A passing remark may at times be a clearer indication of basic conceptions or misconceptions than a well-pondered dissertation, and the present article had its inception in a passing remark of Professor Dewey's, to the effect that no man has as yet seen an atom, although it is quite possible that atoms might be observed in the future.

In earlier articles an account has been given of some of the chief notions in the Organic Philosophy, namely Creativity, Actual Entities, Eternal Objects, God. In the present article the writer will endeavour to present Whitehead's doctrine concerning the space-time continuum and the nature of enduring objects implicated therein.

Auguste Comte, writing of one of his forerunners, Montesquieu, said that the great merit of the latter's memorable work L'Esprit des Lois appeared to him to be in its tendency to regard political phenomena as subject to invariable laws like all other phenomena. Comte himself writes with regard to sociology: “the philosophical principle of the science being that social phenomena are subject to natural laws, admitting of rational prevision, we have to ascertain what is the precise subject, and what the peculiar character of those laws.” “Such prevision,” says Comte in another place, “is a necessary consequence of the discovery of constant relations between phenomena, and it is the unfailing test which distinguishes real science from that erudition which mechanically accumulates facts without aspiring to deduce them one from another.” Elsewhere he speaks of “rational prevision, the principal characteristic of true science.” And Branford and Geddes quote his saying: “Savoir pour prévoir, prévoir pour pourvoir.”

In recent years ethical discussion has centred round the problem of the relation between the idea of right and the idea of good. Previously it had been more or less generally assumed that moral philosophy was principally concerned with the idea of good, and followed its course by asking such questions as: What is the meaning of good? or, What are the characteristics which anything must have in order to be good? or even, What things are good? The idea of right was generally regarded as subordinate, and it was perhaps more often implied than stated that an action was right if by it something good was realized.

“The well-intentioned person…must…assume the being of a moral author of the world, that is, a God” (Critique of Judgement, B. 391). Since Kant wrote those words, the so-called Moral Argument has been a battleground. In our day, at least three eminent Gifford lecturers have attested the view that the facts of the moral life are such as to warrant the belief that when truly analysed and their implications brought to light, certain quite definite theistic conclusions emerge. I refer, of course, to Professors Taylor and De Burgh and to the late Professor Sorley. But, whilst a more recent holder of that illustrious office, Professor Laird, has expressed his scepticism, no less an authority than Professor N. Hartmann on the other hand holds the opinion that far from morality implying any sort of theistic conclusion, in actual fact a living authentic morality suggests quite the opposite and seemingly postulates the non-existence of God. This somewhat startling divergence of view is accentuated by their common agreement on one all-important point, namely, that the moral consciousness recognizes an unconditional obligation to realize certain moral values which are absolute and ultimate.