This paper examines the effect of information processing styles (indexed by the Rational-Experiential Inventory of Pacini & Epstein, 1999) on adherence to bias judgments, and particularly to reverse biases; i.e., when two choice questions that comprise identical normative components are set in different situations and yield seemingly opposite behavioral biases. We found consistent evidence for a negative correlation between rational score and adherence to reverse biases, as well as overall biases, for all three pairs of reverse biases tested. Further, this effect of rational thinking was more pronounced for high experiential individuals, in that high-rational and high-experiential participants committed fewer biases than all other participants. These results lend weight to our claim that low-rational individuals, who are more sensitive to the context, are more prone to utilize some attribute of the provided information when it is uncalled for, but at the same time tend to ignore it or give it too little weight when it is a crucial factor in a normative decision process.

Slowing climate change will almost certainly require a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, but agreement on who should reduce emissions by how much is difficult, in part because of the self-serving bias—the tendency to believe that what is beneficial to oneself is also fair. Conducting surveys among college students in the United States and China, we show that each of these groups displays a nationalistic self-serving bias in judgments of a fair distribution of economic burdens resulting from mitigation. Yet, we also show, by disguising the problem and the identity of the parties, that it is possible to elicit perceptions of fairness that are not influenced by national interests. Our research reveals that the self-serving bias plays a major role in the difficulty of obtaining agreement on how to implement emissions reductions. That is, the disagreement over what constitutes fair climate policy does not appear to be due to cross-national differences in what constitutes a fair distribution of burdens. Interventions to mitigate the self-serving bias may facilitate agreement.

People must often perform calculations in order to produce a numeric estimate (e.g., a grocery-store shopper estimating the total price of his or her shopping cart contents). The current studies were designed to test whether estimates based on calculations are influenced by comparisons with irrelevant anchors. Previous research has demonstrated that estimates across a wide range of contexts assimilate toward anchors, but none has examined estimates based on calculations. In two studies, we had participants compare the answers to math problems with anchors. In both studies, participants’ estimates assimilated toward the anchor values. This effect was moderated by time limit such that the anchoring effects were larger when the participants’ ability to engage in calculations was limited by a restrictive time limit.

Research on the processing of recognition information has focused on testing the recognition heuristic (RH). On the aggregate, the noncompensatory use of recognition information postulated by the RH was rejected in several studies, while RH could still account for a considerable proportion of choices. These results can be explained if either a) a part of the subjects used RH or b) nobody used it but its choice predictions were accidentally in line with predictions of the strategy used. In the current study, which exemplifies a new approach to model testing, we determined individuals’ decision strategies based on a maximum-likelihood classification method, taking into account choices, response times and confidence ratings simultaneously. Unlike most previous studies of the RH, our study tested the RH under conditions in which we provided information about cue values of unrecognized objects (which we argue is fairly common and thus of some interest). For 77.5% of the subjects, overall behavior was best explained by a compensatory parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) strategy. The proportion of subjects using an enhanced RH heuristic (RHe) was negligible (up to 7.5%); 15% of the subjects seemed to use a take the best strategy (TTB). A more-fine grained analysis of the supplemental behavioral parameters conditional on strategy use supports PCS but calls into question process assumptions for apparent users of RH, RHe, and TTB within our experimental context. Our results are consistent with previous literature highlighting the importance of individual strategy classification as compared to aggregated analyses.

Individuals are generally reluctant to trade goods—a phenomenon identified as the endowment effect. This paper focuses on consumers’ puzzling reluctance to exchange gambles, and in particular lottery tickets with identical distribution (i.e., same odds of winning), and identifies the ticket’s vividness as an important moderator. Three studies demonstrate that individuals are more willing to exchange less vivid lottery tickets (e.g., tickets concealed in envelopes, or tickets with an unknown number) compared to more vivid tickets (e.g., tickets not concealed in envelopes, or tickets with a known number) when offered an incentive to exchange. Moreover, this effect is mediated by anticipated regret, such that less regret is anticipated when exchanging less vivid tickets, thus increasing individuals’ willingness to exchange tickets.

Whereas much literature exists on “choice overload”, less is known about effects of numbers of alternatives in donation decisions. We hypothesize that donations increase with the number of recipients, albeit at a decreasing rate, and reflect donors’ knowledge of the recipients. Donations involve different concepts of fairness—equity and equality—and these can interact with numbers of alternatives. In two experiments, respondents indicated how they would donate lottery winnings of 50 Euros. Results showed, first, that more was donated to non-governmental organizations and campaigns that respondents knew better. Second, total donations increased with the number of recipients albeit at a decreasing rate. Third, when limited to giving to only one of multiple alternatives, donors gave less than when this restriction did not apply. Fourth, variability of donations can both increase and decrease with the number of potential recipients. We comment on theoretical and practical implications as well as suggesting issues for future research.

Magical beliefs about contagion via contact (Rozin, Nemeroff, Wane, & Sherrod, 1989) may emerge when people overgeneralize real-world mechanisms of contamination beyond their appropriate boundaries (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). Do people similarly overextend knowledge of airborne contamination mechanisms? Previous work has shown that very young children believe merely being close to a contamination source can contaminate an item (Springer & Belk 1994); we asked whether this same hyper-avoidant intuition is also reflected in adults’ judgments. In two studies, we measured adults’ ratings of the desirability of an object that had made contact with a source of contamination, an object nearby that had made no contact with the contaminant, and an object far away that had also made no contact. Adults showed a clear proximity effect, wherein objects near the contamination source were perceived to be less desirable than those far away, even though a separate group of adults unanimously acknowledged that contaminants could not possibly have made contact with either the nearby or far-away object (Study 1). The proximity effect also remained robust when a third group of adults was explicitly told that no contaminating particles had made contact with the objects at any time (Study 2). We discuss implications of our findings for extending the scope of magical contagion effects beyond the contact principle, for understanding the persistence of intuitive theories despite broad acceptance of science-based theories, and for constraining interpretations of the developmental work on proximity beliefs.

In a series of three experiments, participants made inferences about which one of a pair of two objects scored higher on a criterion. The first experiment was designed to contrast the prediction of Probabilistic Mental Model theory (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991) concerning sampling procedure with the hard-easy effect. The experiment failed to support the theory’s prediction that a particular pair of randomly sampled item sets would differ in percentage correct; but the observation that German participants performed practically as well on comparisons between U.S. cities (many of which they did not even recognize) than on comparisons between German cities (about which they knew much more) ultimately led to the formulation of the recognition heuristic. Experiment 2 was a second, this time successful, attempt to unconfound item difficulty and sampling procedure. In Experiment 3, participants’ knowledge and recognition of each city was elicited, and how often this could be used to make an inference was manipulated. Choices were consistent with the recognition heuristic in about 80% of the cases when it discriminated and people had no additional knowledge about the recognized city (and in about 90% when they had such knowledge). The frequency with which the heuristic could be used affected the percentage correct, mean confidence, and overconfidence as predicted. The size of the reference class, which was also manipulated, modified these effects in meaningful and theoretically important ways.

Despite their efforts to choose the best of all available solutions, maximizers seem to be more inclined than satisficers to regret their choices and to experience post-decisional dissonance. Maximizers may therefore be expected to change their decisions more frequently and hence exhibit lower customer loyalty to providers of products and services compared to satisficers. Findings from the study reported here (N = 1978) support this prediction. Maximizers reported significantly higher intentions to switch to another service provider (television provider) than satisficers. Maximizers’ intentions to switch appear to be intensified and mediated by higher proneness to regret, increased desire to discuss relevant choices with others, higher levels of perceived knowledge of alternatives, and higher ego involvement in the end product, compared to satisficers. Opportunities for future research are suggested.

The objective of this paper is to measure and compare the subjective time discounting of professional athletes and non-athletes. By using a questionnaire, we found higher subjective discounting for professional athletes than for non-athletes. We also found that the professional athletes’ win-orientation positively affected their present preferences. On the other hand, professional athletes’ play- orientation, which reflects their attitude towards the game itself, negatively affected their present preferences. No such effects were found in non-athletes. We argue that the “win-at-all-costs” competitive approach that leads athletes to sacrifice everything in order to win may cause (or reflect) their higher preference for the present.

Marketing science seeks to prescribe better marketing strategies (advertising, product development, pricing, etc.). To do so we rely on models of consumer decisions grounded in empirical observations. Field experience suggests that recognition-based heuristics help consumers to choose which brands to consider and purchase in frequently-purchased categories, but other heuristics are more relevant in durable-goods categories. Screening with recognition is a rational screening rule when advertising is a signal of product quality, when observing other consumers makes it easy to learn decision rules, and when firms react to engineering-design constraints by offering brands such that a high-level on one product feature implies a low level on another product feature. Experience with applications and field experiments suggests four fruitful research topics: deciding how to decide (endogeneity), learning decision rules by self-reflection, risk reduction, and the difference between utility functions and decision rules. These challenges also pose methodological cautions.

The aim of this article is to evaluate the contribution of process tracing data to the development and testing of models of judgment and decision making (JDM). We draw on our experience of editing the “Handbook of process tracing methods for decision research” recently published in the SJDM series. After a brief introduction we first describe classic process tracing methods (thinking aloud, Mouselab, eye-tracking). Then we present a series of examples of how each of these techniques has made important contributions to the development and testing of process models of JDM. We discuss the issue of large data volumes resulting from process tracing and remedies for handling those. Finally, we argue for the importance of formulating process hypotheses and opt for a multi-method approach that focuses on the cross-validation of findings.

Laboratory studies of choice and decision making among real monetary rewards typically use smaller real rewards than those common in real life. When laboratory rewards are large, they are almost always hypothetical. In applying laboratory results meaningfully to real-life situations, it is important to know the extent to which choices among hypothetical rewards correspond to choices among real rewards and whether variation of the magnitude of hypothetical rewards affects behavior in meaningful ways. The present study compared real and hypothetical monetary rewards in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants played a temporal discounting game that incorporates the logic of a repeated prisoner’s-dilemma (PD) game versus tit-for-tat; choice of one alternative (“defection” in PD terminology) resulted in a small-immediate reward; choice of the other alternative (“cooperation” in PD terminology) resulted in a larger reward delayed until the following trial. The larger-delayed reward was greater for half of the groups than for the other half. Rewards also differed in type across groups: multiples of real nickels, hypothetical nickels, or hypothetical hundred-dollar bills. All groups significantly increased choice of the larger delayed reward over the 40 trials of the experiment. Over the last 10 trials, cooperation was significantly higher when the difference between larger and smaller hypothetical rewards was greater. Reward type (real or hypothetical) made no significant difference in cooperation on most measures. In Experiment 2, real and hypothetical rewards were compared in social discounting—the decrease in value to the giver of a reward as social distance increases to the receiver of the reward. Social discount rates were well described by a hyperbolic function. Discounting rates for real and hypothetical rewards did not significantly differ. These results add to the evidence that results of experiments with hypothetical rewards validly apply in everyday life.

Excess choice has previously been shown to have detrimental effects on decisions about consumer products. As the number of options increases, people are more likely to put off making an active choice (i.e., defer) and show less satisfaction with any purchase actually made. We extend this line of enquiry to choosing a charitable organisation to volunteer for. The issue is important because the number of voluntary organisations is enormous and the impact of such a decision may be greater than for consumer decisions in terms of time commitment and benefits to the volunteer and society. Study 1 asked students to examine a real volunteering website and record how many organisations they considered, decision difficulty and whether or not they would like to sign up for a chosen organisation or prefer to defer a decision. Study 2 presented either a relatively small (10) or large (30) choice set of hypothetical organisations and measured deferment likelihood and decision difficulty. In both studies the more options considered, the greater the likelihood to defer. This effect was mediated by decision difficulty. This research is the first to find that detrimental effects of excess choice extend to volunteering. Implications for volunteer recruitment are discussed.

The diversity, ingenuity and differences of opinion displayed in the articles of the recent special issues on the recognition heuristic are testament to the power and theoretical fertility of a simple idea about the role of recognition in decision making. In this brief comment I mention a number of these papers, but my focus is on points of agreement and disagreement with the conclusions drawn by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) in their review of a decade’s worth of research on the recognition heuristic.

The collective recognition heuristic is a simple forecasting heuristic that bets on the fact that people’s recognition knowledge of names is a proxy for their competitiveness: In sports, it predicts that the better-known team or player wins a game. We present two studies on the predictive power of recognition in forecasting soccer games (World Cup 2006 and UEFA Euro 2008) and analyze previously published results. The performance of the collective recognition heuristic is compared to two benchmarks: predictions based on official rankings and aggregated betting odds. Across three soccer and two tennis tournaments, the predictions based on recognition performed similar to those based on rankings; when compared with betting odds, the heuristic fared reasonably well. Forecasts based on rankings—but not on betting odds—were improved by incorporating collective recognition information. We discuss the use of recognition for forecasting in sports and conclude that aggregating across individual ignorance spawns collective wisdom.

Using Kahneman and Tversky’s life-death decision paradigm, Wang and colleagues (e.g., Wang & Johnston, 1995; Wang, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2008; Wang et al., 2001) have shown two characteristic phenomena regarding people’s attitude to risk when the contextual group size is manipulated. In both positive and negative frames, people tend to take greater risks in life-death decisions as the contextual group size becomes smaller; this risk-seeking attitude is greater when framed positively than negatively. (This second characteristic often leads to the disappearance of the framing effect in small group contexts comprising of 6 or 60 people.) Their results could shed new light on the effect of contextual group size on people’s risk choice. However these results are usually observed in laboratory experiments with university student samples. This study aims to examine the external validity of these results through different ways of experimentation and with a different sample base. The first characteristic was replicated in both a face-to-face interview with a randomly selected sample of the Japanese general public, and a web-based experiment with a non-student sample, but not the second.

Currently, a disparity exists between the process-level models decision researchers use to describe and predict decision behavior and the methods implemented and metrics collected to test these models. The current work seeks to remedy this disparity by combining the advantages of work in decision research (mouse-tracing paradigms with contingent information display) and cognitive psychology (eye-tracking paradigms from reading and scene perception). In particular, we introduce a new decision moving-window paradigm that presents stimulus information contingent on eye fixations. We provide data from the first application of this method to risky decision making, and show how it compares to basic eye-tracking and mouse-tracing methods. We also enumerate the practical, theoretical, and analytic advantages this method offers above and beyond both mouse-tracing with occlusion and basic eye tracking of information without occlusion. We include the use of new metrics that offer more precision than those typically calculated on mouse-tracing data as well as those not possible or feasible within the mouse-tracing paradigm.

Is variety of the spice of life? The present research suggests that the answer depends on the rate of consumption. In three experiments, we find that, whereas a variety of stimuli is preferred to repetition of even a better-liked single stimulus when consumption is continuous, this preference reverses when the satiation associated with repetition is reduced by slowing down the rate of consumption. Decision makers, however, seem to under-appreciate the influence of consumption rate on preference for (and satisfaction with) variety. At high rates of consumption, they correctly anticipate their own, high, desire for variety, but at low rates of consumption people tend to overestimate their own desire for variety. These results complicate the picture presented by prior research on the “diversification bias”, suggesting that people overestimate their own desire for variety only when consumption is spaced out over time.

Past research has shown that many people prefer natural foods and medicines over artificial counterparts. The present study focused on examination of aversive events and hazards. Preferences were compared by having subjects consider pairs of scenarios, one natural and one artificial, matched in negative outcome and severity. Pairings were also rated along several dimensions of risk perception such as dangerousness, scariness, likelihood, and fairness. As hypothesized, natural hazards were consistently preferred to functionally identical artificial ones. Additionally, natural hazards tended to be considered less scary and dangerous, but not necessarily more unfair or unlikely than equivalent artificial counterparts. Results are discussed in terms of risk perception, and how that can lead to people diminishing risks associated with natural hazards.