This paper analyses the different cost bases in which public expenditure can be analysed as a policy problem related to the differing requirements of planning, authorising and controlling the various components of public expenditure. The analysis is applied to the United Kingdom, where in 1981 changes were announced in the method of making public expenditure decisions which had evolved over the previous two decades. The various components of public expenditure in the United Kingdom are described, and the decision-making process which led to the March 1981 Public Expenditure White Paper is outlined. The significance of the different price bases used in public expenditure (cash (at current or at expected prices), volume, cost, and constant) is then explored. The advantages and disadvantages for policy-makers of attempting to reduce the number of price bases used are analysed; it is shown that there is no cost-free route to reducing complexity. The significance of government's decision in 1981 to make greater use of the cash basis in decision-making is assessed. The analysis is applied specifically to the United Kingdom, but the issues raised are of policy relevance to the choice of price bases for public expenditure decision-making in any country in a time of inflation.

(A second paper in a future issue of the Journal will examine the political purposes behind gross or net measurement, the earmaking of receipts, and the more precise relationships between figures used in the planning of public expenditure, in macro-economic analysis and forecasting and in Parliamentary and local control.)

This article discusses the use made of the ‘Austrian’ concept of entrepreneurship in the present British government's policy discussions, and, using an ‘Austrian’ method of argument, demonstrates that there is a deep-seated inconsistency in its policies which suggests that it, along with the administrations of a number of other western democracies including the United States, has not fully understood the implications of the doctrines to which it appears to have committed itself. This inconsistency relates to its continued support for the existing structure of subsidies in the UK housing market which, it is argued, have made private home-buying so profitable an activity for entrepreneurial individuals as to substantially reduce the attractiveness of the option of setting up new businesses. Whether or not the government is right to believe that, in an economic environment with greater incentives, there would be a great expansion in individual entrepreneurial effort in ‘productive’ activities, this is not likely to happen whilst, amongst other things, the structure of housing subsidies remains substantially unchanged. We suggest, in the light of comparative international evidence, that a better alternative is available.

This article analyses and contrasts recent attempts by the governments of Britain and France to devise an industrial strategy for the next two decades, prompted by, and in a bid to come to grips with, the uncertain international economic environment. It is in three main parts. The first part comprises a brief resumé of the main features of industrial policy in the two countries over the last two decades. The next section examines the main features of the new industrial strategies being put together in each country, based on the so-called ‘industries of the future’, supplementing (rather than replacing) other forms of selective intervention. The third part discusses the problems involved in attempting to devise and launch strategies based on picking industrial ‘winners’. It suggests that if, as French experience seems to show, technocratic dictatorship is the price of success, this is a price which most industrial democracies would be unwilling to pay.

Governmental commissions are an established part of the British and American systems of government. To what extent are they a means by which social science can have an impact upon policy-making? To what extent do they use empirical research methods to gather evidence which influences the commissions' deliberations? What factors hinder the effective use of social science research by governmental commissions? Drawing on case studies of British Royal Commissions and Departmental Committees, and American Presidential Commissions, this article suggests that the potential effectiveness of social science is reduced by the political context in which commissions work, their preferred modes of taking evidence, the way in which commissions are staffed, and the internal dynamics of their workings.

This paper examines the problem of inappropriate comparisons in evaluating social programs and the erroneous policy conclusions which can be derived from such comparisons. The paper examines two cases from the United States of America which fail to meet the criterion that comparison groups (if necessary after statistical adjustment) should be identical in all essential respects except in their exposure to the program. In the first of the two cases, involving the measurement of work-effort reduction in negative income tax (NIT) experiments, the inappropriate comparison was made in conducting a statistical analysis of program effects. In the second case, involving the analysis of changes in housing consumption in a housing allowance experiment, the statistical analysis of program effects appears valid, but the correctly measured program outcomes were themselves inappropriately used by policy-makers in drawing policy inferences. The conclusion draws out major lessons for policy analysis and policy-making.