Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-24T18:15:45.215Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Testing Philosophical Claims about Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

David Hull
David Hull*
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

With respect to the role of evidence in testing statements both within science and about science, four combinations are possible. Logical empiricists such as Hempel (1966) insist that evidence plays a crucial role in the sort of testing that goes on in science. In their own discussions of science, logical empiricists also include occasional examples drawn from science, both current and past, but these examples function only as illustrations of the points that they are making about science, not as tests.

Type
Part XIV. What Has the History of Science to Say to the Philosopy of Science?
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1992 , 1993 , pp. 468 - 475
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Footnotes

1

Thanks are owed to Kirn Sterelny and Todd Grantham for reading and commenting on an early draft of this paper.

References

Cole, S. (1992), Making Science: Between Nature and Society, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Collins, H. M. (1981a), “What is TRASP?: The Radical Programme as a Methodological Imperative”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11: 215-224.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collins, H. M. (1981b), “Stages in the Empirical Program of Relativism”, Social Studies of Science 11: 3-10.Google Scholar
Desmond, A. (1989), The Politics of Evolution : Morphology, Medicine, and Reform in Radical Lonoon. Chicago: University of Chicago Pr.ess.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. G. (1966), Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Hull, D. L. (1988), Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kuhn, T. S. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lakatos, I. (1971), “History of Science and Its Rational Reconstruction”, in PSA 1970, R.C. Buck and R.S. Cohen (eds.). Dordrecht: Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milliken, R. G. (1984), Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism. Cambridge:MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neander, K. (1991), “Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analysist's Defense”, Philosophy of Science 58: 168-184Google Scholar
Richards, R. J. (1993), “History as the Necessary Foundation for Philosophy of Science”, in PSA 1992, vol. 2, D. L. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik (eds.). East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association.Google Scholar
Rudwick, M. J.S. (1985), The Great Devonian Controversy: The Making of Scientific Knowledge Among Gentlemanly Specialists. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ruse, M.(1979), The Darwinian Revolution : Science Red in Tooth and Claw. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Woolgar, S.(1988), Science: The Very Idea. London: Tavistock.Google Scholar