Some books present such a wide variety of perspectives and so many interesting themes and topics in a particular area of law that it is rather difficult to write a comprehensive but at the same time concise review article about them. Consequently, such books run the risk of remaining unobserved or unattended, however valuable may be their contribution to the development of that area of law. Something like that threatened to happen to the volume of papers that was edited by Sari Kouvo and Zoe Pearson and published in 2011. Writing the book review remained for rather a long time on my to-do list, because reading it had incited me to reconsider my own answers to some foundational questions about feminism, about law, and about the ‘and’ that seems so firmly situated between these two concepts. In fact, feminism and law have been at the core of my professional activities since I finished law school in 1983, so for some thirty years for me these two things were closely connected. I thought that I knew very well what I was doing and why! Reading this book – and having agreed to review it – made these questions manifest and urgent to answer. The book, in short, invokes much (self-critical) thinking about the why and how of any engagement with feminism and (international) law, which is a first reason to recommend it to anyone who stands open for such an endeavour. After a brief description of its structure and content, I will discuss just a few of the many thought-provoking materials in this volume and some of my preliminary reactions to them.

The Geneva Arbitration of 1872 was convened to settle various differences between the United States and Great Britain and, in particular, American allegations of British collusion with regard to shipbuilding for the Southern Confederacy during the American Civil War. The Arbitrators ultimately found Britain liable, and awarded $15,500,000 to the United States. This decision remains controversial to the extent that it rested on rules which were not yet accepted as principles of general international law, and which clearly favoured the case of the United States from the outset. It is thus the purpose of this article to explore the facts behind the Geneva Arbitration, and to argue that the finding of British liability in Geneva marked the beginning decline of the laws of neutrality. Neutral Countries […] may be exploited by the Great Powers both strategically and as a source of additional armies and fleets. Of central importance to the game are those Neutral Countries and provinces which are designated as “Supply Centres.” […] A player's fighting strength is directly related to the number of Supply Centres he or she controls, whilst the game is won when one player controls at least 18 Supply Centres.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which is mandated under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights with promoting and protecting human rights in Africa, has attracted considerable criticism for being an ineffectual body. One of the complaints is that the Charter based regime lacks an effective system of remedies. This paper examines whether this criticism is justified. An analysis of the jurisprudence of the African Commission proves that the Commission is patiently constructing a concept of reparations which has some similarities with that developed by the UN Human Rights Committee.

In 1954, following the US explosion of a large thermonuclear device in the South Pacific, Prime Minister Nehru of India led the first international call for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. It took until 10 September 1996 for the General Assembly of the United Nations to adopt the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). As at the end of April 1997, it had been signed by 142 states including the five nuclear-weapon states.

[…] risks and conflicts of interest can be overcome by rules of conduct adequate to the challenges of life if a conscious effort is made to foresee and counter the problems likely to emmerge.

This essay focuses on the (non)application of the precautionary principle in the Hormones Case. It concludes that the finding of the Appellate Body that the precautionary principle, as such, cannot overrule the explicit wording of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement is debatable, if a similar principle or concept were to exist in health law – a line of thought that is not pursued by the Appellate Body in its consideration of the precautionary principle. In addition, the article includes considerations about the problems that arises if substantive unity is sought in a procedurally non-unified system for international dispute settlement.

On 13 July 1999 Algeria joined the growing list of countries that have adopted some form of ‘amnesty law’ as a means of restoring peace and encouraging reconciliation. After a brief description of the historical context, this article examines the features of the Algerian Civil Concord Law. This law is then used as a backdrop in considering eight ways in which modern amnesty laws may be drafted and adopted to ensure compliance with developing principles of international law.

The World Health Organization (WHO) had, among other things, been examining and deliberating the hazardous effects to health by the use of nuclear weapons. These discussions culminated in a resolution which requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in the following terms: [i]n view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a Stare in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?

On 5 July 2018, the European Parliament adopted a recommendation to the Council endorsing a proposal for the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. Conceived as a new primary organ of the United Nations (UN), the Parliamentary Assembly aims at complementing the work of the General Assembly by giving direct representation to the peoples of the world and passing binding legislation. This article reconstructs the historical roots of the proposal and speculates about the possible legal implications for both the UN and its member states stemming from the establishment of an elected citizens’ chamber within an intergovernmental organization. An argument is made that in order to achieve the stated goals of the model of United Nations Parliamentary Assembly endorsed by the European Union (EU), the required institutional changes to the UN system would be so radical as to effectively repudiate it in favour of a newly established system of international co-operation.

The Fishery Agreement concluded in 1992 between the European Economic Communities and the Republic oj Argentina provides an excellent example of the negotiating process leading to the conclusion of a treaty in the field of international fisheries. The Agreement shows how widely diverging interests and seemingly opposing views can be reconciled by two parties prepared to negotiate constructively and to develop a new generation of agreements. This article should be considered against the background formed by developments in the law of the sea. Particularly in the fields of the protection of the environment, the administration of resources and development policy, and the diverging interests that coastal states and ‘distant water fishing states’ have in these matters. To place the conclusion of this Treaty in the appropriate context, an overview of the structural and economic conditions of the fishery sector in Argentina and the European Communities will be given. Finally, the innovative technicalities of the new treaty will be discussed against this background.

Reprisals originally served individuals seeking redress for an injustice suffered abroad. The concept, however, has undergone extensive development. Nowadays, reprisals are -in themselves illegal- retaliatory measures used by one state seeking redress for an illegal act committed by another. The prerequisites for legal reprisals areformulated in the Naulilaa Incident arbitration of 1928. In her examination of the recent history of the concept of reprisals, this arbitration is the author's starting point. After this examination she compares reprisals to other methods of redress. Finally, she investigates the limitation of the use of reprisals as laid down in humanitarian law treaties.

The Hague Convention on Cultural property of 1954 prohibits the transfer by the occupier of cultural property from territory occupied by him. Under the Protocol annexed to the said Convention, the parties to it undertake to return cultural property transferred in contravention of the Convention to their countries of origin. These provisions arc clearly inadequate when dealing with Jewish cultural property looted by Nazi-Germany and its collaborators in the course of World War II. Jewish cultural heritage was usually considered as endangering the cultural heritage of the host nations and, consequently, subject to harassment and destruction. It would therefore seem inequitable to return looted Jewish cultural property (representing the cultural heritage of the Jewish people) to (those countries from which it was looted; the proper recipient of this heritage (also by virtue of the principle of self-determination) is the Jewish people represented by the State of Israel and the major contemporary Jewish communities around the world.

By an application filed on 29 March 1994, Cameroon instituted proceedings against Nigeria, relying on the declarations under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court, made by both states without reservations. The dispute, according to the Application, related “essentially to the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula”, where, “since the end of 1993”, the Nigerian troops were “occupying several Cameroonian localities”. Cameroon also requested the Court “to determine the course of the maritime boundary between the two states beyond the line fixed in 1975”. In an ‘Additional Application’, filed on 6 June 1994, Cameroon extended the subject of the dispute “essentially to the question of sovereignty over a part of the territory of Cameroon in the area of Lake Chad”, which had become the object of “the official […] claim […] by […] Nigeria quite recently, for the first time”; and also requested the Court “to specify definitely” the whole frontier line from Lake Chad to the sea, and to examine the two Applications as a single case. In its counter-memorial, filed within the prescribed time-limit (18 December 1995), Nigeria raised objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Cameroonian claims, whereupon the proceedings on the merits were suspended and the President of the Court fixed 15 May 1996 as the time-limit within which Cameroon might present its observations on the Nigerian objections.

This article uses the case study of the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) and its work on Syria as a way to reflect on the challenges international lawyers face in conducting research in relation to secret, highly constrained spaces. In particular, the article engages with debates within anthropology on the nature of para-ethnographic research as a way to think about research relationships between international legal scholars and practitioners as conducive of collaboration, (inter)dependency and dialogue. Yet this type of research, especially without the grounding of legal texts, raises questions about the legal researcher’s integrity and author(ity). Thus, the article’s core concern is to explore the inter-relationship between a variety of risks that can occur for both scholars and research subjects operating in secret spaces.

This article presents a theoretical framework by which to understand how disasters are reconciled with a state’s existing obligations under international law. This ‘reactive’ model of disaster regulation hinges on two regulatory techniques, ‘disapplication’ and ‘exculpation’, both of which involve a deviation from the ordinary application of a norm owing to the occurrence of a disaster or to measures adopted by a state in relation to it. It proceeds to outline the various doctrines and mechanisms across different subfields of international law, including international human rights law, investment law and trade law, which may operationalize these techniques in disaster situations. Finally, it argues that the applicability of certain disapplication and exculpation mechanisms to disasters relies on an anachronistic view of such disasters as rare and episodic occurrences beyond human control. This puts these mechanisms at odds with the central objectives of international disaster law and their underlying sociological and scientific premises, which emphasize the need for an ‘adaptive’ model of comprehensive and prevention-oriented disaster regulation. Accordingly, this analysis exposes the conceptual limitations of the reactive model for disaster regulation and explains and validates the inclination toward an adaptive model within international disaster law. It also indicates how mechanisms within the reactive model could be recalibrated to better regulate disasters.