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On the basic logic of STIT with a single agent

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Ming Xu
Ming Xu*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260, E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We present in this paper an axiomatization of Belnap and Perloff's stit theory (a logic of “seeing to it that”) with a single agent. The idea of the proof is to apply the notion of companion sets—the same notion as used in another paper by the author that showed the decidability of stit theory with a single agent and Refref equivalence.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 1995 , pp. 459 - 483
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1995

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References

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