Scholars and journalists connect pandemics to a rise in support for radical political movements. In this study, we draw on this insight to investigate the relationship between the 1918–1919 Spanish influenza pandemic and political extremism—here, the rise of the second Ku Klux Klan—in the United States. Specifically, we ask whether U.S. states and cities with higher death rates from the Spanish flu also had stronger Ku Klux Klan organizations in the early 1920s. Our results do not provide evidence of such a connection; in fact, the data suggest greater Klan membership where the pandemic was less severe. This provides initial evidence that pandemic severity, as measured by mortality, is not necessarily a cause of extremism in the United States; power devaluation as a result of social and cultural change, however, does appear to spur such mobilization.

While there have always been those in the American public who mistrust science and scientists’ views of the world, they have tended to be a minority of the larger public. Recent COVID-19 related events indicate that could be changing for some key groups. What might explain the present state of mistrust of science within an important component of the American public? In this study, we delve deeply into this question and examine what citizens today believe about science and technology and why, focusing on core theories of trust, risk concern, and political values and on the important role of science optimism and pessimism orientations. Using national public survey data, we examine the correlates of science optimism and pessimism and test the efficacy of this construct as drivers of biotechnology policy. We find that science optimism and pessimism are empirically useful constructs and that they are important predictors of biotechnology policy choices.

The classical economics perspective is that public policy should be used to allow, not hinder, economic freedom. In some cases it may be possible for government to gently nudge individuals to change their behavior without hindering freedom. One example is a change from the default on pension program enrollment forms from “not contribute” to “contribute.” This is generally viewed as a good nudge that gets people to do what the majority of people view as generally the correct behavior. However, a choice to contribute to a pension fund is not always in the individual’s best interest — thus, it is a nudge, not a mandate. To maintain personal liberty, individuals should be fully informed about the consequences of their choice and the motives of the political authority. Saving for retirement is a complex issue, and pension contribution decisions are often made with little foresight or information. Pension contribution nudges may not always be freedom preserving because of complexity and unintended consequences. The benefits, risks, and limitations of default contribution pension nudges are discussed.