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Is the History of Science Relevant to the Philosophy of Science?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

Marga Vicedo
Marga Vicedo*
Affiliation:
Arizona State University West
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Science is the subject matter of the philosophy of science. Like evolution, science refers to both a process and a product It is both an activity of production and the set of products resulting from this activity. Philosophers, though, have mainly focused on scientific results, i.e. the products of science, whether current or past. The question I want to raise here is: should philosophers also be concerned with the process of science?

Type
Part XIV. What Has the History of Science to Say to the Philosopy of Science?
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1992 , 1993 , pp. 490 - 496
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Footnotes

1

I am very grateful to Michael Ruse for giving me the privilege to participate in this Symposium. I would also like to thank J. Beatty, R. Burian, R. Creath, T. Nickles, E. Sober, and M. Pera for helpful discussion. Mark Solovey showed me the many ways in which time and articulation are important. I am also truly grateful to him.

References

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