Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 make universities liable for sexual harassment that occurs within both the employment and academic contexts. This article examines how universities implement and enforce the mandates of both Title VII and Title IX through exploratory research about sexual harassment complaint procedures at a public university system on the West Coast. In-depth interviews with personnel at each campus shed light on problems with inserting a complaint resolution process into an institution that simultaneously strives to eliminate sexual harassment, while wanting to protect itself from liability. This inherent conflict of goals is reflected in the differing roles of the Title IX office and the Women's Resource Center, in creation of a user friendly policy, and in the two branches of dispute resolution.

The large U.S. legal profession hurts economic productivity in the United States and our economic competitiveness abroad according to a common claim A number of studies support that claim, but they suffer from serious flaws. I reexamine the hypothesis that large lawyer populations impair economic growth and suggest that it lacks theoretical and empirical support. The hypothesis depends on false assumptions about the organizational capability and interest of the legal profession; the empirical research in sup port of the hypothesis depends on flawed lawyer data, unusual combinations of high lawyer populations and low economic growth in one or two countries, and the unjustified use of lawyer population figures from the 1980s in analyses of economic growth prior to that period. I present the results of research on lawyer populations and economic growth among the US. states and in a sample of countries, correcting for the worst flaws of past research The results do not support the claim that large lawyer populations impair aggregate economic growth The analysis is not intended as the final answer on this important question but rather as an encouragement for a more sophisticated understanding of the role of lawyers in late modern economies.

Since 2013, a three-year entry bar (zapret na v'ezd) has been issued in Russia to migrants with a record of two or more administrative offenses. This article examines the sociolegal characteristics of zapret na v'ezd by situating it in a global, comparative perspective, vis-à-vis the legal developments in the areas of deportation and removal in the United States and the United Kingdom. This article argues that the Russian entry bar law experienced a shift, established by other migration-receiving jurisdictions, from controlling the migration process to controlling the social conduct of migrants, toward an increased reliance on deportability as a form of post-entry control of the migrant population. At a broader level, I aim to shed more light on the migration governance processes in Russia—the third largest destination of migrants worldwide—by moving away from the intellectually dead-end explanations that consider Russia as a deviant exception.

In Breaking the Pendulum, Goodman, Page, and Phelps (2017) advance an “agonistic” perspective that contends struggle drives penal change, and that it does so through perpetual conflict. Yet studying only manifest struggles, when an actor made their resistance to a penal status quo known, presents thorny problems in conceptualizing conflict. One such problem is that conflict among agonists advocating competing penal policies presupposes consensus between those who threaten penal order’s basic conditions. Understanding penal agonism’s corollary, penal antagonism, offers a more complete starting point from which to theorize penal history and penality.

This article explores how welfare clients use and experience the fair hearing system, the administrative mechanism for challenging denials or reductions of aid in public welfare bureaucracies. Drawing on data from in-depth interviews with clients, it explores how old-style procedural protections like fair hearings are being used to challenge new-style welfare reforms. This research found that clients use fair hearings as a form of resistance and self-assertion, hoping that it will protect them from a bureaucracy perceived as arbitrary and capricious. Like many citizens, they are as concerned with being heard by their governmental institutions as they are with the outcome of their case and want to find within the machinery of government a forum where they can obtain recompense and respect. However, the legalistic and rule-bound nature of hearings makes it difficult for clients to present their claims, and meaningful participation is often denied them.

Elite attorneys have been the objects of social scientific study and speculation for many years. This article contributes to that body of thought by reporting some of the results of a research project that studied 59 members of Chicago's corporate actor legal elite-the lawyers who serve the city's major business, social, civic, political, and cultural organizations.

The article briefly defines the elite studied and the design of the overall re-search project. It then focuses on the working situations of these lawyers and the professional roles they play for their respective corporate actors. A division of legal labor that is discovered to separate house counsel from law firm partners among the elite is analyzed in some depth.

Since the professional roles of these elite attorneys differ from those de-scribed by other social scientists earlier, the article concludes by offering a theory to explain this apparent social change. By tapping recent discussions of the coming of postliberal society, it suggests that corporate actors engineer this new division of legal labor for their attorneys in response to the complex new legal problems posed by institutional changes in the larger society.

Civil rights litigation undertaken by lawyers associated with interest groups, particularly the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF), is of ten described as planned” litigation. This article examines litigation by these organizations from the late 1960s through the early 1980s to explore the extent to which “planned litigation” is planned. The author interviewed both staff attorneys for organizations participating in race relations litigation and “cooperating attorneys” associated with such organizations.

Elements of planned litigation discussed are litigating organizations’ choices—of areas of law on which to focus, of cases, of federal or state courts, and of amicus curiae participation—and the dynamics of litigation—including relations between staff and cooperating attorneys, litigators’ control of cases, and the effect of Supreme Court decisions on litigation strategy.

The interviews reveal that much interest-group civil rights litigation is not selected deductively on the basis of previously developed criteria but instead develops inductively from cases that come to the organizations and is affected by pressure and circumstance. Counter to the view, stemming from Brown v. Board of Education, that civil rights litigation is undertaken as planned “campaigns” based on “blueprints,” it appears that much about “planned” litigation is problematic, with many constraints imposed by the actions of others and by resource problems, with the result that many deviations from litigation strategy occur. Thus much “planned” litigation is responsive and reflexive and beyond litigators’ control.

This essay is an attempt to uncover and reconstruct 19th-century legal notions of “public economy” and the “well-ordered market.” Through an analysis of 19th-century product and inspection laws, licensing cases and regulations, and public controls on the urban marketplace, the author argues that economic regulation was deeply rooted in American life and law throughout the pre-Civil War era. The pervasiveness of these regulations and accompanying legal rationales steeped in a vision of a “well-regulated society” call into question historical descriptions of this period as the golden age of market capitalism and possessive individualism Law's preeminent role in the construction of public economy also suggests the need to revise our inherited picture of antebellum law as pragmatic, instrumental, and wedded to classical conceptions of property, contract, and the market.

The aims of retributive or nonutilitarian sentencing are said to conflict with parole as part of a determinate sentencing framework. In this article, we claim that a nonutilitarian approach to punishment does not necessarily conflict with parole. In particular, by adopting core elements of Duff's framework of communicative sentencing, we argue that parole inherently holds a communicative meaning in the form of retributive whisper and can thus be reconciled with a nonutilitarian approach to punishment. In addition, we explore a way to enhance the communicative potential in the parole process and suggest that by recognizing and further incorporating the inherent communicative message in parole we can increase or maximize the board's communicative potential. Finally, we discuss some benefits that can emerge from adapting a communicative sentencing framework to the parole process.

The wrongful death statutes enacted in most states during the mid-nineteenth century have long represented a classic moment in the narrative of American legal history. Historians have not observed, however, that American wrongful death statutes amended the English act on which they were modeled to introduce a gender asymmetry peculiar to the United States. Led by New York, most American jurisdictions limited wrongful death actions to “the widow and next of kin” of the decedent, categories that did not include husbands of deceased wives. Thus, a wife could bring a wrongful death action for the death of her husband, but a husband could not bring a wrongful death action on his own behalf for the death of his wife.

The wrongful death statutes represent a heretofore unrecognized conjuncture of the beginnings of the modem law of torts with the nineteenth-century legal reconstruction of the family. The statutes mowed accident litigation away from an eighteenth-century model of masters suing for loss of the services of a servant, slave, wife, or child, toward the now more familiar model of suits for loss of wages and support. Moreover, the gender asymmetry of the statutes embodied and reproduced a new nineteenth-century conception of the family in which men worked as free laborers and women were confined to relatively narrow domestic roles, removed from the market and dependent for their support on the wages of their husbands. Indeed, the statutes anticipated by over half a century the American welfare state's two-track approach to support for wage-earning men and dependent women.

In their 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein use research from psychology and behavioral economics to argue that people suffer from systematic cognitive biases. They propose that policy makers mitigate these biases by framing people's choices in ways that help people act in their own self‐interest. Thaler and Sunstein call this approach “libertarian paternalism,” and they market it as “the Real Third Way.” In this essay, I argue that the book is a brilliant contribution to thinking about policy making but that “choice architecture” is not just a solution to the problem of cognitive biases. Rather, it is a means of approaching any kind of policy making. I further argue that policy makers must take externalities into account, even when using choice architecture. Finally, I argue that libertarian paternalism can best be seen as motivated by what Sunstein has celebrated in his work on constitutional theory: a humility about the possibility of policy‐maker error embodied in Learned Hand's famous aphorism about the “spirit of liberty” and an attempt to reduce social conflicts by searching for what John Rawls called an “overlapping consensus.”

Incorporating behavioral insights into regulation is plausibly the most significant development in regulatory theory and practice in recent years. Behaviorally informed regulation encourages self-benefiting and socially desirable behaviors with little intrusion on autonomy. Drawing on new empirical findings, this article puts forward the hitherto overlooked possibility of employing the deadline effect as a regulatory tool. Deadlines serve as an antidote to procrastination and forgetfulness. Many empirical and experimental studies have examined the use of deadlines in marketing. This study explores the possible use of deadlines by legal policy makers. It describes two survey experiments, a randomized field experiment and a natural experiment, which suggest that deadlines may encourage self-benefiting and socially desirable behaviors, and that relaxing deadlines may discourage less desirable behavior. The article discusses the practical and normative aspects of using deadlines as a regulatory means, compared to alternative tools, such as default rules and required choices.

In the terms of Erving Goffman's classic role-distancing analysis, newly admitted law students often aspire to an “embraced” lawyer role that directly expresses their personal and political values. Empirical research has suggested that during law school these students are instructed in an amoral and apolitical vision of professionalism. The literature has paid less attention to how students internally experience these norms within their continual processes of self-construction. This article takes an exploratory micro-dynamic look at professional identity formation drawing on longitudinal interviews and identity mapping with three student cohorts. Over the course of their legal education, students bound for large corporate law firms tended to report increasing professional role distancing. In contrast, students who pursued jobs in the public-interest sector tended to sustain a more proximate conception of professional identity, overlapping with racial, gender, political, and other centrally constitutive roles. The article concludes with normative and theoretical implications.

The right to privacy has long been regarded as a liberal progressive principle, one that guarantees gender-based equality and liberty in the domain of reproductive rights. Since the US Supreme Court’s renowned articulation of privacy in Roe v. Wade, privacy’s opponents have condemned the right as an illegitimate judicial invention with no basis in the Constitution. This article addresses the puzzle of why a coalition of Christian conservative legal organizations, conservative foundations, Trump administration officials, Republican party lawmakers, and trans-exclusionary radical feminists has assembled to redefine the right to privacy in service of anti-transgender politics. While much attention has been paid to the proliferation of religious liberty-based challenges to the rights of sexual and gender minorities, these accounts miss how central the fight to reassociate privacy has become in conflicts waged in state and federal courts, city and state legislatures, and ballot referendum campaigns. Although this coalition eschews any mention of Roe or reproductive rights, it does adopt a substantive due process-based interpretation of privacy’s mandate despite the typical conservative disdain for that doctrine. Additionally, the coalition frames its project as one that balances competing rights claims by defending (cis) women’s rights against allegedly lopsided trans-inclusive reforms.

One in seven people in prison in the US is serving a life sentence, and most of these people will eventually be eligible for discretionary parole release. Yet parole hearings are notoriously understudied. With only a handful of exceptions, few researchers have considered the ways in which race shapes decision-makers’ perception of parole candidates. We use a data set created from over seven hundred California lifer parole hearing transcripts to examine the factors that predict parole commissioners’ decisions. We find significant racial disparities in outcomes, with Black parole candidates less likely to receive parole grants than white parole candidates, and test two possible indirect mechanisms. First, we find that racial disparity is unassociated with differences in rehabilitative efforts of Black versus white parole candidates, suggesting that differential levels of self-rehabilitation are not responsible for the disparity. Second, we test the hypothesis that racial disparity owes to commissioners’ reliance on other professionals’ determinations: psychological assessments, behavioral judgments, and prosecutors’ recommendations. We find that reliance on these evaluations accounts for a significant portion of the observed racial disparity. These results suggest that inclusion of professional assessments is not race-neutral and may create a veneer of objectivity that masks racial inequality.

Though the Colombian Constitutional Court has had a lead role in granting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) rights since 1998, conservatives mobilizing against LGBT rights between 1991 and 2007 were active in Congress and the streets rather than in court. After 2007, however, conservatives have maintained consistent opposition to rights claims made by LGBT people in the Constitutional Court. This article draws from fieldwork examining the significance of the Constitutional Court’s transition from granting rights to LGBT people as individuals to granting rights to LGBT people as couples and potential families to theorize conservative legal mobilization, particularly moral conservatism. To account for the rise of conservative legal mobilization against LGBT rights in Colombia in 2007, this article expands on the legal opportunity structure model. It theorizes that legal threats––that is, changes in legal rules that are perceived to increase the costs of mobilization or the expected costs of not taking action––are among the factors that lead movements to engage in legal mobilization, even if legal opportunities are not expanding.

The establishment of community corrections in China marks a restructuring of the Chinese penal field and a possibly differentiated arrangement of penal power. Social forces and community actors are now enabled and encouraged to participate in penal affairs and to share devolutionary penal power with the authoritarian state. Yet little research attention has been allotted to examine how these burgeoning social organizations, professional service providers, and community actors manage their participation in rehabilitative work and negotiate their rehabilitative aspirations with state ideologies and policy mandates as they work within Chinese community corrections (CCC). Drawing on observational data and in-depth interviews with social workers within CCC, we show the ways in which social workers actively create strategies to pursue their professional values of service and implement rehabilitative ideals and caring ethos while, at the same time, minimizing the risk of challenging state authority and jeopardizing penal policy priorities. Three devised approaches are presented, and their implications are discussed.

Using interviews with forty formerly incarcerated people in the Greater Toronto Area, I explore how criminal record holders describe seeking work. People articulate being driven by a desire to be selective to whom, when, and how they disclose their past criminal record; they simultaneously want to talk about their past, at least to some people, some of the time. Many say they are quite selective in what types of jobs and employers they seek out, and their efforts to secure employment are driven by broader projects of stigma management. In light of these findings, I coin “selective, voluntary disclosure” (SVD) as a new set of policy configurations that aim to facilitate not only employment but also dignity, privacy, and empowerment. SVD is well attuned with what former prisoners describe doing on an everyday basis, and it accords with their goals, aspirations, and rehabilitative self-projects.

This article addresses the positionality of anthropologists and the impact of anthropological theories in cultural expertise with the help of three case studies that highlight the engagement of anthropologists with law and governance during colonialism and in the wake of it: a well-known case of witchcraft in Kenya, Volkekunde theories in Africa, and the Rwandan genocide. The article starts with a short genesis of the concept of cultural expertise and its cognate concepts of culturally motivated crimes and cultural defense, to introduce the main question of this article: What can we learn from the use of cultural expertise in the colonial past? Today, as much as in the colonial past, anthropologists have been torn between action and abstention. The article’s three case studies show that neither action nor abstention is free from ethical responsibility. This article argues that the concept of procedural neutrality and its reformulation in the form of critical affirmation help anthropologists to carve out an independent role for themselves in the legal process. Procedural neutrality and its reformulation as critical affirmation make it possible to comply with the ethics and deontologies of the disciplines across which anthropologists operate when providing cultural expertise.