Hume and Smith advance different answers to the question of whether sympathy can ever be the foundation of the moral order. They hold contradictory views of sympathy, called here ‘the Fellow-Feeling Paradox’. For Hume, fellow-feeling tends to reverberate in society, leading to the socialization of the individual and even mob (collective) psychology. Hence, sympathy cannot be the foundation of the moral order. In contrast, for Smith, fellow-feeling develops into critical judgment of the emotions/actions, leading to individual moral autonomy even self-command. Hence, sympathy can be the foundation of the moral order. This paper provides a resolution of the two answers.

This paper examines Roger Scruton's acousmatic account of music, situating it in relation to the anthropology that accompanies it. It suggests that in order to adequately maintain the anthropology Scruton desires (a cognitive rather than an ontological dualism), and to take full account of the parallel he draws between musical and inter-personal understanding (through gesture), the materiality of music needs to be more fully into his account of musical understanding.

David Lewis's Principal Principle (PP) states that our credence in a single case follows from the general probability of all such cases. Against this stands the Challenge Argument (CA) – to show that the inference is justified. Recent (1) law-to-chance, (2) Bayesian, and (3) propensity theories of probability take up the challenge – but, I argue, fall short. Rather, we should understand (4) propensity via Aristotle's analysis of spontaneity (5) and probabilistic reasoning via the Anti-PP and (6) the practice of bundling one offs, where (7) forced bad-odds one offs illuminate how extensive a role luck plays in our lives.

Divine command theories of metaethics are commonly rejected on the basis of the Euthyphro problem. In this paper, I argue that the Euthyphro can be raised for all forms of moral realism. I go on to argue that this does not matter as the Euthyphro is not really a problem after all. I then briefly outline some of the attractions of a divine command theory of metaethics. I suggest that given one of the major reasons for rejecting such an analysis has been found to be unsound divine command theories deserve to be taken more seriously in contemporary metaethics.

A discussion of how and whether judgment regarding the happiness, flourishing or well-being of a life is appropriately influenced by false belief or ignorance on matters central to that life. That is, is it so that what we don't know does not, or cannot hurt us? How much does it matter if the false belief was owing to betrayal or deception by others who mattered deeply to the now dead person? Further, is truthfulness about such betrayal something a friend of a dying person may eschew or is it itself a kind of betrayal?

The role of hypothetical acts, as opposed to actual acts, has been neglected in understanding the nature of what is required by the Respect for Persons formulation of the Categorical Imperative in concrete moral relations between persons. This had led to a failure to understand fully the way and the extent to which the Categorical Imperative may be present in all such relations with others as encapsulated in an appropriate attitude towards others that may refer to hypothetical acts, as well as actual acts. The result is an underestimation of the direct relevance and moral efficacy of the Categorical Imperative.

Polemics are a sort of critique typically suffused with inimical emotions and passions. But how are these emotions and passions to be construed? Neither authorial expression nor actual arousal properly account for their role in polemics. Rather, the polemicist must stage an unequal battle between a polemical self and the polemical target vis-à-vis an anticipated audience, skilfully handling, through his or her words, the emotions ascribed to each of them.

Atheists in general need share no particular political or metaphysical views, but atheists of the most modern, Western, militant sort, escaping from a merely nihilistic mind-set, are usually humanists of an especially triumphalist kind. In this paper I offer a critical analysis and partial history of their claims, suggesting that they are members of a distinctively Christian heretical sect, formed in reaction to equally heretical forms of monotheistic idolatry.

Bryan Magee's recent paper ‘Clarity in Philosophy’ argues that instead of focusing on clarity at the sentence level, writers should emphasize formulating their ideas clearly before any writing takes place. In part using text-analysis of three well-known philosophers, I will uphold Magee's assertion that clear writing is not necessary in order to be considered a great philosopher. On the other hand, I will challenge his ideas regarding the relationship between language and cognition by reflecting on ways in which writing aids the development of ideas.