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Competence Allocation in the EU Competition Policy System as an Interest-Driven Process

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2005

OLIVER BUDZINSKI  and
ANDT CHRISTIANSEN
OLIVER BUDZINSKI
Affiliation:
Economics, University of Marburg
ANDT CHRISTIANSEN
Affiliation:
Economics, University of Marburg
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Abstract

This paper provides a positive analysis of the evolution of competence allocation within the EU Competition Policy System. In the EU, competition policy competences are ascribed both to the European level and to each Member State. In regard to securing a sound antitrust system, the allocation and delimitation of these competences plays a major role. Accordingly, competence allocation has been a major issue in the recent reforms of cartel policy enforcement and merger control. Instead of normatively analysing the characteristics of optimal competence allocation, we positively identify the self-interest of the interacting groups of agents – European Commission and Courts, national authorities, business associations –  as a major-driving force of the reform process. We show that, as a consequence, the interest-driven outcomes of this process are largely ineffective and deficient – even if evaluated against the background of the publicly announced reform goals. This stands in accordance with longer-term patterns in competence allocation evolution in the EU Competition Policy System.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 25 , Issue 3 , December 2005 , pp. 313 - 337
Copyright
© 2005 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the 20th Hohenheimer Oberseminar at the DIW Berlin (9th–10th May 2003) and the International Conference on Economic Policies in the New Millennium at the Faculty of Economics, University of Coímbra, Portugal (16th–17th April 2004). We thank Reinald Krüger, Stephen Wilks, two anonymous referees as well as the participants of the two conferences for their valuable comments. Furthermore, we thank Daniela Budzinksii, Marina Grusevaja, Barbara Majireck and Julia Wolkenhauer for editorial assistance. All remaining errors are ours.