Social innovation has broadly been defined as citizen-led initiatives aimed at improving community welfare through collaborative relationships. However, numerous studies demonstrate that social innovation might actually create new inequalities. In this paper, we address the following questions: how might socially innovative projects influence public policy? How can we understand a policy shift leading to institutions not only giving support to social innovation projects but even promoting their own social innovation schemes? Is institution-led social innovation different from citizen-led efforts? If so, how? We provide evidence of local public policy change occurring in 0–3 education and care in Barcelona between 2015 and 2021. We explain how this happened, examining who redefined the issue and how, how the policy domain was reorganized, and how the policy subsystem was restructured. Our conclusions show how and why citizens and institutions define social innovation differently and how innovative 0–3 policy in Barcelona was adopted.

How does the public form preferences on racialized policy issues that are both widely discussed and broadly misunderstood? This has been the question centering around the sudden attacks on academic terms like “critical race theory” (CRT). I argue that the politicization of, and opinion polarization around, critical race theory is evidence of what I call policy branding, where political parties or organizations brand an arbitrary concept that has national salience into a policy issue. Using a series of original survey experiments, this study shows that one of the primary sources of opposition to critical race theory is the literal use of the term. I juxtapose this with evidence that the education policy issue at the core, antiracist teaching, maintained strong public, bipartisan support. This study has implications for the consequences of political elite capture of academic concepts and ideas.

We propose a qualitative method of assessing a policy mix’s content, which can be utilized alongside currently common quantitative techniques such as counting the number of tools, policies, and levels of government involved. Focussing on whether or not the mix promotes flexibility or standardization and whether it is intended to be maintaining or innovating helps to better map existing policy mixes and inform design decisions than do more contentless quantitative methods. It has implications for theories of policy-making in improving on current depictions of the nature and dynamics of policy mixes, especially with respect to the impact of procedural tools, and also helps underscore the significance of what often appear in quantitative studies to be marginal or incremental shifts in instruments and goals. The utility of the model and its improvement on existing methods are illustrated through examination of two cases of banking regulation and pension policy in Canada.

Policy with concentrated costs often faces intense localized opposition. Both private and governmental actors frequently use financial compensation to attempt to overcome this opposition. We measure how effective such compensation is for winning policy support in the arena of housing development. We build a novel survey platform that shows respondents images of their self-reported neighborhood with hypothetical renderings of new housing superimposed on existing structures. Using a sample of nearly 600 Bostonians, we find that compensating residents increases their support for nearby market-rate housing construction. However, compensation does not influence support for affordable housing. We theorize that the inclusion of affordable housing activates symbolic attitudes, decreasing the importance of financial self-interest and thus the effectiveness of compensation. Our findings suggest greater interaction between self-interest and symbolic politics within policy design than previously asserted. Together, this research signals opportunities for coalition building by policy entrepreneurs when facing opposition due to concentrated costs.

There is a populist narrative that authoritarian regimes were better able to respond to the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic because of their strict enforcement powers, compliance of citizens, and speed of autocratic decision-making in a crisis. Research evidence to date on this assertion is however inconclusive or inconsistent. This paper analyses data from democratic and authoritarian countries with the aim of finding out whether autocratic regimes, using greater stringency measures (policy interventions to tackle COVID-19), had better public health outcomes than their counterparts. The results show that authoritarian regimes performed better in tackling the pandemic in terms of infection and death rates than their counterparts. However, we did not find any empirical evidence on the moderation effect of trust in government on the relationship between stringency measures against COVID-19 and policy outcomes. This result might be due to the lack of data transparency in authoritarian countries.

The ways in which minority street-level bureaucrats construe their identities as state representatives and as representatives of minority clients are known to inform their discretionary behavior toward clients, thereby shaping policy outcomes. While existing studies have examined race and ethnicity as shared identities between minority bureaucrats and clients, the role of “migrant” identity has been overlooked. Focusing on the so-called European migration crisis of 2015–2017, this study addresses this gap. Drawing on qualitative interviews with migrant bureaucrats, it examines how being simultaneously a migrant and a migration policy implementer shapes bureaucratic discretion. This article introduces the notion of “migrant representative” and identifies four profiles of migrant bureaucrats, each corresponding to different degrees of identification with the local migration management system and the migrant clients. In doing so, it contributes to the literature on representative bureaucracy and the debate on the linkage between passive and active representation.

Lobbyists sometimes represent clients with seemingly adversarial policy interests. We seek to explain the occurrence of such ostensible conflicts of interest. In hiring lobbyists, interests encounter a tradeoff between access and agency. Although some lobbyists promise access to lawmakers, they may not lobby as contracted. Interests hire seemingly conflicted lobbyists more often when access is costlier and reputational risks are smaller. We examine the hiring of tobacco lobbyists by health interests, given the possibilities for shirking and reputational damage. We find that institutions such as hospitals hire tobacco lobbyists regularly and more often than membership-based health groups. Intergroup competition for access and lobby laws, especially anti-conflict laws, affect the use of tobacco lobbyists independent of rates of multi-client lobbying. Conflicts are more common today than ever but interests can protect themselves somewhat from opportunistic agents. Our findings also suggest that reforms can improve the representation of client interests.

Although transboundary crises have gained relevance in an increasingly interdependent world, our understanding of the relational dynamics governing these phenomena remains limited. This paper addresses this knowledge gap by identifying common characteristics across interorganizational transboundary crisis networks and drivers of tie formation in successful structures. For this purpose, it applies descriptive Social Network Analysis and Exponential Random Graph Models to an original dataset of three networks. Results show that these structures combine elements of issue networks and policy communities. Common features include moderately high centralization, reciprocated ties, core-periphery structures, and the popularity of international organizations. Additionally, successful networks display smooth communication between NGOs and international organizations, whereas unsuccessful networks have fewer heterophilous interactions. Transitivity seems to play a role in network success too. These findings suggest that crisis networks are robust structures that reconcile bridging and bonding dynamics, thereby highlighting how evidence from relational studies could guide transboundary crisis management.

In recent years, the movement of personnel from the public sector to interest groups has garnered considerable attention throughout Europe. Consequently, there has been an increased focus on the phenomenon of revolving door lobbyists within academic literature. This research contributes to this scholarly discussion by examining how the employment of such lobbyists facilitates access. We argue that interest groups gain advantages by recruiting individuals from the public sector in policy domains with limited mobilization, but this benefit decreases as more interest groups mobilize. Our analysis of survey data from seven European political systems supports these expectations, indicating that recruiting professionals with experience in the public sector enhances access, especially in policy areas with minimal lobbying activity. This highlights the potential for interest mobilization to counterbalance the advantages of hiring revolving door lobbyists.

As governments increasingly adopt algorithms and artificial intelligence (AAI), we still know comparatively little about citizens’ support for algorithmic government. In this paper, we analyze how many and what kind of reasons for government use of AAI citizens support. We use a sample of 17,000 respondents from 16 OECD countries and find that opinions on algorithmic government are divided. A narrow majority of people (55.6%) support a majority of reasons for using algorithmic government, and this is relatively consistent across countries. Results from multilevel models suggest that most of the cross-country variation is explained by individual-level characteristics, including age, education, gender, and income. Older and more educated respondents are more accepting of algorithmic government, while female and low-income respondents are less supportive. Finally, we classify the reasons for using algorithmic government into two types, “fairness” and “efficiency,” and find that support for them varies based on individuals’ political attitudes.

What shapes citizens’ perceptions of long-term welfare state sustainability? Past work hints at three explanations: information about fiscal pressure, deservingness views of recipient groups, and left-right ideology. We consider all three in an experiment exposing people to information about fiscal costs and/or low deservingness in the labor market domain. Left-right ideology functions as a moderator. Unlike past work, which has concentrated on demographic pressures, information about fiscal costs does not generate worries about sustainability (separately or combined with deservingness cues). Rather, left-right ideology moderates reactions. People on the left seem to question and counterargue against fiscal pressure, such that when facing negative information, they develop more positive sustainability views. This counter-reaction coexists with statistically insignificant effects in the negative direction among people on the right. These ideological contingencies arise without partisan cues, suggesting that welfare state pressure itself is ideologically controversial in the labor market domain.

Under what conditions do incumbents succeed in curtailing programs benefitting large constituencies of low-income voters? We undertake a within-country comparison of four highly popular cash transfer policies in Brazil in the 2010s. Our contribution is threefold. First, we refine the concept of policy drift by distinguishing executive-driven drift (resulting from incumbents’ decisions) from opposition-driven drift (resulting from the veto power of welfare opponents). The latter results from the dispersion of authority; the former is favored by its concentration. Second, we show that executive-driven drift is a successful strategy when programs give incumbents discretion over entitlement and benefits, meaning authority to make unilateral decisions. Third, we argue that executive-driven drift explains retrenchment outcomes better than partisan orientation, size of program’s clientele, and fiscal impacts. Incumbents were more successful in their retrenchment initiatives when concentration of authority in the executive branch allowed them to bypass legislative and judicial veto points.

When does the delegation of legislative powers to the executive endanger policy compliance? The European Union (EU) Lisbon Treaty introduced quasi-legislative tertiary legislation – delegated acts – which empowers the European Commission to amend secondary legislation. Formally, member states control delegated acts only ex post via a veto power in the Council, while they have both ex ante amendment powers and ex post veto over the alternative Commission legislation: implementing acts. However, as member states determine the choice of legislative instrument, we argue that they would consent to the Commission adopting delegated acts only on non-controversial issues. Such selection should result in their lower compliance with implementing than with delegated acts. Our analyses of member states’ transposition delays and infringement cases related to EU tertiary directives support this argument. The results suggest that the delegation of legislative powers to the executive does not increase non-compliance when the legislators have the means to moderate it ex ante.

Does American identity predict preferences for anti-democratic policies that aim to marginalize Muslim Americans? Absent significant priming of inclusive elements of American identity, we argue that individuals with stronger attachments to American identity will be less likely than their counterparts to reject a range of anti-Muslim policies that are antithetical to principles of religious liberty and equality. Across three surveys and multiple measures, American identity powerfully predicts preferences for curbing the civil liberties of Muslim citizens. Particularly striking is the finding that the effect of American identity spans the partisan divide; it consistently explains the endorsement of exclusionary policies among self-identified Democrats, who typically hold more progressive policy positions toward minority groups than Republicans. Overall, our study highlights the contradictory and exclusionary nature of American identity, which has important implications for minority groups constructed as outside the boundaries of Americanness.

International efforts to protect biodiversity date back to the 1970s. The effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements and regional legal instruments has been influenced by national implementation. In this process, subnational governance plays a crucial role. Although policy implementation has been extensively investigated, its subnational dimension has been somewhat neglected, particularly in peripheral areas such as the Outermost Regions of Europe. These remote territories are critical areas in the global fight against biodiversity loss since their ecosystems’ richness makes them biodiversity hotspots. The article applies the knowledge cumulated in policy research to the implementation of biodiversity policy in two of these territories – Reunion Island (France) and the Canary Islands (Spain) – and analyzes policy implementation in the context of multi-level governance. The article questions whether and to what extent decentralization benefits biodiversity policies and highlights salient trade-offs: local empowerment versus fragmentation of competences; responsiveness versus subnational discretion; and accountability versus policy capture.

As the COVID-19 pandemic became an unprecedented global threat, it was accompanied by an increase in trust in governments as well as fear among the public. Previous research suggests that both institutional trust and fear contribute to the willingness of citizens to comply with anti-pandemic measures. Moreover, fear during the contagion also increases trust in government. This article presents a test of the mediation of the effects of fear on compliance through trust. In addition, it differentiates between three different facets of COVID-19-related fear: fear of the disease, fear of economic consequences, and fear of political consequences. The results suggest that while fear of the disease increases compliance, fear of political consequences decreases compliance. Moreover, the effects of fear are mediated through trust in government. The negative impact of fear of political consequences on compliance increased between April and December 2020.

The power of economists in policymaking is widely recognized by both scholars and political actors. While the literature on expert influence has primarily focused on the intellectual features of expert arguments, we argue that economists’ strategic use of framing and normative reasoning wields more influence in policymaking than is acknowledged by current scholarship. Through a comprehensive investigation into the institutionalization of the Norwegian Oil Fund and its associated fiscal regime, drawing on 26 elite interviews with key political and technocratic actors, we unveil the considerable influence of state economists in shaping the policy for managing petroleum wealth. These economists not only played a crucial role in legitimizing and lending credibility to the new policy but also employed strategic framing as a reinforcing mechanism to sustain the policy regime, illustrating the essential role of economists as storytellers. Hence, we suggest including strategic framing as a conceptual element within the theoretical framework of expert influence.

Many Western countries first introduced family allowances around the Second World War. We argue that this clustering is not coincidental and put pronatalist policies related to war preparation and the socioeconomic and demographic ramifications of the Second World War at the center of our explanation. To test this, we first conduct brief case studies of France, Germany, Italy, and Japan to detail how war preparation influenced the introduction of such family allowances. Second, a panel regression of 18 Western countries investigates the different factors contributing to the timing of introduction of such policies and shows that war and its aftershocks have been an important causal factor in the introduction of family allowances. It was not so much the destructiveness of and the involvement in the war that played a role, but rather a general wartime crisis that affected belligerent and non-belligerent countries in similar ways.

Through the pooling and exchange of resources such as expertise and knowledge between network participants, European Administrative Networks (EANs) are expected to play a significant role in enhancing policy learning. Yet, scarce empirical evidence has been presented concerning the learning process taking place within EANs. This paper addresses this gap through the analysis of the Network of the Heads of European Environmental Protection Agencies (EPA Network). Based on a unique survey dataset, social network analysis and exponential random graph models are used to trace the interaction patterns within the network and test which factors shape them. The analysis highlights the relevance of national political factors – i.e. the preferences of national governments and ministries – in shaping the learning processes taking place in the EPA Network. While the network is an important venue for disseminating knowledge between directly and indirectly connected actors, learning processes are mainly limited to like-minded peers.