Numerous authors have highlighted utilitarian considerations as sources of public support for the European Union, suggesting that support results primarily from cost-benefit calculations of the gains and losses associated with integration. Benefits accrue, not only to different member states, but also to individuals. Within this discussion it is often suggested that the gains and losses are unevenly distributed across social groups, with the higher status groups being privileged and the lower status groups disadvantaged. This paper challenges arguments that assume a clear division between lower social strata and higher social strata in terms of winning and losing in Europeanization; it looks more closely at how Europeans rate the integration process as it affects them personally, and how this influences their support for integration. The results show that socio-economic characteristics cannot fully explain people's perceptions of being winners or losers, and a large proportion of EU citizens do not consider themselves either winners or losers. The paper also demonstrates that the winner/loser self-characterization is indeed a major determinant of support for the EU, but that it only partly coincides with people's socio-economic position.

This paper provides a positive analysis of the evolution of competence allocation within the EU Competition Policy System. In the EU, competition policy competences are ascribed both to the European level and to each Member State. In regard to securing a sound antitrust system, the allocation and delimitation of these competences plays a major role. Accordingly, competence allocation has been a major issue in the recent reforms of cartel policy enforcement and merger control. Instead of normatively analysing the characteristics of optimal competence allocation, we positively identify the self-interest of the interacting groups of agents – European Commission and Courts, national authorities, business associations –  as a major-driving force of the reform process. We show that, as a consequence, the interest-driven outcomes of this process are largely ineffective and deficient – even if evaluated against the background of the publicly announced reform goals. This stands in accordance with longer-term patterns in competence allocation evolution in the EU Competition Policy System.

Canada has a more restrictive biotechnology policy than the United States. Adopting a similar-cases-research-design, this article shows that policy networks explain this difference. The overlapping nature and the boundary between the multiple networks relevant to biotechnology in each country are distinct. In the United States, two policy networks deal with biotechnology. One primarily handles agricultural plants, while the other deals with food; key state actors overlap. In contrast, networks in Canada are separated between those dealing with regulation with two overlapping networks assessing environmental and health risks, and a network to manage biotechnology promotion. Promotion and regulation thus constitute a network boundary in Canada, but not in the United States, where networks deal with these two issues simultaneously. American networks have promoted beliefs favourable to more permissive regulatory preferences than the Canadian environmental and health risk assessment networks and American biotechnology policies are therefore even more permissive than those of Canada.

Institutional fragmentation is usually assumed to influence social policy outcomes in countries with constitutional features such as federalism and divided government, but not in unitary and parliamentary states. The example of childcare politics in the Scandinavian countries suggests that institutional fragmentation and veto points also can play a significant role in unitary and parliamentary systems. The rules of childcare implementation in the Scandinavian countries to a varying degree provide municipalities and NGOs with veto opportunities and veto incentives against the realization of the central government's ambition of universal childcare coverage. In Norway but not in Sweden and Denmark municipalities and NGOs have been provided with significant veto opportunities as well as considerable incentives to act. This might help to understand why Norwegian childcare development has lagged behind its Scandinavian neighbours.