together and when that body disperses. All of this together constitutes Christian liturgy. My thesis is not that practice is more primary than theory, for that presupposes the possibility of drawing a sharp line between them – an impossible task. Rather, liturgy is a variety of embodied cognition through which we know God and our neighbours. Theology is something that arises from our liturgies and is itself liturgical in nature. We may believe the Nicene Creed, but saying it aloud is performative in nature. I end by examining the relation of phronēsis and theōria in Aristotle and then consider the way Heidegger uses this distinction to argue that ‘know-how’ (Verstehen) is the most basic kind of human knowledge.

This article examines two arguments that a worship-worthy agent cannot command worship. The first argument is based on the idea that any agent who commands worship is egotistical, and hence not worship-worthy. The second argument is based on Campbell Brown and Yujin Nagasawa's (2005) idea that people cannot comply with the command to worship because if people are offering genuine worship, they cannot be motivated by a command to do so. One might then argue that a worship-worthy agent would have no reason to issue a command to worship. I argue that both these arguments fail.

It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, called the highest good. In this article, I outline Kant's argument for why we ought to have faith in God and hope for the highest good, and argue that the Kantian argument can be extended in such a way as to show the unity of the theological virtues. This feature of the Kantian account can then have ramifications in further questions regarding the relationship of faith and moral action.

Although it is commonly accepted that Darwinian evolution could select for true common-sense beliefs, it is altogether less certain that the same can be said for other classes of beliefs, such as moral or religious beliefs. This issue takes centre stage in debates concerning evolutionary debunking arguments against religious beliefs, where the rationality of beliefs is often dependent upon their production by an evolved faculty that is sensitive to truth. In this article, we consider whether evolution selected for true religious beliefs. We begin by highlighting the relevance of this question for broader philosophy of religion, then present a dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments for and against the proposition that true religious beliefs generate pragmatic success and hence can be selected for by evolution.

In God's Final Victory: A Comparative Philosophical Case for Universalism, we argue that for every version of the doctrine of hell there is a version of the doctrine of universal salvation that, granted traditional Christian teachings, is more philosophically defensible. This article explores whether a parallel case can be made for preferring universalism to annihilationism. While assuming for the sake of this article that the chief arguments for favouring universalism over the doctrine of hell, developed in God's Final Victory, are strong, we argue that a comparably strong parallel case for favouring universalism to annihilationism can indeed be made.

Over the past century, divine passibility has become the majority view within Christian theology and philosophy of religion. Yet it faces a serious objection from proponents of impassibility that I shall call the Problem of Creepy Emotions. In this article, I shall develop the objection in detail, and explore two ways for divine passibilists to answer this objection. I shall do this in several steps. First, I will offer some brief historical remarks to help readers understand that divine empathy is the watershed issue in the debate over impassibility and passibility. In particular, impassibility denies that God has empathy, whereas passibility affirms that God has empathy. Second, I provide definitions of important concepts for this debate such as impassibility, passibility, emotions, and empathy. I shall articulate Linda Zagzebski's recent account of passibility called omnisubjectivity, or perfect empathy. Third, I shall examine the Problem of Creepy Emotions that arises from the affirmation that God has perfect empathy. Fourth, I shall explore two different strategies that divine passibility can employ to avoid the Problem of Creepy Emotions.

In presenting his theory of religious pluralism, John Hick discussed the Buddhist concept of śūnyatā, emptiness, which he regarded as functionally equivalent to his postulated noumenal Real. This article introduces Hick's pluralistic hypothesis and reviews the major criticisms of his theory. It then investigates Hick's understanding of śūnyatā, before arguing that a Madhyamaka interpretation of śūnyatā, within the context of the Buddhist theory of ‘two truths’, differs considerably from Hick's understanding. The article suggests that the Madhyamaka interpretation of śūnyatā can be used to reconfigure Hick's pluralistic hypothesis, thereby avoiding the major criticisms Hickian pluralism faces, for it provides a new way of thinking about the relation between ultimate reality and the reality that we experience.

This article accomplishes two things. First, it explores and defends Kierkegaard's distinctive solution to the Problem of Total Devotion, a problem which has been helpfully identified by Robert Adams. Second, it extends that solution by advancing an interpretation of the command to do all things to the glory of God (1 Corinthians 10:31) according to which we are being commanded to intentionally make every one of our actions such that it simultaneously counts as a divine action: in other words, to act intentionally in all things such that it is God who acts through us.

In the literature on toleration, epistemic arguments are commonly equated with John Stuart Mill's fallibilism according to which toleration of opinions is a necessary means to the attainment of truth. This conflation does not capture the variety of those arguments and it results from the fact that a proper analysis of epistemic arguments for religious toleration and a systematic account of their different types are still lacking. The purpose of this article is to provide such an analysis and to argue that those arguments come in four different types, which I name fallibilism, religious belief-forming process, epistemic parity, and differentiated access to religious truth or divine message. I also offer a mapping of those different types of arguments using the standard epistemic notions of justification, truth, and belief coupled with a distinction of focus in the epistemological approach – whether individually or socially focused.

Many philosophers have appealed to the PSR in arguments for a being that exists a se, a being whose explanation is in itself. But what does it mean, exactly, for something to have its explanation ‘in itself’? Contemporary philosophers have said next to nothing about this, relying instead on phrases plucked from the accounts of various historical figures. In this article, I analyse five such accounts – those of Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz – and argue that none are satisfactory. Should we abandon or restrict the PSR, then? I think that would be hasty, for many reasons. I therefore consider the prospects of explaining everything, including God, given the constraints of certain features of good explanations, and conclude with several observations about future approaches.

Philosophers and theologians have long recognized apparent contradictions in the Christian doctrine of the incarnation wherein Jesus is both fully divine and fully human and thereby exemplifies all properties essential to being divine and all properties essential to being human, including, respectively, immutability and mutability. In this article, we outline a new account of such apparent contradictions, wherein each such pair of (modal) properties involves different modal operators.

This article argues against the rationality of ‘hopeful universalism’, the components of which include the unconditional considered hope that soteriological universalism is true, and an absence of belief that it is true. Some proponents maintain that there is simply not enough evidence to affirm or deny universalism; others believe that it is probably false but nonetheless hope they are mistaken. This article argues that worshippers of God who maintain unconditional considered hope in the truth of universalism ought either to believe universalism or seek to abandon their hope in its truth, depending (in part) on how their confidence in the considerations that steer them away from universalism measure up against the beliefs that underwrite their hope in its truth. For such people, neither withholding belief in universalism nor believing that it is false while continuing to hope that it is true is a rational option.