Most of the work of public interest law organizations does not make money. How do these organizations survive, given the economic realities of law practice? Drawing on survey data from a national random sample of public interest law firms, we investigate how funding models vary across public interest organizations and how funding sources affect these organizations’ activities. We find funding structures have, over time, shifted away from foundation support toward government grants. Compared to other organizations, however, conservative organizations draw significantly less of their budget from federal and state grants, and significantly more of their budget from private contributions. Conservative organizations are significantly less likely than other organizations to rely on funding that prohibits engaging in class actions, receiving attorney's fees, or lobbying. Respondents reported that funding restrictions hamper their ability to negotiate favorable settlements, bring about systemic change, and represent vulnerable client communities. We close with a comparative institutional analysis of different funding models.

Christopher Columbus Langdell (whose career ended a century ago) achieved fame by devising the case method to turn law into a laboratory science divorced from politics and to make his course so rigorous that it would attract able students seeking to test and prove themselves with the severest academic challenge. The method was adapted by many law teachers who were unpersuaded by the idea of law as apolitical science. These included Langdell's colleagues, James Bradley Thayer and John Chipman Gray, who shared Holmes's disdain for the theory. The method survived and flourished despite its theoretical weakness because it worked in practice. No mere rite of passage, it developed numerous traits and skills useful to lawyers, it revealed a true picture of the political and atomized nature of American law, and it nurtured many of the civic virtues that American law teachers have sought to nurture since the time of George Wythe.

In ordinary conversation, speakers are often called on to defend their assertions. In talk that takes place in institutional settings, speakers must often account for their claims as well. This study concerns the methods of argumentative support employed by participants in a particular institutional setting: jury deliberations. Micro-interactional analysis of transcripts of two actual deliberations—using the theore tical and methodological perspectives of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis-reveals that when jurors present defenses or accounts of their positions, they often reference mundane experience and practical reasoning. Jurors do not, then, merely weigh strictly “legal” considerations. Three of the jurors' discursive methods are scrutinized: Normative assertions, claims of expertise, and declarations of knowledge. These techniques serve not only to establish “evidence” in support of a juror's position but also to deflect other jurors' disagreement

This article examines the persistent authority of lobola, the customary practice for forming marriages in many South African communities. South African marriage rates have sharply fallen, and many blame this on economic challenges completing lobola. Using in-depth, qualitative research from a village in KwaZulu-Natal, where lobola demands are the country's highest and marriage rates its lowest, I argue that lobola's authority survives because lay actors have innovated new approaches for pursuing emerging desires for marriage via lobola. I argue that dyadic narratives of marriage increasingly circulate alongside “traditional” extended-family narratives, especially among the young women who strongly support lobola while yearning for gender-egalitarian marriages. My argument synthesizes actor-oriented analyses of legal pluralism with Ewick and Silbey's theorization of lay actors’ role in producing legality to illuminate how lay actors contribute not only to the form and content of different legal systems, but also to the reach of their authority.

The author surveys and compares the legal professions of 15 nations, including both civil law and common law countries. The essay is organized around the ways that legal professionals control their markets—first by controlling “production of producers” or who and how many enter the profession (with formal education or apprenticeship requirements, examinations, access to entry-level positions). Legal professionals also control “production by producers”—both external competitors and lawyers themselves. This occurs, for example, through definition and defense of the professional monopoly, control of competition between licensed professionals, and creation of demand. The discussion takes place against the background of the legal profession's recent history—assessing changes in its composition (by race, age, gender), in lawyers’ practice settings, in the categories of work they perform, and in the income and status associated with these categories and with the profession in general.

This essay responds to the three commentators in the symposium on my book, Law's Fragile State, by describing the sociolegal study of the rule of law as an investigation into both a set of ideals (the rule of law as a normative question) and a set of practices (the rule of law as an empirical question). Studying the rule of law involves understanding the contingent nature of its ideals as well as investigating the actual work that lawyers, judges, state officials, aid workers, activists, and others have done in specific contexts to promote legal remedies to social or political ills. These overlapping layers of the study of the rule of law—ideals and practices, normative and empirical—provide a sociolegal framework for understanding the successes and failures of legal work and, ultimately, how citizens experience state power in democratic and nondemocratic societies alike.

Drawing on prior theoretical and empirical work that has begun to constitute the insurance field as a distinct sociolegal research project, this study uses quantitative and qualitative data collected following Hurricane Andrew in 1992 to explore distributional questions within that field. Survey results show that higher income, age, and education were associated with having home insurance and that Hispanics and blacks were less likely than non-Hispanic whites to have insurance. The study provides the first quantitative evidence of bias in the insurance claims process by documenting a statistically significant and substantial ethnic difference in the timing of insurance payments. The qualitative research helps to explain the difference in the timing of insurance payments as the product of unconscious bias by insurance adjusters. The study concludes by proposing market-structuring regulation to reduce the inequality encountered.

Pornography is notoriously hard to define, yet like the Supreme Court all of us think we know it when we see it. Even if we cannot define pornography, we can say if something is or is not pornographic. How do we do this? More precisely, what is it that we think we know, when we think that something is or is not pornographic? We make these experiential determinations by reference to what I call our “traditional conception” of pornography. This conception is not based on definitions of pornography, for we have none. Rather, the traditional conception consists of broadly stated and widely believed inductive generalizations, which are in turn based on a multitude of common and shared experiences with pornographic materials. Recently—in the last ten years or so—that traditional conception of pornography has begun to change. But it is changing slowly. It still dominates our sense of what is and is not pornographic and our arguments about the value of pornography.

It has become commonplace among historically inclined legal scholars to look to the history of the United States’ elimination of bans on mixed-race sexual relationships for guidance about the recent controversy over same-sex marriage. This article argues that, while the analogy is helpful, it is not perfect because of the particular historical circumstances of the battle over antimiscegenation laws. Because regulations against interracial marriage were at the heart of defining and perpetuating the political and institutional system of white supremacy, they served a different purpose than the bans on same-sex marriage. The analogy can be pursued, however, to promote a critical consideration of the history of marriage as a heteronormative institution, generating a broader agenda for empowering change. Such a use of history takes the experience of the struggle against the antimiscegenation regime as a cautionary tale rather than a guidepost.

Access to essential medicines remains highly contested around the globe and a vital issue in South Africa. At the same time, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the demand for medical services are having important political and social consequences in a society heavily impacted by the pandemic. Legal and institutional changes within the postapartheid state in South Africa are in part a reflection of the interaction of opportunities and constraints both within and across the country's geographical boundaries. The transformation of state institutions in this context has been set in motion and shaped by different policy imperatives: from demands for medical care to the promotion of economic competition and the need to implement international trade commitments, including specific levels of intellectual property protection. Despite a strong commitment to social change, to address the legacies of apartheid, as well as the relative strength and political will of the dominant political party, the African National Congress, the transformation of a number of state institutions was significantly framed by the global environment in which the country found itself. In the context of South Africa's democratic transition and the devastating HIV/AIDS pandemic, the state responded to a range of shifting opportunities and constraints, whether real or perceived. As a result, impetus was given to different policies and competing political and economic factions, enabling particular institutions and rules to be embraced, created, reshaped, or simply foregone.

Between the 1970s and 1990s, political scientists in the United States pursued a distinctive research program that employed ethnographic methods to study micro politics in criminal courts. This article considers the relevance of this concept for court researchers today through a case study about bail decision making in a lower criminal court in Australia. It describes business as usual in how decisions are made and the provision of pretrial services. It also looks at how traditionalists and reformers understood business as usual, and uses this as a critical concept to make visible micro politics in this court. The case study raises issues about organizational change in criminal courts since the 1990s, since there are fewer studies about plea bargaining and more about specialist or problem-solving courts. It is suggested that we need a new international agenda that can address change and continuity in criminal courts.

This essay explores religion's need for law, comparing the story told in Mitra Sharafi's Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia (2014)—about the virtual hijacking of British colonial law to serve the communal religious needs of Parsis in colonial India—to other contexts in which secular and religious legal systems have built symbiotic relationships, including in the United States and Thailand. It concludes by urging a reweaving of religious and legal histories after the critique of secularism and its shadows, separationism, and antinomianism.

Social scientists need clarification about the extent to which the confidential aspects of their research are protected from compulsory disclosure in legal proceedings, and the extent to which they ought to be. Investigating the nature of social science research with an emphasis on researcher-participant relationships in ethnographic practice, I conclude that a qualified privilege would confer three major benefits on social science researchers: confidence that the government will not unnecessarily interfere with research, facilitation of improved researcher-participant relationships, and increased accuracy, thoroughness, and reliability of research data. I also discuss the development of privilege and confidentiality issues in practical research contexts through an examination of two criminal cases in which social science researchers refused to divulge the confidential information obtained in the course of research. Finally, I discuss the possible formulations of a scholarly research privilege. This is especially important because courts have cast social scientists as members of the larger community of academic or scholarly researchers with respect to these issues. Potential sources of protection include state journalist protection laws, federal common law, and federal statutory law. Evaluation of these sources and the case law to which they correspond suggests that developing common law privileges in state and federal jurisprudence is the most promising means of affording the confidential aspects of social science research legal protection. As researchers continue to press privilege issues in state and federal courts, these courts should recognize a qualified research privilege accordingly.

This article uses an original database of confirmation hearing dialogue to examine how the Senate Judiciary Committee's role in Supreme Court confirmations has changed over time, with particular attention paid to the 1939–2010 era. During this period, several notable developments took place, including a rise in the number of hearing comments, increased attention to nominees’ views of judicial decisions, an expansion of the scope of issues addressed, and the equalization of questioning between majority and minority party senators. We demonstrate that these changes were shaped by both endogenous and exogenous factors to promote the legitimization of the Judiciary Committee's role in the confirmation process and to foster the instrumental goals of senators. This research contributes to our understanding of the development of political institutions, interbranch interactions, and how institutional change affects the behavior of legal and political actors.

Parole boards possess the notable power to grant release from prison, oftentimes well short of an incarcerated person’s legally allowable length of sentence. Although the exercise of that power is, at least in part, governed by law, extralegal considerations likely play an influential part in decisions to grant release. Indeed, the analysis offered here of parole board hearings in Washington State reveals, in particular, the work that board members perform to reinforce the moral significance of past criminality. In parole hearings, board members find ample opportunities to morally condemn the index offenses that petitioners have perpetrated and to express skepticism about narratives of petitioner change. Instead of helping petitioners ease the burden of being profaned for their past acts, board members often act to reinforce the mark of a criminal record. These realities underscore the significant work necessary to shift attitudes toward those convicted of crimes, and expose the cultural challenges that attempts to reduce incarceration more generally are likely to face, especially in the United States.

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program provides qualifying undocumented immigrant youth with significant benefits. These benefits exist in a state of tension because they are temporary, making the status of DACA recipients precarious. In this article we draw on survey and interview data collected with DACA recipients in Colorado, along with community stakeholder interviews and observations to examine the liminally legal experience of recipients, both before and after Donald Trump’s announced intention to terminate the program. Focusing on their experiences of precarity across educational, economic, and emotional spheres, we document the negative and lasting consequences that the loss of DACA status would have for them. Given the rapidly shifting legal context of the DACA program, we argue that liminal legality varies in intensity based on political context and place. While undocumented young adults are acutely aware of the uncertainty of this moment, we also show how they are demonstrating resilience in the face of increasingly harmful immigration policies. The liminal legality of DACA status, which has worsened in the recent political context, underscores the urgent need for a permanent legislative solution.

The large U.S. legal profession hurts economic productivity in the United States and our economic competitiveness abroad according to a common claim A number of studies support that claim, but they suffer from serious flaws. I reexamine the hypothesis that large lawyer populations impair economic growth and suggest that it lacks theoretical and empirical support. The hypothesis depends on false assumptions about the organizational capability and interest of the legal profession; the empirical research in sup port of the hypothesis depends on flawed lawyer data, unusual combinations of high lawyer populations and low economic growth in one or two countries, and the unjustified use of lawyer population figures from the 1980s in analyses of economic growth prior to that period. I present the results of research on lawyer populations and economic growth among the US. states and in a sample of countries, correcting for the worst flaws of past research The results do not support the claim that large lawyer populations impair aggregate economic growth The analysis is not intended as the final answer on this important question but rather as an encouragement for a more sophisticated understanding of the role of lawyers in late modern economies.