In a recent contribution to this journal Loughlin (2011) reflected on the place of wonder in Newman's education. This instructive piece followed a pattern in which Newman is regarded as having made positive contributions to educational debates. It is this pattern or assumption about Newman's contribution to education, particularly for the theory or philosophy of Catholic education that will be the focus in this article. It will be explained that there is some ambiguity over how much Newman's arguments for liberal education are actually grounded in more general theological arguments about the distinctive nature of Catholic education. In what follows it will be argued that a more general analysis of Newman on education draws attention to a wider issue concerning what ought to be the relationship between theology and the theory or philosophy of education. It will be proposed that Newman down played the role of theology in defending liberal education and this has implications for those who might want to appeal to him now in terms of guiding debates about the philosophy of Catholic education.

Thomas Aquinas's use of the terms libero, libertas, and liberum arbitrium in the Summa theologiae gives us a wealth of information about free will and freedom. Human beings have free will and are masters of themselves through their free will. Free will can be impeded by obstacles or ignorance but naturally moves toward God. According to Servais Pinckaers, our freedom can be that of indifference (the morality of obligation) or that of excellence (the morality of happiness). The difference is that of free will moving reason versus reason moving free will. The freedom of indifference is the power to choose between good and evil. The will is inclined toward neither and freely chooses between them. The freedom for excellence is the power to be the best human being we can be. Here the rules, or what makes for a good human being, are the grounding for freedom. One who observes these rules has the freedom to become excellent. According to Aquinas, intellect and will have command over free will. This then is true freedom, and on this Aquinas and Pinckaers agree. We do not have freedom of indifference, we have freedom for excellence. Anything else makes us slaves.

Developments in technology and communications have enhanced the status and role of imaging. They have resulted not just in the excellent quality of images but also in the speed and ease of distributing or communicating them. But with the welcome advances have also come undesirable and even threatening consequences for both individuals and society generally. These have presented challenges and issues which need to be addressed urgently. The essay considers these from a philosophical perspective. Focusing first on the tension between image and reality, it provides a philosophical background to the debate. It then discusses the question of truth and the related issues of the right to know, freedom of speech and privacy. It provides the foundation for these fundamental rights but also examines the tensions or conflicts in their exercise. The essay then offers and discusses some guidelines to deal with these challenges and issues; namely, the criteria of appropriateness and acceptability and the importance of accountability. It suggests that in addition, given the frailty of human nature and the lessons of history, society also needs the support of laws and policies.

This paper describes the background to the last fifty years of violence in Columbia and identifies its causes in inequality, poverty and displacement. It then explores the ways in which the Catholic Church has been prominent in developing processes of peace-building that include “accompaniment” of the victims to include them in structures of citizen participation. It ends with theological and pastoral reflections on how this can be enabled practically in the Columbian context.

The results of Vatican II for the study of Scripture produced both expected and unexpected fruits. Those combined fruits provide the opportunity for some reflection on the current status of biblical scholarship in relation to the Church. This current status helps identify what we must appreciate and celebrate, but also helps identify remaining gaps to be filled. By assessing some of the gaps, the fruits of the second Vatican council are used to provide one way of approaching these remaining gaps, and charting a hopeful way ahead.

This essay falls into two parts. In the first I offer a panorama of my book, In Defence of War (Oxford University Press, 2013), highlighting its main features. These comprise: its rhetorical position; its opposition to the “the virus of wishful thinking”, pacifism, legal positivism, and liberal individualism; and its promotion of the early Christian tradition of just war reasoning and of three kinds of realism – moral-ontological, Augustinian-anthropological, and practical. Then in the second part, I consider four controversial issues that the book raises: love, proportionality, Britain's entry into the First World War, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

This article examines the retrieval of patristic exegesis in two major figure in Catholic Ressourcement theology: Henri de Lubac and Yves Congar. Henri de Lubac's driving concern in his biblical writings is not so much to chronicle the history of interpretation as it is to explicate the great theological synthesis, which underlies the doctrine of the fourfold sense of Scripture. For de Lubac, this synthesis, wherein the totality of Christian doctrine and practice is centered in Christ and grounded in the reading of Scripture, is an essential component of Christianity. De Lubac encourages the integration of this theological vision with modern biblical studies, but he does not offer much as to what such an integration might look like in practice. Congar, building upon de Lubac's work, goes beyond de Lubac in making concrete efforts to integrate some of the theory and practice of patristic interpretation with modern exegesis. Important here is Congar's notion of “typological tradition” whereby the divine mystery concealed and revealed in the realities presented by the biblical text, unfold in the tradition, doctrine, and practice of the Church.

This essay supports William Cavanaugh's thesis in The Myth of Religious Violence that the distinction between the “religious” and the “secular” is arbitrary. This essay also accepts the claim that this arbitrary distinction can be used to form unhelpful inversely-valued dichotomies for the sake of ideological or sectarian ends. However, the current essay seeks to show that this binary goes in the opposite direction as well. Sectarian outlooks of various kinds also postulate a strict and inversely valued dichotomy between the believing community and the world, where the former is the locus of truth and life and the latter, falsehood and death. Instead of this model of ethics, I commend an approach that upholds the prospect of concord between the believing community and the world, of the religious and the secular, even if these are somewhat inevitably arbitrary categories. In this approach, religious and civil loyalties are not pitted against each other, but rather exist on a continuum of provenance and perfection.

The Enlightenment has bequeathed to us the notion that religion can be treated as an object of theoretical inquiry, giving rise to the “secular” concept of religion as a field of meaning or truth-content that is (ideally) isolable from the particular practices that constitute religious worship. I argue that the later Heidegger's “poetic” thought disrupts the paradigm underlying the secular concept of religion and points us toward an alternative understanding of religion as tantamount to being-in-the-world. Heidegger thus opens the way for post-secular reflection on the transformative potential of religion in human culture.

The present article examines the perspectives of two understudied, female spiritual writers, Elizabeth of the Trinity and Caryll Houselander, on the doctrine of ‘divine indwelling’. After a brief discussion of classical elaborations of this doctrine, the paper gives an account of Elizabeth's and Houselander's respective Trinitarian and Incarnational readings of God's indwelling of the human soul. This discussion shows that a given interpretation and experience of the divine indwelling is inevitably shaped by – and shapes – the particularity of one's concrete life context, as well as the doctrinal prism through which it is approached. It furthermore demonstrates that such different accounts nonetheless converge on key, and at times surprising issues, such as the reciprocal nature of divine indwelling, and its interdependency on the separation between God and the human being.

The Catholic Church claims that its ethical teaching, especially on sex, is based upon natural law. I first show that natural law theories prior to the Middle Ages provide no authority for the Church's teaching on sex. I then examine Aquinas's teaching on natural functions and natural law in the two Summae. I suggest that he partly anticipates Enlightenment thinking about law and morals. I compare his theory of natural law with that of Germain Grisez and John Finnis. Finally, I examine the notion of a principle of practical reasoning and indicate how such principles could be formulated to correspond to elements in human nature.

Every form of government, whether by its action or inaction, encourages certain forms of behavior and discourages others. The moral well being of a society necessitates its consideration of civil law's legitimate role in shaping moral character. In this paper, I will attepmt to argue that the Thomistic account of civil law is not merely negative, but entails a positive pedagogy that seeks to nurture the moral virtue of its citizens, for both the viciously inclined and those who are already good. Furthermore, Aquinas’ theory of the common good is such that its role is not merely limited, i.e., through establishing some form of civic tranquility and providing basic goods of the material or economic order with little worry of the moral habits thus cultivated.

The treatment of Thomas’ teaching on human law will not be fully exhausted in this paper. However, from examining the texts from the Summa Theologiae and the De Regno, it will appear evident that St. Thomas has provided a concise and intelligent framework for seeing and actualizing the necessary relationship between human law and moral virtue.

Christian hope of resurrection requires that the one raised be the same person who died. Philosophers and theologians alike seek to understand the coherence of bodily resurrection and what accounts for numerical identity between the earthly and risen person. I address this question from the perspective of disability. Is a person with a disability raised in the age to come with that disability? Many theologians argue that disability is essential to one's identity such that it could not be eliminated in the resurrection. What anthropology undergirds these claims is not often explicated. I argue that Thomistic hylemorphic anthropology provides the best context to understand the human person such that disability is not essential to identity. In the resurrection, we shall become truly ourselves. The marks of disability may remain, but Thomistic anthropology expresses the coherence of bodily resurrection in which one may hope for healing which eliminates the disability but not numerical identity.