The ‘Westphalian’ system existed in a disguised form in Europe before the Thirty Years War. It threw off the disguise in the late sixteenth century and revealed underlying discrete ‘municipal’ legal orders. By the mid-seventeenth century this ‘Westphalian model’ was widely perceived and accepted as a useful basis for political thought.

Punitive damages are a heavily debated aspect of the US legal system. Courts and commentators from both within and outside the United States have leveled criticism at their foundation and application in current law. It is important to note, however, that punitive damages both originated in and exist in other legal systems. Much of the current debate in the US about punitive damages is fueled by ideological posturing in a national political debate more polarized than at any time in recent memory. It is not surprising that in the midst of such a domestic debate the view of punitive damages from abroad is less than flattering.

By the Act of 27 November 2013, the Dutch Government has radically changed the provisions of its Penal Code pertaining to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction (Arts. 4-8 Penal Code). The new rules take effect from July 1st 2014 onwards. Most importantly, the Act widens the scope of the passive personality principle, generalizes the application of the domicile principle, which equates permanent residents with nationals for purposes of the application of the active personality principle, and establishes jurisdiction over foreigners present in the Netherlands who have committed a serious crime abroad if extradition proves impossible (aut dedere aut judicare), even if international law does not oblige the Netherlands to do so. In addition, the Act brings order to the Penal Code's hitherto rather chaotic jurisdictional provisions by, inter alia, grouping the jurisdictional mandates based on international legal instruments together in one provision, and limiting the number of jurisdictional grounds on which offences can be prosecuted.

1. In the present paper I intend to discuss some developments in the practice of States granting asylum to certain categories of individuals, as well as the extent to which and the way in which this practice is influenced by the Convention on the Status of Refugees. “Asylum” is the protection a State may afford to an individual by letting him enter the territory of the State and allowing him to stay within it. A State has a nearly unfettered discretion to grant this protection to any alien it wishes. But the term “asylum” is not employed in ordinary cases of admission of aliens; it is reserved for cases where the alien in question has left his country for what may roughly be characterized as political reasons, and is admitted to another country.

It now looks as though the middle of the 1980's will mark an important turning point in the development of Dutch civil law. By that time, books 3–6 and some parts of book 7 of the New Civil Code will probably have entered into force in the Netherlands. Two books have already come into force and it is expected that after 1985 the remaining parts of book 7 and book 8 will soon follow suit.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the US declared a war on terrorism, principally aimed at Al Qaeda. The declaration could be dismissed as a sleight of words were it not for the fact that, for the US and for those it affects, it has real and serious legal consequences. The US claims that its declaration of a war on terror is merely an act of self-defence as in its view, Al Qaeda declared a state of war through the 9/11 attacks and these initiated an armed conflict to which the laws of armed conflict apply. Although the characterization of the war on terror as an armed conflict has been rejected by many authorities, the view that the 9/11 attacks were an armed attack giving rise to the rise of self-defence has been widely accepted.

If the 9/11 attacks are armed attacks giving rise to the right of self-defence but the attacks did not constitute an armed conflict; as an act of war, they would not be subject to the laws of war. This would disconnect jus ad bellum and jus in bello in relation to acts of war. If there is a state of war without there being an armed conflict, this would allow the US to take certain measures in relation to the terrorist threat but would not give it the more extensive liberties associated with an actual wartime situation.

This article reviews Dutch contributions to international law and focuses on the last 100 years to mark the centenary of the Netherlands Society of International Law. It poses the question whether this is a missionary burden, resulting from the constitutional duty incumbent upon the Dutch government to ‘promote the development of the international legal order’, or enlightened self-interest on the part of the Netherlands. The article briefly recalls the two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and Dutch initiatives for a third that had been planned for 1915 at a time when the Dutch pursued a policy of neutrality. It also reviews some Dutch initiatives in the context of the League of Nations and Dutch policy during the San Francisco Conference that established the United Nations in 1945. The German occupation and membership of the United Nations marked the real end of the Dutch policy of neutrality. From the outset, the Netherlands became an active participant in nearly all principal fields of the United Nations' activity. The article highlights a number of Dutch international law initiatives in the fields of human rights, development, peace and security, international humanitarian law, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. It concludes with final observations on the preoccupation of the Netherlands with international law.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee is a body of 18 independent experts (including a member from the Netherlands, Professor Cees Flinterman) who are tasked with monitoring compliance with the provisions of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in force 23 March 1976). The Committee deploys four principal activities – periodic examination of State Party reports, interpretation and progressive development of the provisions of the Covenant in the form of General Comments, and adjudication of individual complaints under the Optional Protocol, as well as follow-up procedures. This article analyzes the Committee's second General Comment on Article 19 of the Covenant, which stipulates freedom of opinion and freedom of expression. In 52 paragraphs the General Comment systematically examines, defines and delimits the concepts contained in the three subparagraphs of Article 19, basing itself primarily on the Committee's concluding observations upon examination of State Party reports and on the case-law in response to petitions under the Optional Protocol. The Committee highlights the primacy of freedom of opinion, recognizing that it is crucial for a democratic society that persons have access to truthful, reliable and pluralistic information, including through the internet, in order to develop a personal opinion whose expression must then be protected by law. The Committee notes, however, that whereas it is inadmissible to impose any restrictions on freedom of opinion, there are certain responsibilities that attach to the exercise of freedom of expression, namely the respect of the reputation of others as well as considerations of health, morals and national security. The Committee holds that so-called ‘memory laws’ as well as blasphemy laws are incompatible with Article 19 and that defamation laws must strike a balance between competing rights and interests. Paragraph 49 of the General Comment clearly affirms the right to hold non-conformist historical views and the right to be wrong. While it is not the function of lawyers or judges to establish what historical truth is, Article 20 of the Covenant imposes an obligation on governments to prohibit incitement to racial hatred or violence, the criminalization of which requires narrow definition of the elements of the crime.

United Nations human rights treaties dealing with specific concerns contain provisions in terms of obligations for states, rather than individual rights. This has consequences for the assessment by treaty monitoring bodies of the level of compliance by States Parties. While human rights norms generally impose obligations on states, the opposite is not always the case; not all obligations in human rights treaties contain corresponding rights for individuals. While the ILC Articles on State responsibility address the establishment of state responsibility in contentious procedures established by the regional human rights conventions; they do not take into account other monitoring procedures that exist, in particular under United Nations human rights treaties. These instruments create different mandates for treaty monitoring bodies, under which they can and do examine treaty implementation in much more general terms than would be possible under the contentious procedure. The individual complaint procedure under some of the treaties, the inquiry procedure and the reporting procedure offer possibilities to assess whether states' non-compliance with treaty obligations. This article examines these possibilities in the light of the ILC Articles on state responsibility.

According to the pronouncements of the International Court of Justice, rules of municipal law have to be regarded, from the standpoint of international law, as mere facts. This docs not prevent these “facts” from having legal consequences under international law, as they often do: to that extent they are not “mere” facts but legal facts (faits juridiques; rechtsfeiten). In quite a number of cases international tribunals, including the International Court itself, had to interpret rules of municipal law of a State because of their being relevant to a legal dispute between States.

The old truism, that international law is not a suicide pact, is forceful in an age of destructive weaponry. Nevertheless strategically, there is little precedent for a major military offensive against a state that has not proximately used force against the interests of the belligerent state. Legally, while a number of legitimate justifications might permit the use of force, an appropriate international law doctrine, under which the United States could execute the military campaign it recently successfully launched against Iraq, does not currently exist. But that lacuna was seemingly plugged with the ‘Bush Doctrine’ that advocates pre-emptive strikes against rogue states and/or entities involved in terrorism. The so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ articulates a new rule of international law that seeks to bring to life the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence as an appropriate means through which to combat terrorism (including states that actively support terrorism or that are themselves terror states in the sense of acquiring and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction).

The prohibition of the use of force is generally considered to be a jus cogens rule, which would mean that it does not permit any derogation, neither by consent nor by treaty. Yet multiple apparent derogations from the prohibition exist: Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter, Articles 105, 110 and 111 of the UNCLOS, and other treaties all permit uses of force, and ad hoc consent to use force is common. This article explains how this can be legally valid, by reference to the distinctions between derogations, exceptions, and scope.

Much has been said about the potential of the World Bank's Inspection Panel to contribute to the normative development of international law. Yet, empirical evidence to contest or affirm this potential has been scarce. This article situates the Panel as a body that operates within a ‘system of quasi-judicial oversight’, and expounds the Panel's development of normative standards in three areas: the compliance review process, international human rights and public participation in decision-making. The article concludes by restating the Panel's normative potential in the light of its institutional realities as a body functioning in a ‘quasi-judicial oversight system’.

Examination of the work of the International Court of Justice over the period mentioned shows more frequent use of the Court by a wider range of states; a consistent use of the possibilities of advance acceptence of jurisdiction; and some procedural developments, in particular the establishment of provisional measures as imposing a binding obligation of compliance. Some concern is expressed at a trend toward favouring jurisdiction in doubtful cases. The major problem noted is the Court's excessive workload, and a tentative proposal is advanced for easing this.

The evolution of international commercial arbitration as an alternative mechanism for the resolution of international commercial disputes has been accompanied by the gradual liberalization of national arbitration laws and the acknowledgement of the special role this institution has had to play in international trade. At present, most of the developed national arbitration laws accord substantial freedoms to parties and arbitrators in framing the arbitral procedure as they see fit and reduce the instances of possible court interference in the proceedings. These developments have been accompanied, and sometimes preceded, by the evolution of legal theories aimed at explaining the specific contractual nature of international commercial arbitration and justifying its autonomous and independent status.

Like any legal system, international law assigns a place to responsibility. The very recognition of the existence of international law implies the principle of responsibility for the violation of the international legal duties imposed on the State. As formulated by Max Huber, the first president of the Permanent Court of International Justice: “La responsabilité est le corollaire nécessaire du droit. Tous droits d'ordre international ont pour conséquence une responsabilité internationale.” Ch. de Visscher regards the international responsibility of States as a logical consequence of their equality in the international legal system. The mutual recognition of their sovereignty implies on the one hand the freedom of action essential to the accomplishment of their objectives, while on the other hand it imposes upon them the restrictions necessarily ensuing from the existence of different States that have equal rights. “Une fois reconnu par la communauté Internationale, l'Etat … apparait comme capable d'enfreindre le droit international et d'assumer de ce chef des responsabilités.”

The article addresses the question which consequences the war on terrorism has for the practice of and thinking about humanitarian intervention. The discussions about the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention reached their peak after the NATO bombardments against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to protect the Albanians in Kosovo in 1999. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, which led to the war on terrorism, however, changed the focus of attention. The central question for international lawyers is no longer whether states may use force to protect human rights, but whether the use of force in anticipatory self-defence is allowed under international law in view of new security threats. After describing humanitarian intervention after the end of the Cold War, the impact of the war on terrorism on the protection of human rights is analysed. Although some authors think that the war on terrorism can coincide with the protection of human rights, the present author is more pessimistic. Subsequently the concept of the responsibility to protect is discussed. The author concludes that this concept is less revolutionary as some authors claim it to be. Most importantly, it does not provide a legal justification for the use of force to protect human rights without permission of the Security Council. The last section of the article therefore investigates whether the principle of necessity can serve as a potential legal justification for an intervention for human protection purposes without Security Council authorization.

On 10 December 1982, 117 States signed the Convention on the Law of the Sea and about forty signatures were later added to this impressive number. However, one should not conclude from this that the Convention will come into force soon, for that would require 60 ratifications. It is certain that the industrialized nations are hesitating as many of them have difficulties with the mining regime for the deep sea-bed, provision for which was made in the Convention. Among those who have not yet signed are the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The Netherlands have signed but explicitly stated that a later decision is required whether or not they will also have to ratify the Convention. All attention was understandably focussed on the deep seabed mining regime which should not make one forget that this was only one of the many features of the Convention. With reference to other provisions in the Convention, some of which would appear to be rather important, there is no difference of opinion. When one takes a cursory look at the 320-articles therein, some subjects seem to merit special attention: the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, fishing, the continental shelf, the high seas, the control of pollution of the marine environment, marine scientific research and the settlement of disputes.