Though many reports have assessed hospital emergency responses during a disaster that affected the facility's operations, relatively little work has been dedicated to identifying factors that aid or impede the recovery of such hospitals.

On 05 October 2005, Hurricane Stan triggered landslides that buried an impoverished Mayan community in Santiago Atitlán, Guatemala. The six-bed Hospitalito Atitlán also was in the landslide's path. Though opened just months earlier, the institution maintained 24-hour services until reopening in a new facility only 15 days after the landslides.

This qualitative study examined the Hospitalito Atitlán's disaster recovery using unstructured interviews with key hospital personnel and community members. Participant observation provided information about institutional and cultural dynamics affecting the hospital's recovery. Data were collected retrospectively during June–September 2006 and June 2007.

The Hospitalito's emergency responses and recovery were distinct endeavors that nonetheless overlapped in time. The initial 12 hours of disorganized emergency relief work was quickly succeeded by an organized effort by the institution to provide inpatient and clinic-based care to the few severely injured and many worried-well patients. As international aid started arriving 2–3 days post-landslide, the Hospitalito's 24-hour clinical services made it an integral organization in the comprehensive health response. Meanwhile, a subset of the Hospitalito's non-clinical staff initiated rebuilding efforts by Day 2 after the event, joined later by medical staff as outside aid allowed them to handoff clinical duties. Effective use of the Internet and conventional media promoted donations of money and supplies, which provided the raw materials used by a group determined to reopen their hospital.

Early work by a recovery-focused team coupled with a shared understanding of the Hospitalito as an institution that transcended its damaged building drove the hospital's rapid post-emergency revival. Encouraging a similar sense of mission, emulating the Hospitalito's handling of funding and material procurement, and conducting rebuilding and relief efforts in parallel may aid recovery at other health facilities.

Mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) result in the evacuation of many patients to the nearest medical facility. However, an overwhelming number of patients and the type and severity of injuries may demand rapid, mass airmedical transport to more advanced medical centers. This task may be challenging, particularly after a MCI in a neighboring country. The Israeli Air Force Rescue and Airmedical Evacuation Unit (RAEU) is the main executor of airmedical transport in Israel, including MCIs.

The available data on airmedical transport from remote MCIs are limited. The objective of this study was to evaluate the airmedical transport from a rural hospital after two remote MCIs.

The study was retrospective and reviewed descriptive records of airmedical transports.

The RAEU was involved in airmedical transports from a peripheral hospital shortly after two remote MCIs that occurred in the Sinai desert near the Egyptian-Israeli border. Nineteen (22.4%) and 25 (100%) of the treated trauma patients from each event were airmedically transported to Level-1 Trauma Centers in Israel within hours of the dispatch. The rapid dispatch and accumulation of medical personnel and equipment was remarkable. The airmedical surge capacity was broad and sufficient. Cooperation with local authorities and a tailored boarding procedure facilitated a quality outcome.

The incorporation of a large-scale airmedical transport program with designated multidisciplinary protocols is an essential component to a remote disaster preparedness plan.

The large number casualties caused by the 1995 Great Hanshin and Awaji Earthquake created a massive demand for medical care. However, as area hospitals also were damaged by the earthquake, they were unable to perform their usual functions. Therefore, the care capacity was reduced greatly. Thus, the needs to: (1) transport a large number of injured and ill people out of the disaster-affected area; and (2) dispatch medical teams to perform such wide-area transfers were clear. The need for trained medical teams to provide medical assistance also was made clear after the Niigata-ken Chuetsu Earthquake in 2004. Therefore, the Japanese government decided to establish Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), as “mobile, trained medical teams that rapidly can be deployed during the acute phase of a sudden-onset disaster”. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams have been established in much of Japan. The provision of emergency relief and medical care and the enhancement and promotion of DMATs for wide-area deployments during disasters were incorporated formally in the Basic Plan for Disaster Prevention in its July 2005 amendment.

The essential points pertaining to DMATs were summarized as a set of guidelines for DMAT deployment. These were based on the results of research funded by a Health and Labour Sciences research grant from the, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) of the Ministry of Health. The guidelines define the basic procedures for DMAT activities—for example: (1) the activities are to be based on agreements concluded between prefectures and medical institutions during non-emergency times; and (2) deployment is based on requests from disaster-affected prefectures and the basic roles of prefectures and the MHLW. The guidelines also detail DMAT activities at the disaster scene of the, support from medical institutions, and transportation assistance including “wide-area” medical transport activities, such as medical treatment in staging care units and the implementation of medical treatment onboard aircraft.

Japan's DMATs are small-scale units that are designed to be suitable for responding to the demands of acute emergencies. Further issues to be examined in relation to DMATs include expanding their application to all prefectures, and systems to facilitate continuous education and training.