This article analyzes civil society participation in the free trade debate by focusing on networks that opposed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in El Salvador. Drawing on documents, direct observation, and semistructured interviews with civil society leaders, two kinds of opposition coalitions are identified. “Critic negotiators,” emphasizing active engagement and policy research, used the limited participation space opened by authorities to push for reform. “Transgressive resisters,” repudiating the formal consultation process, deployed confrontational tactics and posed more fundamental challenges. This work uses social movement theory to explore coalition resource mobilization, the role of movement entrepreneurs, strategic decisionmaking, mechanisms linking local and transnational activists, and the dynamics of intramovement competition.

This article analyzes the discourse of Brazil's foreign policy toward South America from 1995 to 2010 by means of quantifying, codifying, and weighting all speeches registered in the homogeneous and periodic official documentation of Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs using a discourse analysis approach. The aim is to investigate discourse patterns in order to qualify Brazil's foreign policy as either hard power or soft power and to identify the orientation and differences in its discourse of foreign policy regarding each country of South America during the presidential terms of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003–2010).

Firms should be considered as actors that potentially mediate between social movement pressures and policy outcomes. This article shows that at the mining project level, social mobilization can generate important changes in corporate practices toward nearby communities, and that these practices can undermine the cohesion of social movement coalitions advocating for regulatory intervention or reform, thus limiting their ability to make compelling claims on the state. In this way, company interpretations of and responses to protest are an important mediating process that conditions civil society efforts to activate state institutions in their favor. This argument extends recent work on the social foundations of regulation in Latin America by including corporate actors. The article is based on a comparative case study of the Pascua Lama/Veladero mining projects in both Argentina and Chile, using both secondary sources and primary field research.

The Sandinistas celebrated their first party congress on 19 July 1991, the eleventh anniversary of the day of the “Triumph,” but this time the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) had little to celebrate and a lot to worry about. The party that once claimed so surely to be

was now struggling to reconstitute itself as an effective political organization after being ousted from power in 1990 by the population it claimed to represent and lead.

The late Professor Carl Stone was perhaps best known in the academic community as a political behavioralist who pioneered the systematic study of voting behavior in Jamaica, using the Michigan model of opinion research. In the Caribbean, he was famous for his "hitting the nail on the head" election predictions, correctly predicting, in terms of the victorious party, the outcome of all national elections held in Jamaica between 1976 and 1993 and, in several instances, in terms of constituency seats and percentage of votes received.

One of the fundamental difficulties in the study of Latin American politics by North American scholars has been the attempt to apply the political experience of the United States (and, to a lesser extent, that of the developed countries of Europe and Asia) to that region. In attempting to interpret Latin America’s political patterns and understand her political difficulties, emphasis has been placed historically on such visible features as the instability of national governments, the lack of adequate party systems, the dysfunctional role of the military, inadequate constitutions, hierarchic social structures and a variety of deficiencies in the region’s political culture. In proceeding along these lines, analysts have been working from the implicit, although I believe unconscious, assumption that the Latin American nation-state constitutes a large, geographically dispersed polity. Until recently there has been very little effort to even study the political processes of the Latin American city, much less attempt to understand national politics in light of the region’s peculiar urban culture.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of economic relations between Latin America and the United States in the 1970s and to suggest the implications of this evolution. The central proposition is that a shift in relative strength took place during this period that created the potential for achieving a new balance of economic power. This shift also created tension in the old pattern of inter-American security links. The process of transforming potential power into real power had relevant implications for economic, political, and security interests.

The peasant is one of the least understood and most abused actors on the modern political stage. He is maligned for his political passivity and distrust of national political movements. Yet, most of the great twentieth-century revolutions in the Third World have, according to most scholars, been peasant based (Landsberger, 1973: ix; Wolf, 1969). In Latin America the peasant was once pictured as the archetypical parochial who was more suited for siestas under his sombrero than serious political activity. Stereotypes aside, the region has been no exception to the growing tendency of peasants to become involved in major revolutionary processes.

The parochial priests in small Paraguayan towns are generally reputed, in Paraguay, to exercise an extraordinary amount of power and influence over the people of their parishes—to a greater extent, it would seem, than in most other Latin American countries. This is, moreover, despite the fact that the church, as an institution, is considerably weaker, economically and politically, than in all but a handful of such countries. Therefore, what power the individual priest may have can not be viewed as simply an extension of the power of the church. Most urban Paraguayans, including at least some members of the church hierarchy, are inclined to attribute this situation to the alleged superstitious or credulous nature of the Paraguayan peasants. The rural people themselves, on the other hand, are apt to explain the influence of their own local priest, at least, as due to his personal qualities or strength of character, as did the Services when referring to the prestige of the local priest of Tobati.

Electoral opposition to long-established authoritarian regimes may be loyal or rejectionist. Loyal oppositionists vote to send a selective signal to rulers; rejectionist oppositionists vote blank or void the ballot in full disapproval. In Cuba, the number of candidates equals the number of seats, yet voters may vote blank, void, or selectively (choosing some but not all candidates on the ballot), although the Communist Party has campaigned for all candidates. This article uses a unique dataset for Cuba's 2013 National Assembly elections to study aggregate opposition outcomes. It shows the emergence of a loyal opposition, which sometimes votes for and sometimes against Communist Party candidates. The rejectionist opposition, stable over time, never votes for Communist Party candidates; it is found where the Communist Party behaves monopolistically. This combined opposition has better national-level political information; it comes from more educated or larger urban areas or areas closer to Havana.

This study analyzes Latin America in light of the post–Cold War transformation of the global system. Much of Latin American foreign policy studies traditionally has been concerned with the region's subordinate position to “core” countries (generally, developed states and their ruling elites) and the degree to which these countries' policies constrain Latin American policies and development. While this juxtaposition is still a major topic, it ignores the leverage of new “spheres of authority” (SOAs), where global rules and norms are increasingly sustained. A hypothesis presented here is that the U.N. system is an example of such an SOA, which creates a new context for the insertion of periphery demands in the international agenda. A second hypothesis is that such insertion is increasingly made through the creation of new regional groupings, which are an expression of national development and security demands. Such processes carry both new possibilities and challenges.

High levels of crime are a key driver of emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean. But can emigration change public opinion about how best to respond to crime? Focusing on the political economy of remittances—the money migrants send to their families and communities—this study argues that emigration can increase support for violent responses to crime. Migrants’ families often spend remittances on investment goods, which makes them more vulnerable to crime and more supportive of violence to protect themselves. An analysis of AmericasBarometer data finds that remittance recipients are more likely both to fear crime and to be victims of crime than nonrecipients. They are also more approving of vigilantism, more tolerant of police bending the law to apprehend criminals, and more supportive of deploying the military in crime fighting. These findings contribute to our knowledge of the consequences of international migration for political development in migrant-sending countries.

Neopatrimonial exercise of power, combining ruler appropriation of resources with ruler discretionality in the use of state power, remains present to varying degrees in contemporary Latin America. Building on an extensive literature, this article provides a delimited conceptualization and measurement of neopatrimonialism for 18 countries in the region and examines the effects of neopatrimonial legacies on poverty with cross-national quantitative analysis. The study finds that higher levels of neopatrimonialism have a significant, substantive impact on poverty levels, controlling for other relevant demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors. It confirms the importance of a cumulative record of democracy for poverty alleviation, while the analysis indicates that neopatrimonialism limits the effects of the political left in power on poverty reduction.

After more than a decade of leftist governments in Latin America, the left turn began to reverse course, giving way to the rise of rightist political forces. Even moderate right-wing governments undertook reforms to reduce public spending. This agenda, however, encountered important obstacles. Focusing on the 2017 Argentine pension reform and based on extensive qualitative research, including in-depth interviews with key players, the findings here uphold previous work on the strength of policy legacies in opposition to promarket reforms. This study contributes to the existing theory by showing that protests against retrenchment favor the formation of opposition coalitions only in places where left-leaning governments had established inroads with organized popular sectors, maintaining relationships of coordination and collaboration. In these cases, the cost of specific reforms can jeopardize the broader project of retrenchment.

The most widely-professed fact in the field of Latin American politics is unquestionably the dominant role of the president. The task facing Latin Americanists is not the defense of this theme but the elaboration of it. One of the most confining factors — so often lamented at conferences where these matters are discussed — is the lack of information in depth concerning all of the revelancies of power structure. This is particularly evident in appraising cultural factors although it must be admitted that much excellent work is now being done. A very challenging problem in the area of comparative government is involved, a problem admitting of some of the methodological uneasiness associated with that branch of political inquiry. Obviously, in the study of Latin American politics one may proceed with greater assurance with the “variations on a theme” technique than would be possible in many other areas; however, some disillusionment and appreciable inaccuracies lie in wait if one submits to this temptation too extensively.

Recent research on U.S. diplomacy in Latin America has indicated the prominent role of the State Department in gaining for American airlines a major share of interamerican aviation in the mid-1920s. The department's campaign to “de-Germanize” commercial aviation in the western hemisphere immediately prior to and during World War II has also drawn the attention of historians (McCann, 1968; Newton, 1965; Conn, 1960; Burden, 1943). Yet little analysis has been directed to U.S. policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s, crucial years for the shift of power away from European-supported commercial airlines in Latin America to Pan American Airways.

The analysis of voting behavior patterns from electoral statistics aggregated by regions and urban and rural districts has a long and rich tradition (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). This mode of electoral analysis has, however, declined in usage due to the emergence of the sample survey method, which allows for a more detailed analysis of individual voting choices and the related social and attitudinal factors which influence them.

It is often forgotten, however, that aggregate analysis of area or geographically defined voting statistics is a low-cost research method when compared to the exclusive and much more expensive sample survey research method. Aggregate analysis can be applied effectively with careful adaptation to most of the areas of electoral analysis, particularly so in societies in which community and residential patterns are structured according to clear socioeconomic and stratification variables such as income, status, and occupation. This applies as well to societies in which regional and cerritorial divisions are more than just administrative units but represent focal points of local identities and loyalties.

Margarita Island, Venezuela, located at the southeastern corner of the Caribbean, has been exporting people to mainland Venezuela for over 450 years (Fig. 1). However, over the years the reasons for the migration and the character of the migrants have changed. Within a few years of the island's discovery in 1498, some of the aboriginal inhabitants, the Guayquerí Indians, moved to the mainland. Perhaps this was the result of a falling out with the Spaniards. Others became loyal allies of the Spaniards and accompanied them as auxiliary troops in the Spanish invasions of the mainland. About 1550, some Guayquerí began to move from Margarita into areas along the Paria-Cumaná coast which, as the result of Spanish invasions and slave raids, had lost much of their native Indian population. Eventually, the Guayquerí remaining on the island were almost entirely absorbed into the mestizo population of Margarita. The islanders — Margariteños now — continued migrating to the mainland.

Despite the Great difficulty in separating "good" international diversification from "bad" capital flight, the size and variance of these capital exports from developing countries have become a matter of increasing concern. According to some analysts, this capital flight has contributed to the sharp increase in foreign debt of developing countries, undermined the tax base, and — in extreme cases — even resulted in a net real capital transfer out of the country (Khan and Ul-Haque, 1985). This perception that capital flight might be undermining development efforts has led to a series of studies which have attempted to estimate the volume of capital flight. The best summary of this work is the conference proceedings edited by Lessard and Williamson (1987).