A study entitled “Does Blind Tasting Work? Investigating the Impact of Training on Blind Tasting Accuracy and Wine Preference,” published in the Proceedings issues of this journal, analyzed the effects of training on blind wine tasting accuracy (Wang and Prešern, 2018). I point out two issues with that study and reanalyze their data. I find that the effects of training on accuracy are small, even without controlling for self-selection bias that may produce upwardly biased estimates. To the extent training works, it does not seem to work well and it may only work as a selection device. (JEL Classifications: C91, D83, L66)

A recent study in the Journal of Wine Economics presented forecasts of future alcohol consumption derived using the ARIMA (Box–Jenkins) method. Alcohol consumption forecasts can be developed using many different methodologies. In this Note we highlight the value of using multiple methods to develop alcohol consumption forecasts, and demonstrate the capability of the R software platform as a general forecasting tool. (JEL Classifications: D12, C53)

Little attention has been paid to the effects of personality traits on the consumption of wine and beer. We used a survey to investigate the associations between personality traits and the differences in expected consumption frequencies of wine and beer for 3,482 Norwegian respondents. High scores on extraversion and openness to experiences increased the expected frequency of wine consumption, high score on agreeableness reduced the frequency of wine consumption, while scores on conscientiousness and neuroticism had no effects. For beer, there were no significant effects between personality traits and the frequency of consumption. (JEL Classification: D12, Q13).

In recent years, several European antitrust authorities intervened in the wine sector to authorize mergers and acquisitions, provide opinions to governments, and ascertain anticompetitive agreements. This article analyzes these interventions in the context of an evolving regulatory framework. I draw conclusions about the direction of competition policy, in particular in relation to possible co-operations among various players in the wine industry. (JEL Classifications: K21, L40, L51)

An en primeur agreement is an unconventional forward contract. In this article, we provide a new conceptual framework for analyzing the properties of en primeur prices based on the cost of carry approach. The results, based upon Bayesian modeling, indicate that the cost of carry increases up to 0.9598 when en primeur and bottled wines are traded in parallel. Moreover, our findings confirm that price dispersion around the mean value is greater for en primeur wines (22.42%) than for standard bottled wines (8.2%) traded after the sale of en primeur wines has ended. (JEL Classifications: G12, G15, L66, Q02)

Information conveyed on the price tag or label of a consumable packaged good is widely thought to change the consumer's sensory experience of consuming the good. Can the positive “placebo” effects of high prices and negative “nocebo” effects of low prices on consumer experience be isolated and observed in a controlled experiment without using deception? In a pilot wine experiment using a method I call “half-blind tasting,” I observe that the nocebo response to a $5 price tag is stronger than the placebo response to a $50 price tag. To interpret these preliminary results, I borrow some insights from prospect theory. (JEL Classifications: C91, D81, L66, M31, Q11)

Agricultural cooperatives’ economic performance and efficiency today have great economic and social relevance. Consistent with the recent literature, this article examines wine cooperatives and compares them with wine investor-owned firms, studying their innovation capabilities, Miles and Snow strategies, and performance. A survey was conducted in all the wineries in Spain, with 339 responses. The interactions between the independent variables and the dependent variable were analyzed using the logit regression model. The study points out that cooperatives do not have fewer innovation capabilities, nor are they more inefficient, than investor-owned firms, although the factors that modulate their economic performance are different. (JEL Classifications: L66, M10, P13, Q13)

In this article, we report the results of an experiment designed to address the effect of risk attitudes on valuations of aged wines. We find that higher risk taking in the economic domain is associated with a significantly higher willingness to pay for an old wine. Given the increasing interest of consumers and investors in old wines, our results are applicable to the pricing of old wines and to the use of auctions as an efficient willingness to pay elicitation mechanism. (JEL Classifications: C91, D44, L66)