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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
“The well-intentioned person…must…assume the being of a moral author of the world, that is, a God” (Critique of Judgement, B. 391). Since Kant wrote those words, the so-called Moral Argument has been a battleground. In our day, at least three eminent Gifford lecturers have attested the view that the facts of the moral life are such as to warrant the belief that when truly analysed and their implications brought to light, certain quite definite theistic conclusions emerge. I refer, of course, to Professors Taylor and De Burgh and to the late Professor Sorley. But, whilst a more recent holder of that illustrious office, Professor Laird, has expressed his scepticism, no less an authority than Professor N. Hartmann on the other hand holds the opinion that far from morality implying any sort of theistic conclusion, in actual fact a living authentic morality suggests quite the opposite and seemingly postulates the non-existence of God. This somewhat startling divergence of view is accentuated by their common agreement on one all-important point, namely, that the moral consciousness recognizes an unconditional obligation to realize certain moral values which are absolute and ultimate.