Ecological inference is a statistical technique used to infer individual behavior from aggregate data. A particularly relevant instance of ecological inference involves the estimation of the inner cells of a set of R × C related contingency tables when only their aggregate margins are known. This problem spans multiple disciplines, including quantitative history, epidemiology, political science, marketing, and sociology. This paper proposes new models for solving the problem using the latent structure theory, and presents the ecolRxC package, an R implementation of this methodology. This article exemplifies, explains, and statistically documents the new extensions and, using real inner cell election data, shows how the new models in ecolRxC lead to significantly more accurate solutions than ecol and VTR, two Stata routines suggested within this framework. ecolRxC also holds its own against ei.MD.bayes and nslphom, the two algorithms currently identified in the literature as the most accurate to solve this problem. ecolRxC records accuracies as good as those reported for ei.MD.bayes and nslphom. Besides, from a theoretical perspective, ecolRxC stands up for modeling a causal theory of political behavior to build its algorithm. This distinguishes it from other procedures proposed from different frameworks (such as ei.MD.bayes and nslphom) which model expected behaviors, instead of modeling how voters make choices based on their underlying preferences as ecolRxC does.

In this note, we provide direct evidence of cheating in online assessments of political knowledge. We combine survey responses with web tracking data of a German and a US online panel to assess whether people turn to external sources for answers. We observe item-level prevalence rates of cheating that range from 0 to 12 percent depending on question type and difficulty, and find that 23 percent of respondents engage in cheating at least once across waves. In the US panel, which employed a commitment pledge, we observe cheating behavior among less than 1 percent of respondents. We find robust respondent- and item-level characteristics associated with cheating. However, item-level instances of cheating are rare events; as such, they are difficult to predict and correct for without tracking data. Even so, our analyses comparing naive and cheating-corrected measures of political knowledge provide evidence that cheating does not substantially distort inferences.

Mixed-methods designs, especially those in which case selection is regression-based, have become popular across the social sciences. In this paper, we highlight why tools from spatial analysis—which have largely been overlooked in the mixed-methods literature—can be used for case selection and be particularly fruitful for theory development. We discuss two tools for integrating quantitative and qualitative analysis: (1) spatial autocorrelation in the outcome of interest; and (2) spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of a regression model. The case selection strategies presented here enable scholars to systematically use geography to learn more about their data and select cases that help identify scope conditions, evaluate the appropriate unit or level of analysis, examine causal mechanisms, and uncover previously omitted variables.

This article analyzes election data that permit simple tests of rational voting and agenda setting. The voting test pertains to aggregate election results. The prediction is that when voters have single-peaked preferences, there will be more opposition to the second of two budget proposals that are voted on simultaneously. Unlike the standard binary choice setting, not all voters have weakly undominated voting strategies, but the game among the voters can be solved simply by iterative application of weak dominance. The agenda-setting prediction tested is that agenda setters should make one proposal rather than two when given the option. The data come from Oregon school district financial elections from 1980–83, years in which the rules for these elections were abruptly changed.

We examine citizens' evaluations of majoritarian and proportional electoral outcomes through an innovative experimental design. We ask respondents to react to six possible electoral outcomes during the 2019 Canadian federal election campaign. There are two treatments: the performance of the party and the proportionality of electoral outcomes. There are three performance conditions: the preferred party's vote share corresponds to vote intentions as reported in the polls at the time of the survey (the reference), or it gets 6 percentage points more (fewer) votes. There are two electoral outcome conditions: disproportional and proportional. We find that proportional outcomes are slightly preferred and that these preferences are partly conditional on partisan considerations. In the end, however, people focus on the ultimate outcome, that is, who is likely to form the government. People are happy when their party has a plurality of seats and is therefore likely to form the government, and relatively unhappy otherwise. We end with a discussion of the merits and limits of our research design.

Exploring if/how lobbying patterns differ by political regime, this paper uses data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys with about 29,000 firms across 83 country/years to test the hypothesis that this political activity should be greater in democracies. Considering a variety of democracy indicators and different lobbying measures, it finds strong support for this expected positive relationship. It then employs these data to consider the trade and currency policy preferences of firms within the special interest channel, comparing democracies with non-democracies. These results show a greater percentage of exporting firms, a lesser percentage of import-competing firms, and a greater percentage of non-tradable firms within the democratic special interest channel, helping to build a lobbying-based explanation for why democracies tend to have more open trade policies and more flexible exchange rate regimes.

Existing arguments across political science posit that parties in government use domestic and international institutions to lock in their own policy preferences by tying the hands of successors. I demonstrate that these arguments contrast with the assumption of office-seeking parties and therefore portray an incomplete picture of the incentives of governments. The paper emphasizes the trade-off between implementing policy preferences, on the one hand, and exploiting partisan differences for electoral success, on the other hand: locking in a policy takes an issue off the table, but it also undermines a party’s ability to leverage differences to the opposition in elections. Because office-seeking parties need to take into account these electoral consequences, they have a disincentive to tie their successors’ hands. I advance this argument in the context of the establishment of independent central banks, provide empirical evidence, and suggest implications for the literature on international institutions.

During the political process, the electorate needs to determine the competence of the government by both observing its policy decisions and acquiring information from the media. However, media reports are often criticized for not being independent and truthful. This paper discusses whether the public can determine the quality of a government from media reports. In other words, are media outlets more likely to act as watchdogs or just as “yes men” to the government? This paper argues that, because of reputational concerns, the media usually avoid criticizing the government. The media only report truthfully when the expected competence of the government is sufficiently low and the probability for the voter to learn from other information sources is sufficiently high. Otherwise, media outlets—especially low-quality outlets—will pander to the government in their reporting. Policy bias or media capture is not required for the yes-man problem to prevail.

Doubts about the integrity of ballot secrecy persist and depress political participation among the American public. Prior experiments have shown that official communications directly addressing these doubts increase turnout among recently registered voters who had not previously voted, but evaluations of similar messages sent by nongovernmental campaigns have yielded only suggestive effects. We build on past research and analyze two large-scale field experiments where a private nonpartisan nonprofit group sought to increase turnout by emphasizing ballot secrecy assurances alongside a reminder to vote in a direct mail voter mobilization campaign during the 2014 midterm election. Our main finding is that a private group’s mailing increases turnout by about 1 percentage point among recently registered nonvoters. This finding is precisely estimated and robust across state political contexts, but is not statistically distinguishable from the effect of a standard voter mobilization appeal. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

What are the electoral consequences of urban riots? We argue that riots highlight the economic and social problems suffered by those who participate, inducing potential electoral allies to mobilize. These allies can then punish local incumbents at the ballot box. We test this hypothesis with fine-grained geographic data that capture how exposure to the 2011 London riots changed vote choices in the subsequent 2012 mayoral election. We find that physical proximity to both riot locations and the homes of rioters raised turnout and reduced the vote for the incumbent Conservative mayor. These results are partly driven by a change in the turnout and vote choices of white residents. This provides support for the view that riots can help shift votes against incumbents who oppose the implied policy goals of rioters.

Economic development and accompanying structural changes of the economy create new opportunities, however not everywhere and not for everyone. Development increases the demand for skilled labor, improving their welfare perceptions, but low-skilled workers feel more insecure and worse off economically. This adverse effect results from a mismatch between local labor demand and individual skill sets. To measure the development levels of people's local environments, I combine geocoded Afrobarometer data and night lights. Bayesian multilevel analysis confirms that the highly skilled are economically most dissatisfied in lagging areas, while the low-skilled are less satisfied in highly developed environments. These findings emphasize the importance of local conditions for welfare perceptions and show the unequal effect of development leaving behind large parts of the population.

Some work in political methodology recommends that applied researchers obtain point estimates of quantities of interest by simulating model coefficients, transforming these simulated coefficients into simulated quantities of interest, and then averaging the simulated quantities of interest (e.g., CLARIFY). But other work advises applied researchers to directly transform coefficient estimates to estimate quantities of interest. I point out that these two approaches are not interchangeable and examine their properties. I show that the simulation approach compounds the transformation-induced bias identified by Rainey (2017), adding bias with direction and magnitude similar to the transformation-induced bias. I refer to this easily avoided additional bias as “simulation-induced bias.” Even if researchers use simulation to estimate standard errors, they should directly transform maximum likelihood estimates of coefficient estimates to obtain point estimates of quantities of interest.

This paper proposes a Bayesian multilevel spatio-temporal model with a time-varying spatial autoregressive coefficient to estimate temporally heterogeneous network interdependence. To tackle the classic reflection problem, we use multiple factors to control for confounding caused by latent homophily and common exposures. We develop a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to estimate parameters and adopt Bayesian shrinkage to determine the number of factors. Tests on simulated and empirical data show that the proposed model improves identification of network interdependence and is robust to misspecification. Our method is applicable to various types of networks and provides a simpler and more flexible alternative to coevolution models.

We argue that education's effect on political participation in developing democracies depends on the strength of democratic institutions. Education increases awareness of, and interest in, politics, which help citizens to prevent democratic erosion through increased political participation. We examine Senegal, a stable but developing democracy where presidential over-reach threatened to weaken democracy. For causal identification, we use a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits variation in the intensity of a major school reform and citizens’ ages during reform implementation. Results indicate that schooling increases interest in politics and greater support for democratic institutions—but no increased political participation in the aggregate. Education increases political participation primarily when democracy is threatened, when support for democratic institutions among educated individuals is also greater.

The increasing cost of political campaigns and its impact on the electoral process are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability in which candidates choose whether or not to commit to constituency service and whether or not to pay a campaign cost to advertise their platform. A higher campaign cost decreases voter welfare when partisan imbalance is low. However, when partisan imbalance is high, a higher campaign cost is associated with a higher expected level of constituency service. More costly campaigns can thus have a rebalancing effect that improves electoral accountability. We discuss the implications of our findings for campaign finance regulation and present empirical evidence consistent with our key predictions.

Whether a topic is seen in a moral or moral-emotional light has significant political implications. Yet, we lack knowledge about the process of moralization: Who defines the way topics are communicated about? Where prior research has investigated the relative power of different actors to place a topic on the agenda or shape opinions, we study who sets the moral and moral-emotional tone of debate. To do so, we zoom in on immigration discourse in Germany and analyze fine-grained social media data from politicians, political parties, newspapers, and members of the public over a period of more than four years. After employing a transformer model to identify moral and moral-emotional appeals, we use structural vector autoregression models to demonstrate the important role of radical-right challengers in shaping public discourse in a negative moral-emotional direction. The results inform theories of moralization and political entrepreneurship.

Many believe primary elections distort representation in American legislatures because unrepresentative actors nominate extremist candidates. Advocates have reformed primaries to broaden voter participation and increase representation. Empirical evidence, however, is quite variable on the effects of reform. I argue that when institutional reform narrows one pathway of political influence, aggrieved actors take political action elsewhere to circumvent reform. I use a difference-in-differences design in the American states and find that although changing primary rules increases primary turnout, campaign contributions also increase with reform. Implementing nonpartisan primaries and reforming partisan primaries lead to estimated 9 and 21 percent increases in individual campaign contributions per cycle. This suggests actors substitute action across avenues of political influence to limit effects of institutional reform.

What explains a party's dual decision about whether to endorse a referendum on an international treaty and whether to support that treaty in a referendum campaign? Relying on an original game of second-order electoral competition, this article argues that the relative likelihood of a party endorsing a referendum is highest at the beginning and end of the electoral cycle, and when the public supports the treaty. The study uses data on the position of 175 parties in 24 member states vis-à-vis the EU's Constitutional Treaty and its preferred mechanism of ratification to test these expectations against empirical evidence. Using a multinomial logistic regression model, it finds robust support for the argument.

Does increasing executive power necessarily decrease accountability? To answer this question, I develop a two-period signaling model comparing voter welfare in two separation-of-powers settings. In one, the executive works with a median legislator to change policy; in the other, the executive chooses between legislation or unilateral action. Both politicians may have preferences that diverge from the voter's, yet I find that increasing executive power may increase accountability and welfare, even in some cases when the legislator is more likely to share the voter's preferences than the executive. Unilateral power allows a congruent executive to overcome gridlock, implement the voter's preferred policy, and reveal information about the politicians’ types—which can outweigh the risks of a divergent executive wielding power for partisan ends.

Ethnic relations play an important political role in many countries and can have serious consequences for policy and stability, with many conflicts occurring along ethnic lines. While most studies on ethnic relations focus on the behavior of the general public, ethnic bias among political elites may be equally consequential but remains understudied. This study explores tools that improve interethnic cooperation among politicians in governance (rather than electoral competition). We argue that shared interests incentivize elites to overcome ethnic bias. We conduct two experiments (one survey and one lab-in-the-field) with local politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and find support for this expectation, i.e., concrete information about shared policy priorities and goals foster interethnic cooperation.