This article investigates how two eminent scholars, the French cultural historian Rémi Brague and the American professor of Government J.Budziszewski misunderstand Aquinas on law. It explores the possible reasons for their misunderstandings. In both cases there is a failure to appreciate the theological context and content of what St Thomas has to say about law. Their lack of appreciation for the theological content explains also their individual specific distortions of the account of law. Brague confuses eternal law and divine law, which Aquinas explicitly distinguishes, and applies an abstract notion of the divine which heapplies not only to medieval Christian texts, but also to Greek, Egyptian, Jewish, and Islamic ideas on law. Budziszewski imposes on St Thomas’s classification of types of law the logical structure of genus and species, despite acknowledging that Aquinas avoids this language. The result is that he fails to appreciate the significance of eternal law. Both scholars misapprehend eternal law, and this is due to their ignoring theology. They exemplify a characteristic mistake of treating St Thomas as a philosopher, and his theology as something added on to the philosophical account.

This article explores some ethical implications of nuclear energy from a theological perspective. The key point argued for is that the few texts in the literature that address nuclear energy from a theological perspective do not give adequate weight to the importance of the potential benefits of nuclear energy as part of climate change mitigation strategies. The same also applies to the possible role of nuclear energy in providing compensation for future generations in terms of energy resource durability. The texts thus fail to address matters of importance for intergenerational justice. I examine first an article by Jame Schaefer that discusses Aquinas’ conception of prudence in relation to nuclear energy. I then discuss the relevant sections of the papal encyclical, Laudato Si’ and the Japanese Bishops Conference’s document, Abolition of Nuclear Power. All these texts fail to articulate the potential benefits of nuclear energy pertaining to some perspectives on intergenerational justice, because they do not take sufficient note of advances in nuclear technology that would allay some of the concerns expressed within the texts with which I take issue.

Aquinas’ anthropology is commonly believed to prevent the mind–body problem by treating the human being as one substance, and the soul as a formal cause. Thomists’ descriptions of Aquinas’ anthropology tend to understate or even omit its more dualistic elements, e.g., that the soul is an agent cause that moves the body, and that acts through the mediation of the ‘corporeal spirits’. More importantly, these descriptions overlook that Aquinas himself recognizes a problem of mental causality and even argues for some solutions to it. This paper aims to show that there is such a problem within Aquinas’ conceptual frame, and that contemporary Thomist anthropologies are also vulnerable to it.

In his 2019 essay, Arthur Kleinman laments that medicine has become ever-competent at managing illness, yet caring for those who are ill is increasingly out of practice. He opines that the language of ‘the soul’ is helpful to those practicing medicine, as it provides an important counterbalance to medicine’s technical rationality that avoids the existential and spiritual domains of human life. His accusation that medicine has become soulless merits considering, yet we believe his is the wrong description of contemporary medicine. Where medicine is disciplined by technological and informational rationalities that risk coercing attention away from corporealities and toward an impersonal, digital order, the resulting practices expose medicine to becoming not soulless but excarnated. Here we engage Kleinman in conversation with Franco Berardi, Charles Taylor, and others to ask: Have we left behind the body for senseless purposes? Perhaps medicine is not proving itself to be soulless, but rather senseless, bodyless – the any-occupation of excarnated souls. If so, the dissension of excarnation and the recovery of touching purpose seems to us to be an apparent need within the contemporary and increasingly digitally managed and informationally ordered medical milieu.

While various parts of St Thomas’ work have been suggested as places to discern a Thomistic ecclesiology, this article tries to situate the Church in a discussion of creation and the communication of divine goodness that is at the heart of the mystery of providence and predestination. Despite the assurance that God works for good with those who love him, our understanding of divine providence must begin with the frank admission of a tension between our intuition that creation must be ordered, and our experience of contingency. By understanding the Church’s place within creation, in a hidden and shadowy way from Abel until its manifestation in the Lord’s Paschal Mystery, we can see how God’s loving purposes are worked out both in the implicit faith in a Mediator, which finds its expression in a belief in God’s providential care of creation, and in the life of the visible Church where the mystery of predestination is worked out in the lives of the faithful until all is at last made manifest at the end of time. Such an ecclesiology allows us to see the fundamental importance, and mystical meaning, of the visible hierarchical Church.

The once-popular thesis that non-Christians who are inculpably ignorant of the gospel can be saved through ‘implicit faith’ in Christ has fallen on hard times. In this paper, we consider objections raised against this position by a range of Catholic critics, including Thomas Crean, Augustine DiNoia, Gavin D’Costa, and Stephen Bullivant. In our judgement, criticisms of ‘implicit faith’ often suffer from a lack of clarity about the nature of such faith, although admittedly this ambiguity was present even in original Scholastic uses of the term. However, in the past few decades, analytic philosophers have explored many forms of belief, which one might call ‘implicit’. Accordingly, we draw on both Scholastic and analytic epistemology to arrive at a more attractive characterisation of implicit faith. We argue that once implicit faith is understood in this way, recent objections to the claim that non-Christians can be saved soluble.

In recent years, a large amount of scholarship has been written about St Thomas Aquinas’s views on free will and determinism. This paper is an attempt to bring some Thomist views of libertarian free will into dialogue with analytic philosopher Peter van Inwagen and his ‘mysterianism’ about free will. The thesis of this paper is that Thomist libertarians about free will are committed to Peter van Inwagen’s mysterianism about free will. The paper intends to accomplish this aim by showing how recent accounts of Thomist libertarianism cannot defeat the intuitive strength of van Inwagen’s ‘Replay argument’. The significance of this conclusion is that some Thomists are committed to mysterianism and that mysterianism is a legitimate position a Thomist can hold. This also provides evidence that the Thomist tradition can grow and be nourished by engagement with contemporary analytic philosophy.