A type of conventional wisdom has developed among many scholars that industrialized countries with independent central banks produce lower relative inflation rates than countries that do not have these institutions. We argue that the relative importance of central bank independence for fighting inflation changed fundamentally from the 1970s to the 1980s as a result of experiences in the advanced industrialized democracies, which led both Right and Left governments to move toward more neo-liberal macroeconomic policies. As governments made price stability more of a priority, the anti-inflationary effects of independent central banks would become much less pronounced. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed in the study in a multi-variate regression analysis using data from eighteen industrialized democracies.

This article analyzes the development of environmental regulation in the European Union from the perspective of comparative federalism. It presents a theory of regulatory federalism that explains how the basic institutional structures of federal-type polities shape the development of regulatory policy. The article assesses the theory by systematically comparing the development of environmental regulation in the EU, the US, Canada and Australia. The analysis suggests that the EU's institutional structure encourages the development of a US-style pattern of regulation, characterized by detailed, non-discretionary rules and a litigious approach to enforcement.

This paper investigates the conditions under which political framing can render welfare restructuring more palatable. I start by asking two research questions. What are the necessary (albeit perhaps insufficient) conditions that allow leaders successfully to frame welfare reform? To what extent are these conditions evident across welfare regimes? I identify four variables that affect leaders' opportunities for framing social policy: (1) extant frames, (ii) actors, (iii) institutions and (iv) policy arena. After examining the four dominant types of frames found across affluent societies, I review the discursive politics surrounding The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act as a case where all four conditions for framing welfare reform coalesced.

Politics of accountability theory contends that policymakers are unlikely to adopt external accountability policies. Contrary to the theory, many countries have adopted external school accountability policies, while Israel has not. The disequilibrium theory of policy selection is used to analyze differences among countries in school accountability policymaking. I find that the symbolic potency of policies helps to explain these differences. The symbolic potency of external school accountability depends on the extent to which school performance is perceived as a problem, the degree to which powerful stakeholders are affected by the problem and some broader political and administrative factors. Where client stakeholders are stirred out of their apathy, the education policy subsystem will adopt school accountability policies. However, preliminary evidence reveals implementation obstacles that may render these policies ineffective.