In 1883 Henry Sidgwick complained that, with the recent undermining of the authority of political economy, “utterances of dissent from economic orthodoxy” could obtain a ready hearing. This was of particular concern to those writing and teaching on political economy at Cambridge University. As Henry Dunning Macleod was one of the dissenters named by Sidgwick, it appears odd that Macleod was also recognized as a lecturer in political economy at Cambridge between the late 1870s and mid-1880s. This article examines that peculiar occurrence, showing how Macleod exploited the struggle between reformers and conservatives over teaching reform in the university.

In his Nobel lecture, Friedman built on his earlier argument for a “natural rate of unemployment” by painting a picture of an economics profession which, as a result of foolish mistakes, had accepted the Phillips curve as offering a lasting trade-off between inflation and unemployment, and was thereby led to advocate a policy of inflation. It is argued here that, in fact, the orthodox economists of the time often did not accept Phillips’ analysis; almost no one made the mistakes in question; and very few advocated inflation on bases vulnerable to Friedman’s theoretical criticisms. The Phillips curve was put to various uses, but advocating inflation was hardly amongst them. It is suggested that one lasting result of the uncritical acceptance of Friedman’s history is to limit what appears to be within the reasonable range of views about macroeconomic policy.

Before the emergence of the field of development economics in the mid-1940s, the mainstream of Western economists had very little to say about the world outside western Europe. However, perhaps due to Russia’s ambivalent location as a nation considered not fully European (nor completely Asiatic) and to her status as a major player in the international arena despite the fact of her modest economic achievements, from the eighteenth century onwards the “Russian case” called the attention of some of the most prominent Western minds, including the first economists. By discussing Russia’s economy, they came to notions and concepts regarding development and backwardness that, to a great extent. informed the twentieth-century debate. The aim of this article is to explore the way in which Russia as a case study affected the evolution of ideas on economic growth or development. The evidence of things Russian, it will be argued, raised doubts about common economic views, thus enabling new thinking that pointed either to criticism of liberal orthodoxy, or to expansion and refinement of its arguments.

This paper describes Gary Becker’s theoretical models of marriage. At the micro level, these are all rational choice models. At the market level, Becker offers two major types of models: partial equilibrium models based on price theory as taught by Marshall and Friedman; and optimal sorting models based on optimal assignment models. This paper examines some of the possible intellectual influences on Becker’s theory of marriage, compares Becker’s research on marriage with that of some scholars interested in intra-marriage distribution, and documents that Becker’s students at Chicago were more interested in Becker’s Friedmanian models of marriage than in his optimal assignment models.

In this paper we address the subject of Keynes as a speculator. We look first at the primary sources of information, which are in the form of unpublished letters and broker’s statements. Secondly, we look at the theory Keynes sparingly presented in his writings, but which nevertheless is grounded on his first-hand knowledge of speculative behavior. Thirdly, we examine the focus on speculation in commodities, which had great weight in his portfolio, and have chosen a particular commodity -wheat- for our investigation. In particular, we examine some of Keynes’s dealings in wheat futures with the aim of shedding light on the underlying investment strategy.

Henry George, self-taught economist to the common man, developed a strong following outside the halls of academic discourse for his ideas about land, rent, and the single tax. Since he drew the ire of important economists such as John Bates Clark and Alfred Marshall, it should come as no surprise that few professional economists were willing to acknowledge his influence on the economics of the day. Yet, a closer look reveals that at least in the case of Thorstein Veblen, a clear connection can be made between these two important American thinkers. The concept of an unearned increment establishes their shared connection by illustrating the tension that exists between individuals and communities when individual property rights are assigned to community assets.