The history of the Gentzenization of relevant logics goes back to Kripke [17], who in 1959 Gentzenized R→ and went on to prove its decidability. Formulae were separated by commas on the left side of the turnstile, the commas just representing nested implications. Kripke employed just a singleton formula to the right of the turnstile. He also considered adding negation, as well as other connectives, but it was not until 1961 that Belnap and Wallace, in [5], Gentzenized and proved its decidability, though their Gentzenization employed commas on both sides of the turnstile. Subsequently, in 1966, the logic R without distribution, now called LR (for lattice R), was Gentzenized in a similar style by Meyer in [20]. He also went on to show decidability for LR by extending Kripke's argument. Later, in 1969, Dunn Gentzenized R+ (published in [1], pp. 381–391) using two structural connectives (commas and semicolons) to the left of the turnstile, and with a single formula to the right. Here, the commas represent conjunction and the semicolons represent an intensional conjunction, called “fusion”. This is all nicely set out in McRobbie [19], where he also introduces left-handed Gentzenizations and analytic tableaux for a number of fragments of relevant logics. In 1979, further work on distributionless logic was done by Grishin, in a series of papers, including [16], in which he produced a Gentzenization of quantified RW without distribution (which we will call LRWQ), and used it to prove the decidability of this quantified logic.

In Part I, we produced a Gentzenization L6LBQ of the distributionless relevant logic LBQ, which contained just the one structural connective ‘:’ and no structural rules. We compared it with the corresponding “right-handed” system and then proved interpolability and decidability of LBQ. Knowledge of Part I is presupposed.

In Part II of this paper, we will establish Gentzenizations, with appropriate interpolation and decidability results, for the further distributionless logics LDWQ, LTWQo, LEWQot, LRWQ, LRWKQ and LRQ, using essentially the same methods as were used for LBQ in Part I. LRWQ has been Gentzenized by Grishin [2], but the interpolation result is new and the decidability result is proved by a substantial simplification of his method. LR has been Gentzenized and shown to be decidable by Meyer in [5], by extending a method of Kripke in [3], and McRobbie has proved interpolation for it in [4], but here the Gentzenization and interpolation results are extended to quantifiers.

We axiomatize these logics as follows. The primitives and formation rules are as before, except that LTWQ and LEWQ require the extra primitive ‘o’, a 2-place connective (called ‘fusion’), and LEWQ also requires ‘t’, a sentential constant.

We establish cut-free left-handed Gentzenizations for a range of major relevant logics from B through to R, all with distribution. B is the basic system of the Routley-Meyer semantics (see [15], pp. 287–300) and R is the logic of relevant implication (see [1], p. 341). Previously, the contractionless logics DW, TW, EW, RW and RWK were Gentzenized in [3], [4] and [5], and also the distributionless logics LBQ, LDWQ, LTWQo, LEWQot, LRWQ, LRWKQ and LRQ in [6] and [7]. This paper provides Gentzenizations for the logics DJ, TJ, T and R, with various levels of contraction, and for the contractionless logic B, which could not be included in [4] using the technique developed there. We also include the Gentzenization of TW in order to compare it with that in [4]. The Gentzenizations that we obtain here for DW and RW are inferior to those already obtained in [4], but they are included for reference when constructing other systems. The logics EW and E present a difficulty for our method and are omitted. For background to the Gentzenization of relevant logics, see [6], and for motivation behind the logics involved, see [6], [1] and [15]. Because of the number of properties that are brought to bear in obtaining these systems, we prefer to consider Gentzenizations for particular logics rather than for arbitrary bunches of axioms.

This paper is a continuation of Zakharyaschev [25], where the following basic results on modal logics with transitive frames were obtained:

• With every finite rooted transitive frame and every set of antichains (which were called closed domains) in two formulas α (, , ⊥) and α(, ) were associated. We called them the canonical and negation free canonical formulas, respectively, and proved the Refutability Criterion characterizing the constitution of their refutation general frames in terms of subreduction (alias partial p-morphism), the cofinality condition and the closed domain condition.

• We proved also the Completeness Theorem for the canonical formulas providing us with an algorithm which, given a modal formula φ, returns canonical formulas α(i, i), ⊥), for i = 1,…, n, such that

if φ is negation free then the algorithm instead of α(i, i, ⊥) can use the negation free canonical formulas α(i, i). Thus, every normal modal logic containing K4 can be axiomatized by a set of canonical formulas.

In this Part we apply the apparatus of the canonical formulas for establishing a number of results on the decidability, finite model property, elementarity and some other properties of modal logics within the field of K4.

Our attention will be focused on the class of logics which can be axiomatized by canonical formulas without closed domains, i.e., on the logics of the form

Adapting the terminology of Fine [11], we call them the cofinal subframe logics and denote this class by . As was shown in Part I, almost all standard modal logics are in .

The Sacks Density Theorem [7] states that the Turing degrees of the recursively enumerable sets are dense. We show that the Density Theorem holds in every model of P− + BΣ2. The proof has two components: a lemma that in any model of P− + BΣ2, if B is recursively enumerable and incomplete then IΣ1 holds relative to B and an adaptation of Shore's [9] blocking technique in α-recursion theory to models of arithmetic.

This paper is concerned with the determination of the proof-strength of the power set axiom relative to axiom systems for Feferman's explicit mathematics. As conjectured by Feferman, we obtain that the presence of the power set axiom does not increase proof-strength.

Results are achieved by reducing the systems including the power set axiom to subsystems of classical analysis. In those cases where only the induction axiom is available, we make use of the technique of asymmetrical interpretations.

My aim in this paper is to propose what seems to me a distinctive approach to set theoretic methodology. By ‘methodology’ I mean the study of the actual methods used by practitioners, the study of how these methods might be justified or reformed or extended. So, for example, when the intuitionist's philosophical analysis recommends a wholesale revision of the methods of proof used in classical mathematics, this is a piece of reformist methodology. In contrast with the intuitionist, I will focus more narrowly on the methods of contemporary set theory, and, more importantly, I will certainly recommend no sweeping reforms. Rather, I begin from the assumption that the methodologist's job is to account for set theory as it is practiced, not as some philosophy would have it be. This credo lies at the very heart of the so-called ‘naturalism’ to be described here.

A philosopher looking at set theoretic practice from the outside, so to speak, might notice any number of interesting methodological questions, beginning with the intuitionist's ‘why use classical logic?’, but this sort of question is not a live issue for most practicing set theorists. One central question on which the philosopher's and the practitioner's interests converge is this: what is the status of independent statements like the continuum hypothesis (CH)? A number of large questions arise in its wake: what criteria should guide the search for new axioms? For that matter, what reasons support our adoption of the old axioms?

Let be a first-order structure; we denote by DEF() the set of all first-order definable relations and functions within . Let π be any one-to-one function from ℕ into the set of prime integers.

Let ∣ and • be respectively the divisibility relation and multiplication as function. We show that the sets DEF(ℕ, π, ∣) and DEF(ℕ, π, •) are equal. However there exists function π such that the set DEF(ℕ, +, ∣), or, equivalently, DEF(ℕ, π, •) is not equal to DEF(ℕ, +, •). Nevertheless, in all cases there is an {π, •}-definable and hence also {π, |}-definable structure over π which is isomorphic to 〈ℕ, +, •〉. Hence theories TH(ℕ, π, ∣) and TH(ℕ, π, •) are undecidable.

The binary relation of equipotence between two positive integers saying that they have equal number of prime divisors is not definable within the divisibility lattice over positive integers. We prove it first by comparing the lower bound of the computational complexity of the additive theory of positive integers and of the upper bound of the computational complexity of the theory of the mentioned lattice.

The last section provides a self-contained alternative proof of this latter result based on a decision method linked to an elimination of quantifiers via specific tables.

Recently, Lincoln, Scedrov and Shankar showed that the multiplicative fragment of second order intuitionistic linear logic is undecidable, using an encoding of second order intuitionistic logic. Their argument applies to the multiplicative-additive fragment, but it does not work in the classical case, because second order classical logic is decidable. Here we show that the multiplicative-additive fragment of second order classical linear logic is also undecidable, using an encoding of two-counter machines originally due to Kanovich. The faithfulness of this encoding is proved by means of the phase semantics.

The main result of this paper is a probabilistic construction of finite rigid structures. It yields a finitely axiomatizable class of finite rigid structures where no formula with counting quantifiers defines a linear order.

A structure is locally finite if every finitely generated substructure is finite; local sentences are universal sentences all models of which are locally finite. The stretching theorem for local sentences expresses a remarkable reflection phenomenon between the finite and the infinite models of local sentences. This result in part requires strong axioms to be proved; it was studied by the second named author, in a paper of this Journal, volume 53. Here we correct and extend this paper; in particular we show that the stretching theorem implies the existence of inaccessible cardinals, and has precisely the consistency strength of Mahlo cardinals of finite order. And we present a sequel due to the first named author:

(i) decidability of the spectrum Sp(φ) of a local sentence φ, below ωω; where Sp(φ) is the set of ordinals α such that φ has a model of order type α

(ii) proof that bethω = sup{Sp(φ): φ local sentence with a bounded spectrum}

(iii) existence of a local sentence φ such that Sp(φ) contains all infinite ordinals except the inaccessible cardinals.

We prove that a necessary and sufficient condition for a countable set of sets of integers to be equal to the algebra of all sets of integers definable in a nonstandard elementary extension of ω by a formula of the PA language which may include the standardness predicate but does not contain nonstandard parameters, is as follows: is closed under arithmetical definability and contains 0(ω) the set of all (Gödel numbers of) true arithmetical sentences.

Some results related to definability of sets of integers in elementary extensions of ω are included.

In the predicate calculus, variables provide a flexible indexing service which selects the actual arguments to a predicate letter from among possible arguments that precede the predicate letter (in the parse of the formula). In the process of selection, the possible arguments can be permuted, repeated (used more than once), and skipped. If this service is withheld, so that arguments must be the immediately preceding ones, taken in the order in which they occur, the formula is said to be fluted. Quine showed that if a fluted formula contains only homogeneous conjunction (conjoins only subformulas of equal arity), then the satisfiability of the formula is decidable. It remained an open question whether the satisfiability of a fluted formula without this restriction is decidable. This paper answers that question.

In this paper, we solve the strong uniqueness problem posed in [St2]. That is, we extend the full fine structure theory of [MiSt] to backgrounded models all of whose levels are tame (defined in [St2] and below). As a consequence, more powerful large cardinal properties reflect to fine structural inner models. For example, we get the following extension to [MiSt, Theorem 11.3] and [St2, Theorem 0.3].

Suppose that there is a strong cardinal that is a limit of Woodin cardinals. Then there is a good extender sequence such that

(1) every level of is a sound, tame mouse, and

(2) ⊨ “There is a strong cardinal that is a limit of Woodin cardinals”.

Recall that satisfies GCH if all its levels are sound. Another consequence of our work is the following covering property, an extension to [St1, Theorem 1.4] and [St3, Theorem 1.10].

Suppose that fi is a normal measure on Ω and that all premice are tame. Then Kc, the background certified core model, exists and is a premouse of height Ω. Moreover, for μ-almost every α < Ω.

Ideas similar to those introduced here allow us to extend the fine structure theory of [Sch] to the level of tame mice. The details of this extension shall appear elsewhere. From the extension of [Sch] and Theorem 0.2, new relative consistency results follow. For example, we have the following application.

If there is a cardinal κ such that κ is κ+-strongly compact, then there is a premouse that is not tame.

We address the classification of the possible finitely-additive probability measures on the Boolean algebra of definable subsets of M which are invariant under the natural action of Aut(M). This pursuit requires a generalization of Shelah's forking formulas [8] to “essentially measure zero” sets and an application of Myer's “rank diagram” [5] of the Boolean algebra under consideration. The classification is completed for a large class of ℵ0-categorical structures without the independence property including those which are stable.

In his 1936 paper, On the Concept of Logical Consequence, Tarski introduced the celebrated definition of logical consequence: “The sentenceσ follows logically from the sentences of the class Γ if and only if every model of the class Γ is also a model of the sentence σ.” [55, p. 417] This definition, Tarski said, is based on two very basic intuitions, “essential for the proper concept of consequence” [55, p. 415] and reflecting common linguistic usage: “Consider any class Γ of sentences and a sentence which follows from the sentences of this class. From an intuitive standpoint it can never happen that both the class Γ consists only of true sentences and the sentence σ is false. Moreover, … we are concerned here with the concept of logical, i.e., formal, consequence.” [55, p. 414] Tarski believed his definition of logical consequence captured the intuitive notion: “It seems to me that everyone who understands the content of the above definition must admit that it agrees quite well with common usage. … In particular, it can be proved, on the basis of this definition, that every consequence of true sentences must be true.” [55, p. 417] The formality of Tarskian consequences can also be proven. Tarski's definition of logical consequence had a key role in the development of the model-theoretic semantics of modern logic and has stayed at its center ever since.