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The Fellow-Feeling Paradox: Hume, Smith and the Moral Order*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 July 2015

Elias L. Khalil
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Abstract

Hume and Smith advance different answers to the question of whether sympathy can ever be the foundation of the moral order. They hold contradictory views of sympathy, called here ‘the Fellow-Feeling Paradox’. For Hume, fellow-feeling tends to reverberate in society, leading to the socialization of the individual and even mob (collective) psychology. Hence, sympathy cannot be the foundation of the moral order. In contrast, for Smith, fellow-feeling develops into critical judgment of the emotions/actions, leading to individual moral autonomy even self-command. Hence, sympathy can be the foundation of the moral order. This paper provides a resolution of the two answers.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 90 , Issue 4 , October 2015 , pp. 653 - 678
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2015 

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Footnotes

*

The paper was supported by the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research and Monash University's Faculty Research Grant. An earlier version received comments from Philippe Fontaine, Ulrich Krohs, Robert Sugden, Aldo Rustichini, Ian McDonald, Caroline Gerschlager, Herbert Gintis, Robin Pope, Taiki Takahashi, Roland Cheo Kim San, Jonathan Wight, Steven Gardner, and many seminar participants. The usual caveat applies.

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