Since the period between May, 1955, and December, 1956, when the Hindus of India lost their system of “personal law”, and the latter was replaced by a new system comprised in the so-called “Hindu Code”, the Sanskrit books which contain the accumulated learning of the dharmaśāstra, or so much of the ancient Indian “science of religious-and-civil law” as survives the ravages of time and the neglect of private owners of manuscripts, have ceased to be the fundamental source of Hindu law, and it is only in marginal contexts that for practical purposes reference to them will ever again be made in that country. Yet the relegation of their ancient learning to practical uselessness may be expected to have a beneficial effect on the study of the dharmaśāstra itself, and that literature, which has been widely neglected in all continents, may once again receive the volume of attention which it could command about eighty years ago. About that time it was still very doubtful what the śāstra had to say on topics of practical importance, and Bühler and Jolly, for example, could be sure that their researches, despite their predilection for the ancient and the “original”, would be of use in the Courts in addition to providing material for academic exercises. By the end of the first decade of this century it was evident that at least as far as British India was concerned the law was about to develop along lines which were to a certain extent incompatible with the śāstra, and the relation of academic study to practical advocacy became intolerably delicate.