This paper builds a small-open-economy nonscale-growth model with negative population growth and investigates the relationship between trade patterns and per capita consumption growth. Under free trade, if the population growth rate is negative and its absolute value is small, the home country becomes an agricultural country. Then the long-run growth rate of per capita consumption is positive and depends on the world population growth rate. On the other hand, if the population growth rate is negative and its absolute value is large, the home country becomes a manufacturing country. Then the long-run growth rate of per capita consumption is positive and depends on both the home country and the world population growth rates. Moreover, the home country is better off under free trade than under autarky in terms of per capita consumption growth irrespective of whether the population growth is positive or negative.

We formulate a central bank's problem of selecting an optimal long-run inflation rate as the choice of a distorting tax by a planner who wishes to maximize discounted stationary utility for a heterogeneous population of infinitely lived households in an economy with constant aggregate income and public information. Households are segmented into agents who store value in currency alone and agents who have access to both currency and loans. We show that the optimum inflation rate is positive, because inflation reduces the value of the outside option for credit agents and raises their debt limits.

This article examines if professional forecasters form their expectations regarding the policy rate of the European Central Bank (ECB) consistent with the Taylor rule. In doing so, we assess micro-level data including individual forecasts for the ECB main refinancing operations rate as well as inflation and gross domestic product (GDP) growth for the Euro Area. Our results indicate that professionals indeed form their expectations in line with the Taylor rule. However, this connection has diminished over time, especially after the policy rate hit the zero lower bound. In addition, we also find a relationship between forecasters’ disagreement regarding the policy rate of the ECB and disagreement on future GDP growth, which disappears when controlling for monetary policy shocks proxied by changes in the policy rate in the quarter the forecasts are made.

This paper shows that limited asset-market participation (LAMP) generates an extra inflation bias when the fiscal and the monetary authority play strategically. A fully redistributive fiscal policy eliminates the extra inflation bias, but at the cost of reducing Ricardians' welfare. A fiscal authority that redistributes income only partially reduces the inflation bias, but raises government spending. Although a fully conservative monetary policy is necessary to get price stability, it implies a reduction in liquidity-constrained consumers' welfare, in the absence of redistributive fiscal policies. Finally, under a crisis scenario, none of the policy regimes is able to avoid the fall in economic activity when the increase in the fraction of LAMP is coupled with a negative technology shock, whereas optimal policy can avoid recession when it responds to the increase in LAMP proportion alone.

Recurring financial instabilities have led policymakers to rely on early-warning models to signal financial vulnerabilities. These models rely on ex-post optimization of signaling thresholds on crisis probabilities accounting for preferences between forecast errors, but come with the crucial drawback of unstable thresholds in recursive estimations. We propose two alternatives for threshold setting with similar or better out-of-sample performance: (i) including preferences in the estimation itself and (ii) setting thresholds ex-ante according to preferences only. Given probabilistic model output, it is intuitive that a decision rule is independent of the data or model specification, as thresholds on probabilities represent a willingness to issue a false alarm vis-à-vis missing a crisis. We provide real-world and simulation evidence that this simplification results in stable thresholds, while keeping or improving on out-of-sample performance. Our solution is not restricted to binary-choice models, but directly transferable to the signaling approach and all probabilistic early-warning models.

In this paper, we study the effects of government debt on macroeconomic aggregates in a non-Ricardian framework. We develop a microfounded framework that combines time-varying markups, endogenous labor supply, and overlapping generations based on infinitely lived families. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a new transmission mechanism for public debt through the countercyclical markup movements induced by external deep habits. We analyze the effects of a positive shock to public debt. We show that the interest rate rises, entailing higher markups and a fall in employment and consumption. Interestingly, even without capital, a crowding-out effect of government debt is obtained in the long run. In addition, we show that when prices are sticky, public debt has a short-run expansionary effect, which is strengthened by the presence of deep habits.

I examine the optimal inflation target in a dynamic stochastic New Keynesian model featuring an occasionally binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rate (ZLB). To this end, I first calibrate the shock needed to generate the risk of hitting the ZLB that matches the U.S. data, based on a fully nonlinear method. I then resolve the model with different inflation targets and find that the optimal target is 3.4%. In addition, the optimal inflation target is a nonlinear function of the risk of hitting the ZLB and inflation indexation. It is always greater than 2% if the risk is greater than 2.5% or if the inflation indexation is higher than 0.5. Finally, the linear–quadratic approach overestimates the true optimal inflation target. In particular, based on the benchmark calibration, it generates an optimal target of 5.5%, compared with 3.4% found by the fully nonlinear method.

Rapid growth in large emerging economies has been spread unequally across their regions leading to growing income disparities. This paper examines the distribution of regional output per capita and the evolution of its shape in Brazil, China, India, and Russia from the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s. A comparative analysis of convergence is conducted using a nonparametric methodology. The results reveal different distribution dynamics across the four economies. Chinese regions with below-median output per capita have the highest probability of transitioning toward higher-income levels, while their Brazilian counterparts are trapped at the bottom of the distribution. Although India has the lowest and Russia one of the highest regional income inequalities, they display similar divergence patterns exemplified by high persistence at both ends of the distribution. Our findings indicate that government spending and the rule of law are the major driving forces behind regional convergence, except in Russia where they have the opposite effect. Innovation and property rights also promote convergence in China, but cause regional divergence in India.

We explore the roles of subsidies in the Matsuyama model [K. Matsuyama, Econometrica 67 (1999), 335–347] of growth through cycles with a Solow investment phase and a Romer innovation phase when innovation and intermediate goods production rely on existing capital. We show that subsidies to R&D investment or to the purchase of new intermediate goods can arbitrarily reduce the threshold level of capital per type of intermediate good beyond which the economy moves to the innovation phase. Sufficient subsidization can eventually eliminate cycles. For plausible parameterizations, optimal subsidies can achieve significant welfare gains equivalent to as much as 10% rises in consumption at all times.

We study the dynamic macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks under lump-sum tax financing. To this end, we develop an intertemporal macroeconomic model for a small open economy, featuring monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market, endogenous (intertemporal) labor supply, and finitely lived households. Fiscal shocks are shown to yield endogenously determined (dampened) cycles for a realistic calibration of the model. Impulse response functions of fiscal policy shocks in the finite-horizon model differ substantially from those resulting from an infinitely lived representative agent model. This can be explained by the presence of Ethier-productivity effects, which increase the size of long-run output multipliers to a greater extent in the infinite-horizon model.

We study the impact that financial intermediation can have on productivity through the alleviation of credit constraints in occupation choice and/or an improved allocation of risk, using both static and dynamic structural models as well as reduced-form OLS and IV regressions. Our goal in this paper is to bring these two strands of the literature together. Even though, under certain assumptions, IV regressions can accurately recover the true model-generated local average treatment effect, this is quantitatively different, in order of magnitude and even sign, from other policy impact parameters (e.g., ATE and TT). We also show that laying out clearly alternative models can guide the search for instruments. On the other hand, adding more margins of decision, that is, occupation choice and intermediation jointly, or adding more periods with promised utilities as key state variables, as in optimal multiperiod contracts, can cause the misinterpretation of IV as the causal effect of interest.

Does excluding food and energy prices from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) produce a measure that better captures permanent price changes? To examine this question, we decompose CPI inflation and “core” inflation into their permanent and transitory components, using a correlated unobserved-components model. The stationarity of inflation may be time-varying, so we examine the performance of the core measure of inflation separately for periods in which inflation is I(1) and I(0). For a period in which inflation appears to be I(1), we find that core inflation and the permanent component of overall inflation are closely related, but there are some caveats. For a period in which inflation appears to be I(0), we decompose the core and overall price levels and find that the permanent component of the core CPI is much more volatile than the actual core series and that the core excludes volatile permanent shocks to the overall price level.

Why do governments in developing economies favor roads rather than schools in public investment scale-ups? We study this question using a dynamic general equilibrium model and argue that the different pace at which roads and schools contribute to economic growth, public debt intolerance, and political myopia are central to this decision. In a thought experiment with a large return differential in favor of schools, a benevolent government would intuitively devote the majority of an investment scale-up to them. However, the fraction of schools chosen by the government falls with increasing levels of debt intolerance and political myopia. In particular, political myopia is a meaningful explanation for the observed result to the extent that an extremely myopic government would not invest in schools at all.

We adopt mechanism design to study the effects of inflation on output, trade, and capital accumulation. Our theory captures multiple channels for individuals to respond to inflation: search intensity, market participation, and substitution between money and a higher return asset. We characterize constrained efficient allocations and show inflation has nonmonotonic effects on the frequency of trades (extensive margin) and the total quantity traded (intensive margin). The model features monetary superneutrality for low inflation rates, nonlinearities in trading frequencies, and substitution of money for capital for higher inflation rates. While these effects are difficult to capture in previous models, we show how they are intimately related by all being features of an optimal trading mechanism.

When some steps of a complex, multi-step task are automated, the demand for human work in the remaining complementary sub-tasks goes up. In contrast, when the task is fully automated, the demand for human work declines. Upon aggregation to the macroeconomic scale, partial automatability of complex tasks creates a bottleneck of development, where further growth is constrained by the scarcity of essential human work. This bottleneck is removed once the tasks become fully automatable. Theoretical analysis using a two-level nested constant elasticity of substitution production function specification demonstrates that the shift from partial to full automation generates a non-convexity: humans and machines switch from complementary to substitutable, and the share of output accruing to human workers switches from an upward to a downward trend. This process has implications for inequality, the risk of technological unemployment, and the likelihood of a secular stagnation.

This paper develops a model positing a nonlinear relationship between public investment and growth. The model is then applied to a panel of African countries, using nonlinear estimating procedures. The growth-maximizing level of public investment is estimated at about 10% of GDP, based on System GMM estimation. The paper further runs simulations, obtaining the constant optimal public investment share that maximizes the sum of discounted consumption as between 8.1% and 9.6% of GDP. Compared with the observed end-of-panel mean value of no more than 7.26%, these estimates suggest that there has been significant public underinvestment in Africa.

Industrial production and employment in Italy were hard hit by the Great Depression, and remained below trend until at least 1936. Few quantitative studies have been conducted on the causes of Italy's recession and slow recovery. Using monthly data, and reviving an aggregate supply model published in Bernanke and Carey [Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996), 853–883], we empirically test whether Italy's 1930s industrial performance could be related to the Fascist wage and price policies, which, aiming at keeping workers' real wages constant, actually raised firms' labor costs, computed as nominal wages deflated by wholesale prices, hence stalling industrial production. We find evidence of a strong countercyclicality of real wages and of nominal wage stickiness in the period 1929–1936, which would confirm our hypothesis. Trade restrictions are found to play a smaller role in hindering industrial production than previously stated in the literature, whereas we confirm the weak transmission of financial turbulence to the real economy.

The standard model of the small open economy is burdened with a unit root that greatly complicates numerical computation of the global saddle path. In this paper we solve the unit root problem by developing a set of innovative forward-shooting algorithms. Exploiting the fact that the algorithms are mechanical and model-free, we have placed canned, fully automated programs in the public domain. The programs do not require any substantive human input. The user's only responsibility is to type in the equations of the model correctly.

Empirical literature provided convincing evidence that explicit (i.e., legislated) inflation targets anchor expectations. I propose a novel game theoretic framework with generalized timing that allows us to formally capture this beneficial anchoring effect. Using the framework I identify several factors that influence whether and how strongly expectations are anchored, namely (i) the public's cost of decision making, (ii) the public's inflation aversion, (iii) the slope of the Phillips curve, (iv) the magnitude of supply shocks, (v) the degree of central bank conservatism, and under many (but not all) circumstances, (vi) the explicitness of the inflation target.

In this paper, I examine the role of government spending persistence on fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound (ZLB) in a more realistic environment while keeping the model simple enough to identify mechanisms driving the result. In particular, I build on a standard dynamic New Keynesian (DNK) model with an occasionally binding ZLB and Rotemberg pricing with rebates, where the probability of hitting the ZLB and the government purchase shock are in line with US data. Moreover, I compute the multiplier in a state that mimics the Great Recession. The main findings of the paper are as follows: (1) the multiplier is non-monotonic in the persistence of government spending while the economy is at the ZLB; (2) given the persistence estimated from US data, the multiplier is 1.25; and (3) in the framework with perfect foresight or with aggregate resource cost for adjusting prices, the multiplier is around 1 or less.