Taiwan is an island and trade has always been the locomotive of its economic development. From the 1620s to the 1960s, cane sugar was Taiwan's most representative export commodity. Yet little attention has been paid to the business strategies of sugar traders and the changes in their thinking. How did the Takow (Kaohsiung) merchants who first went to Japan and Hong Kong to conduct cross-border trade in person learn about international trade and build a network of human resources that crossed borders, especially after the 1870s? And how did they face the great changes of an era in which tradition and modernity were intertwined, so that, following the regime transfer in the 1890s from the Qing Dynasty to the Japanese empire, they were able to expand their business territory and become major sugar merchants in southern Taiwan?

This article examines the career of Wang Xuenong—a well-known sugar merchant in Taiwan during the Meiji period (1868–1912). It attempts to explain, from the perspective of cross-cultural knowledge transfer and human resource strategies, why and how sugar merchants such as Wang, who had gone to Japan in the early years of the Meiji Restoration for purposes of cross-border trade, introduced a trading company system that incorporated a mixture of East Asian and Western elements. It further investigates how they expanded their business from the sugar trade into a wider commercial domain that included mechanical rice milling and steamship transport. Finally, it looks at how their actions affected a transformation of Taiwan's commercial culture from the late Qing Dynasty to the early days of Japanese rule, and the historical significance of these changes in Taiwan's transitions towards industrialisation and modernisation.

This article examines international transactions related to steam locomotives at the beginning of the twentieth century while focusing on Japanese trading companies. In particular, it considers in detail how Japanese trading companies acquired the knowledge and know-how of locomotive trading to carry out their business transactions through a case study of Okura & Co.'s New York branch office. The analysis highlights the following three factors that supported Okura's locomotive trade in New York: first, the company took advantage of business opportunities by collecting information through networks of Japanese contacts in New York and local experts; second, it utilised social and technological infrastructure, including international communication lines, transportation, and financial systems, as key fundamentals of its overseas activities; third, a former oyatoi (hired foreigner) played a critical role as its consulting engineer. In particular, the overseas activities of Japanese trading companies drew heavily on formerly hired foreign engineers, whose technological knowledge and networks became an essential route of knowledge transfer in cross-regional commercial management. These will contribute to the evolution of history related to the starting points of global activities of Japanese trading companies.

This article examines the social background of engineers in Meiji Japan by analysing their employment-seeking activities and their role in fostering industrial development. In particular, it focuses on the graduates from the Imperial College of Engineering (ICE) in Tokyo. One of the most prestigious schools for technical education, the ICE was established by the Meiji government in 1871 and opened in 1873. In traditional Japanese society, the handicraft manufacturing sector was held in low regard. The difficulties that graduates faced while the industry was still developing serve as a stark reminder of the widespread contempt and disdain for manufacturing that existed in Japan before the new profession of engineer gained traction. By scrutinising the memoirs of these engineers, this study shows that new engineering graduates faced barriers to employment in industry due to the low social prestige of those working in manufacturing in the private sector and the conflict with traditional workers, as well as the fact that private companies could not afford to employ engineers in the early years of industrialisation.

The history of mining education in late Qing China has received relatively little attention in scholarly literature. Through the lens of institutionalising global mining knowledge, this article addresses the following questions: How did the demand for expertise within the framework of mining bureaucracy evolve under the impact of Western imperialism? How did mining education enter scholarly discourse and become eventually institutionalised in the late Qing China? Drawing on evidence from the collections of Sheng Xuanhuai's archive series, it investigates two previously overlooked ‘failures’ of Sheng's mining-related enterprises, namely his earliest mining practices in Hubei in the 1870s and his proposal for establishing a mining school in Shandong in 1888–89. It then reconnects these efforts with the histories of Western learning, late Qing mining bureaucracy, the monetary crisis of that era, and the global recruitment of engineers despite a pronounced distrust of foreign expertise. It argues that these seemingly discrete efforts or ‘failures’ in fact paved the way for initiating China's first engineering university as well as other mining colleges in around 1895 and eventually led to the rise of engineering education before the entire educational system was transformed in China.

Standardisation is a product of the second wave of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America. This article examines how Western standardisation practices were introduced, transmitted, and promoted in China during the first half of the twentieth century. In particular, it looks at the critical role played by British, American, and local Chinese engineers in the transmission process. The topics covered in the present article have seldom been considered, and this article tries to fill the gap in scholarship. It analyses the shifting patterns of various standardisation efforts that are closely related to the governance of both cities and the wider nation. Work examined includes that of the Engineering Society of China, led by British engineers, which initiated standardisation in the Shanghai International Settlement in the early twentieth century; that of the Association of Chinese and American Engineers, founded by engineers of China and the USA, which, after World War I, began to implement the standardisation of railway infrastructure, with the cooperation of the Ministry of Transportation of the Beijing government; and efforts in the 1930s under the Nanjing government to establish an ‘engineering’ or ‘technocratic’ state, which included the execution of national schemes for the development of industrial standardisation. From the period of World War I until the 1930s, the orientation and practices of American standardisation strategies dominated China; then, due to the worsening situation of the Chinese–Japanese War, ideological tendencies and national strategies for standardisation began to diverge.

This article analyses labour-intensive workforce strategies in Japan's government-run informational infrastructure (post, telegraph, and telephone) and in the adjunct services associated with their administration in the decades up to the Pacific War. It asks to what extent the growing scale of employment in Japan's communications infrastructure in this period confirms the existence of labour-intensive growth outside the manufacturing sector, and how far the growth of the labour force in post and telecommunications was facilitated by specific labour-absorbing institutions—that is, formal or informal institutions designed to mobilise or incentivise large numbers of employees. The discussion of these two associated questions shows not only that this area of infrastructure provision was highly labour-intensive in terms of the numbers employed and the diverse tasks undertaken, but also that the government-run postal system in effect depended for its growth and development on labour strategies and labour-absorbing institutions analogous to those usually associated with manufacturing development. The article also seeks to establish how far we can see in this sector the gradual improvement in the quality of labour normally associated with the labour-intensive industrialisation process, providing evidence that the evolving institutions were closely associated with a gradual improvement in the quality of labour and its ability to interact with rapidly changing needs and technologies.

This study employs annual reports, time-series statistics, and internal training records of the colonial-era Korean Government Railways (KGR) to conduct a quantitative analysis of its labour management practices. It addresses the colonial characteristics associated with Japanese techno-imperialism beyond ethnic discrimination, revealing a dual-pronged labour strategy that adopted a Japanese government employee system to manage middle- and upper-level personnel and directly recruited on-site workers for the lower echelons. This deviates from the low rates of local employment in Western colonies, particularly self-governing British territories or integrated French territories. In contrast, KGR's employment practices demonstrated economic and ethnic inequalities. It predominantly made Koreans on-site labourers, whereas Japanese not only held similar roles, but also occupied upper- and middle-management positions. Worker mobility, particularly among Japanese employees, grew following the outbreak of war between Japan and the USA, leading to the mass external recruitment of Koreans and the expansion of internal education to alleviate labour shortages. Nevertheless, preferential treatment toward Japanese individuals, which had been in relative decline for promotion, wages, and admission rates to training schools, ultimately persisted. Understanding KGR's employment structure shows how colonisation mediated Korea's modernisation and imposed technical limitations on the management of local labour. National technological decolonisation thus required Koreans to further introduce external technologies after the end of Japan's imperial reign.