With respect to the role of evidence in testing statements both within science and about science, four combinations are possible. Logical empiricists such as Hempel (1966) insist that evidence plays a crucial role in the sort of testing that goes on in science. In their own discussions of science, logical empiricists also include occasional examples drawn from science, both current and past, but these examples function only as illustrations of the points that they are making about science, not as tests.

It is the fall of 1992. A certain young graduate student—let us call her Sue Smithson—has just completed her comprehensives at a leading graduate school in history of science—let us say Cambridge, or San Diego, or Princeton for the sake of argument. She now has to decide on her dissertation topic. Let us eavesdrop as she ruminates about what it should be.

The assumption underlying this symposium betrays an unusual transformation of attitude and an uncharacteristic openrnindedness, in that it holds that philosophers of science can leam something from historians of science. Philosophers of science used to regard historians as rather dull witted. But attitudes have changed, and for fair reason. A judicious assessment of the two disciplines in the last decade or so would suggest that many of the interesting philosophical questions have flowed from history. As I will argue in a moment, this is exactly what one should expect.

Science is the subject matter of the philosophy of science. Like evolution, science refers to both a process and a product It is both an activity of production and the set of products resulting from this activity. Philosophers, though, have mainly focused on scientific results, i.e. the products of science, whether current or past. The question I want to raise here is: should philosophers also be concerned with the process of science?