Scholars have credited the victory of Edward Brooke, America's first popularly elected black U.S. senator, to a “deracialized” or “color-blind” election strategy in which both the candidate and the electorate ignored racial matters. This article revises this prevailing historical explanation of Brooke's election. Drawing from the historical-ideational paradigm of Desmond King and Rogers Smith, this paper argues that Brooke was much more of a “race-conscious” candidate than is generally remembered. Primary documents from the 1966 campaign reveal that Brooke spoke openly against racial inequality, argued in favor of racially targeted policies, and called for stronger racial equality legislation. In addition, this paper argues that Brooke's appeals were not targeted primarily to the state's small black population but to liberal whites. Far from ignoring race, internal campaign documents and interviews with campaign staff reveal that Brooke's campaign strategists sought to appeal to white desires to “do the right thing” by electing an African American candidate. Internal polling documents from the Brooke campaign and newspaper commentaries further demonstrate that a proportion of the white electorate cited Brooke's race as the reason for supporting his candidacy. This paper suggests that Brooke's election was extremely well timed—coming soon after the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act but before the urban riots of the “long hot summer of 1967”, the King assassination riots, and anti-busing riots in Boston. The first half of Brooke's 1966 campaign slogan “Proudly for Brooke: A Creative Republican” signals the race-conscious dynamics of his candidacy.

This paper examines the extent to which ambivalent sexism toward women influenced vote choice among American women during the 2016 Presidential election. I examine how this varied between white women and women of color. The 2016 American National Election Study (ANES) features several measures from the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI)—a scale developed by Glick and Fiske (1996) to assess sexist attitudes toward women. An index of these measures is used to examine the extent to which ambivalent sexist attitudes influenced women's vote choice for Donald Trump, controlling for racial resentment, partisanship, attitudes toward immigrants, economic anxiety, and socio-demographics. On the one hand, my findings indicate that ambivalent sexism was a powerful influence on women's Presidential vote choice in 2016, controlling for other factors. However, this finding, based on a model of all women voters is misleading, once an intersectional approach is undertaken. Once the data are disaggregated by gender and race, white women's political behavior proves very different than women of color. Among white women, ambivalent sexist views positively and significantly predicts vote choice for Trump, controlling for all other factors. However, for women of color, this relationship was negative and posed no statistical significant relationship to voting for Trump. Scholarship in gender and politics that does not account for group differences in race/ethnicity may present misleading results, which are either underestimated or overestimated.

This paper explores the effect of norms—standards of conduct dictated by an identity—on white, American immigration attitudes. Results from a survey experiment show that when respondents evaluate immigrants who violate cultural norms, by speaking a non-English language and/or rooting for a foreign soccer team, respondents are less supportive of green cards for immigrants. Moreover, norm violations are consequential for tolerant, prejudiced, liberal, moderate, and conservative respondents. Valuing cultural norms is a shared and pervasive aspect of immigration attitudes, and targeting norms for inquiry brings into view the societal structure of opposition to immigration. However, norm violations affect green card support among liberals only in evaluations of Latino immigrants, and among conservatives only in evaluations of European immigrants.

This paper demonstrates that the relationship between wanting a descriptive representative based on gender, and giving that attitude weight in voting decisions, is weakest among White women voters. Among under-represented groups of voters, White women were uniquely positioned going into the 2016 presidential election—they had the option to choose “one of their own” in terms of race and gender. Yet, the majority did not vote for the White woman on the ballot, Hillary Rodham Clinton. This outcome is an opportunity to interrogate how descriptive representation functions in different ways across groups with distinct socio-political positions in American politics. I argue that the relationship between desiring descriptive representation, and giving it weight when deciding for whom to vote for, is different across groups. Using American National Election Survey (ANES) data, I show that this is the case in the 2016 election. Nearly two-thirds of White women who said that electing more women is important, voted for Trump. Moreover, White women's espoused belief in the necessity of electing more women had no significant effect on their ultimate vote choice. In contrast, the same desire for increased descriptive representation based on gender had large, positive, and significant effects on women of color's vote choice. This study bears on extant research considering descriptive representation's importance to voters based only on race, or gender, and on the broader literature linking group identities and voter behavior.

Under what conditions does coethnicity undermine mutually beneficial collective action? One of the most enduring hypotheses in a comparative political economy decade is that ethnic diversity tends to undermine public goods provision. Ethnically homogenous communities are assumed to have a distinct advantage in local goods provision because shared identities tend to facilitate cooperation among coethnics. However, one can observe variation in the success of local goods provision across homogenous communities. To explain this puzzling occurrence, I explore the relationship between coethnicity and social capital, examining how they interact differently in different contexts. Empirically, I conduct an analysis of my own fieldwork on community policing efforts in two ethnically homogenous communities in Cape Town, South Africa. Ultimately, the paper demonstrates that, in some contexts, coethnicity facilitates the development of bonding social capital, a type of social capital that constricts opportunities for individual action by creating certain expectations about behavior. In the context of community policing, those expectations can discourage individuals from participating in collective efforts.

While a number of studies demonstrate that black candidates have the ability to increase black political participation, a growing literature is investigating why descriptive representation matters. This paper contributes to this discussion by exploring whether perceptions of candidate traits play a mediating role between the presence of an African American candidate on the ballot and increases in black political activity. I test this trait hypothesis using data from the 1992–2012 American National Election Study, a survey experiment, and statistical mediation analysis. The results indicate that perceptions of black candidates as being better leaders, more empathetic, knowledgeable, intelligent, honest, and moral explain a substantial amount of why descriptive representation increases black political participation across a range of different political activities. In the conclusion, I discuss the importance of the psychological link between blacks and their co-racial representatives in inspiring higher levels of political participation.

This article posits that the key to understanding the low levels of political involvement within contemporary immigrant communities, such as Asian and Latino communities, requires a closer examination of the partisan socialization process of the native-born children of immigrants. This article finds that many native-born children of immigrants, otherwise known as second-generation Americans, experience what I call a “prolonged partisan socialization process.” In the absence of parental partisan transmission, many second-generation Americans are left to find their own path to partisan attainment. The consequences of this are that many second-generation Americans eventually come to find their partisan identity outside of the home and much later in life. These findings disrupt the traditional partisan attainment story, which assumes that partisanship is the product of a process of socialization led by parents. Accounting for this prolonged socialization process provides significant insight into why partisan identification, and by extension political participation, among many second-generation Americans, such as Latinos and Asians appears muted. Therefore, while it will likely take some time for many within these contemporary immigrant communities to reach “partisan maturity,” we should not mistake the prolonged socialization process to mean that these individuals are destined to be politically disengaged.

In addition to being the most racially and ethnically diverse generation, millennials comprised an equal number of the voting-eligible population as baby boomers in 2016 and are projected to become the largest share of the American voting-eligible population by 2018. Drawing from several distinct datasets, this study explores three primary topics: (1) examining how race influenced the vote choice of millennials in the 2016 presidential election; (2) comparing partisanship and vote choice among white millennials to older whites; and (3) identifying differences between white millennials who voted in 2016 to those who did not cast a ballot. The study finds that young whites are the outlier category of their age group; being white is associated with a higher probability of voting for Donald Trump, even when accounting for the effects of racial resentment, partisanship, ideology, and other factors. While white millennials appear conservative relative to their peers of color, however, the preferences of young whites are more Democratic than older whites. Non-voting white millennials are more likely than their voting counterparts to identify as independents and ideological moderates, making them a political swing bloc as white millennials age. While political observers are quick to point to the liberal-leaning preferences of young people as a whole, disaggregating the 18–30 age group by race as this study suggests that the Democratic preferences displayed by millennials in the aggregate are largely driven by the cohort's racial and ethnic diversity.

Recent studies confirm that Anglxs’ racial attitudes can shape their opinions about the Affordable Care Act (ACA), particularly when this federal health care policy is linked to Barack Obama. Strong linkages made between Obama and the ACA cue Anglxs to apply their racialized feelings toward Obama to their health policy preferences. This is consistent with a growing body of research demonstrating that “racial priming” can have a powerful impact on Anglxs’ political opinions. Yet few studies have explored racialized policy opinion among minorities, and fewer still have explored racial priming among Latinxs. In this paper, we compare the effect of racial priming on the health policy preferences of Latinxs and Anglxs. Using survey evidence from the 2012 American National Election Study, we find important Anglx–Latinx differences in racialized policy preferences. However, we also find that racial priming has an effect on U.S.-born Latinxs that closely resembles its effect on Anglxs. Results suggest that increasing ethnic diversity in the United States will not necessarily produce increasingly liberal politics as many believe. American politics in the coming decades will depend largely on the ways in which Latinxs’ racial sympathies and resentments are mobilized.

This paper highlights differences in evangelical identity and its association with political attitudes across racial groups. It finds that White evangelicals hold more conservative views than Black, Latinx, and Asian American evangelicals, despite similar levels of religiosity. White evangelicals' more conservative political attitudes are driven by a sense of in-group embattlement, or the idea that their group faces as much or more discrimination as persecuted outgroups. This sense of in-group embattlement is distinct from the effects of economic resources, economic anxiety, partisanship, region (South) and generalized conservative outlook. The paper draws on survey data collected in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 election.

While extant research has documented the existence of negative attitudes toward Muslim Americans, it is unclear whether old-fashioned racism (OFR) is at the root of contemporary Islamophobia, and whether beliefs in the inherent inferiority of Muslims are linked to support for political actors and policies that aim to further isolate them. Bringing to bear a unique dataset of 1,044 white, black, Latino, and Asian participants, we demonstrate that a nontrivial portion of survey respondents make blatantly racist evaluations and rate Muslim Americans as the least “evolved” group. Next, we illustrate that these dehumanizing attitudes are strongly linked to modern objections of Muslim Americans, which we measure with a new Muslim American resentment scale (MAR). Our mediation analysis reveals that the relationship between OFR, support for President Trump, and various policy positions is powerfully mediated by MAR. These results suggest that the relevance of OFR in contemporary politics should not easily be dismissed, and that the literature on racial attitudes, which has predominantly focused on the Black-white dichotomy, should also be extended to appraisals of Muslim Americans.