A simulation approach is used to investigate how various investment strategies affect the ability of retirees to spend at a desired level up until death. Retirees are assumed to maintain all investment and longevity risk, and also have access to a government-sponsored and means-tested Age Pension to provide part of their desired expenditure. It is found that a 100% allocation to growth assets is optimal for large expenditure desires relative to initial balance levels, with allocations outside of this being sensitive to movements in initial balance and desired expenditure level, as well as interactions with the Age Pension.

Micro-econometric intra-cohort profitability analyses of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension contributions are rare. We use representative employment histories of German PAYG pension insurants retiring in year 2005 to examine the determinants of the profitability of contributions using nominal internal rates of return (IRR) as measure. When future nominal pension entitlements are frozen at today's level, average IRR is about three percent. It increases in beneficiaries' remaining life expectancies at retirement and in the length of non-contribution periods resulting, for example, from child care. Interestingly, IRR is decreasing in insurants' earnings capacity, indicating that the system entails an intra-cohort progressive element.

Plan knowledge and trust in financial institutions – two variables missing from standard neoclassical or behavioral models of decision-making – are strongly correlated to 401(k) savings behavior based on results from this paper. In voluntary enrollment settings, plan knowledge and demographic characteristics are related to participation in a 401(k) plan. In automatic enrollment settings, trust in financial institutions and knowledge of an available plan match are related to participation. Although this study cannot prove causality of the relationships, it does extend our understanding of the complex factors underlying savings choices. Policy implications are discussed.

This article considers the amount of economic capital that defined benefit (DB) pension schemes potentially need to cover the risks they are running. A real open scheme, the Universities Superannuation Scheme, is modelled and used to illustrate our results and, as expected, economic capital requirements are large. We discuss the appropriateness of these results and what they mean for the DB pension scheme industry and their sponsors. The article is particularly pertinent following the recent European Commission Green Paper on the future of European pensions systems, its call for advice on reviewing the Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision Directive and the introduction of the Basel 2 and Solvency 2 risk-based regulatory regimes for banking and insurance, respectively.

We present a new database of social security indicators for 11 Latin-American countries designed to show how much they promise to pay in return to contributions. These are based on micro-simulations according to existing norms. We use response-surface analysis to characterize simulation results. Our results indicate that most programs are progressive. The length of service (LOS) has a strong impact on the expected returns to contributions. In several programs, the expected rates of return exhibit striking discontinuities in the LOS, mostly due to vesting period conditions. This implies these programs may be exacerbating income risk.

How do pension fund trustees deal with demographic and economic shocks? We examine this issue by using a vignette study among pension fund trustees in the Netherlands. Trustees show asymmetric reactions to shocks in the level of reserves of pension funds. Pension premiums are upwardly flexible but trustees are reluctant to decrease premiums. Asymmetries are also revealed by choices regarding the inflation indexation of benefits and changing real (defined) benefits. Asymmetry is not visible in the policy responses to demographic shocks: increases in life expectancy are reflected by taking structural measures for a defined benefit contract: raising pension premiums and the pension age. Furthermore, trustees allow their choices to be affected by the forces of social comparison: the reserve position of their fund compared to the position of other funds has a significant influence in choosing pension fund policy instruments.

This paper facilitates the exploration of optimal individual retirement savings strategies within a life-cycle framework by providing a convenient tool to implement a model suggested by Yaari (1965) with an uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraints. The solution is given both for the general case and for cases leading to closed-form equations such as power utility and Gompertz mortality. Illustrations for a wide range of parameters indicate that starting to save for retirement in the first phase of one's career is rarely optimal. Of course, this is not to say that young workers should not save for other motives – a limitation of this model is that risks besides mortality are not considered. The conclusion should also be interpreted cautiously as it is difficult to represent every possible individual circumstance and saving incentive in a single model. The intuition behind the result is that an efficient strategy allocates the burden of financing retirement first to periods with higher income (i.e. lower opportunity costs), creating the potential for an initial period without savings when income grows.

In this paper, we adopt a financial measure (net present value ratio) to assess the extent of the redistribution of lifetime earnings operated by the introduction of a notional defined contribution (NDC) system in the Italian PAYGO system. Our simulations are based on a representative sample of the Italian population consisting of individuals born between 1975 and 2000. We identify three channels of redistribution: between genders (from men to women), along educational lines (from the less-well-educated to the highly educated) and between diverse lifetime-earnings quintiles (from the poor to the rich). This happens because certain groups of individuals systematically live shorter-than-average lives (men, the less well-educated and the poor), whereas others live longer-than-average lives (women, the highly educated and the rich) and, at the same time, the NDC system does not take into account such differences. Comparison between the old defined benefit system and the reformed NDC one shows that intergenerational fairness has improved sensibly but differences between gender and educational levels remained nearly the same. Sensitivity analysis and the consideration of survival pensions in our simulations confirm the general trends of our base case.

In most industrial countries, public pension systems redistribute from workers to retired people, not from high-income to low-income earners. They are close actuarial fairness. However, they are not all equivalent. In particular, some pension benefits are linked to full lifetime average earnings, while others are only linked to partial earnings history. In the latter case, we then show in this article that an actuarially fair pay-as-you-go pension system can both reduce lifetime income inequality and enhance economic growth. We also shed light on the dilemma between inequality and economic growth in retirement systems: greater progressivity results in less lifetime inequlity but also less growth.

Many economists and policy-makers argue that households do not save enough to maintain an adequate standard of living during retirement. However, there is no consensus on the answer to the underlying question about what this standard should be, despite the fact that it is crucial for the design of saving incentives and pension systems. We address this question with a randomized survey design, individually tailored to each respondent's financial situation, and conducted both in the U.S. and The Netherlands. We find that adequate levels of retirement spending exceed 80% of working life spending for a majority of respondents. Minimum acceptable income replacement rates range from 95 to 45% across income quintiles in the U.S., and from 75 to 60% across income quintiles in The Netherlands. The smaller range in The Netherlands may in part reflect the much tighter income distribution there.

This paper examines differences between immigrant and native employees in retirement plan participation using SIPP data. We find that the participation rate among natives is 60 percent, while the native-immigrant participation gap ranges from 10.9 percentage points for naturalized citizens to 35.4 percentage points for non-permanent residents. Controlling for demographic and job characteristics can explain up to half of the gap. Decomposing the overall immigrant-native difference into differences in employer offers, plan eligibility, and plan take-up shows that the likelihood of working for an employer that offers a plan is the primary driver of the overall gap.

In an environment with asymmetric information and intragenerational externalities, the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke–Groves–Vickrey mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can be covered in every generation only if the initial allocation is not dynamically efficient. While introducing a pay-as-you-go scheme without addressing the externality already yields a Pareto improvement, further welfare gains can be captured by using the additional resources to achieve a perfect internalization.

This paper introduces a continuous-time allocation model for an investor facing stochastic liability commitments indexed with respect to inflation. In the presence of funding ratio constraints, the optimal policy is shown to involve dynamic allocation strategies that are reminiscent of portfolio insurance strategies, extended to an asset–liability management (ALM) context. Empirical tests suggest that their benefits are relatively robust with respect to changes in the objective function and the introduction of various forms of market incompleteness. We also show that the introduction of maximum funding ratio targets would allow pension funds to decrease the cost of downside liability risk protection.

This paper investigates empirically how unemployment-induced employment-breaks at different career stages influence pension benefits. The analysis is based on German data. I distinguish four different career phases and investigate to what extent the prevailing social security policy compensated for earning losses. The results suggest that (1) losses in pension benefits were the greatest if unemployment occurred in the middle of a career (between 31 and 50); (2) social security policies have had a mitigating effect on losses in pension benefits. These findings indicate that institutions have a decided influence on how career patterns translate into pension benefits.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the dynamic effects of the different parametric reforms oriented to reach the financial balance of public pension systems on the well-being of the retired population. Using the Spanish social security system as a case study, a duration analysis is implemented to look for a causal relationship and then estimate separately the effects of an effective retirement age delay and a replacement rate reduction as well as the combined effect of these two measures. We also estimate the effects of a delay on the reforms. We find that a change in the effective retirement age would have positive effects on the individual welfare of retired population, while a reduction of the replacement rate would diminish it. The combined effect of the two measures would finally translate into a welfare lost of the retired population. The delay on the reforms implies higher welfare loss (to the affected generations) than the analyzed reforms.

The paper analyzes the recent pension reform in Germany which increases the normal retirement age by two years. The applied simulation model features a realistic demographic transition, distinguishes three skill classes with different life expectancies and allows individuals to choose their labor supply at the intensive and the extensive margin.

Our simulation results indicate that under the existing pension rules long-run contribution rates and old-age poverty rates will increase considerably. The proposed rise in the normal retirement age will postpone effective retirement by about one year and redistribute towards future cohorts. A stronger delay in effective retirement may be achieved by raising the actuarial adjustment of benefits.

We analyze the consequences of increasing MENA-to-EU migration on both sending and receiving regions. Using a general equilibrium model, we find that increasing MENA-to-EU migration generates significant changes in EU15 tax rates and income per capita. Compared to a non-selective immigration shock, selecting immigrants leads to a moderate reduction in tax rates, but to a greater impact on income per capita in the EU15. Emigration, especially if high-skilled, has a detrimental impact on MENA tax rates. Finally, the negative effects in MENA are mitigated if the brain drain leads to side-effects or is accompanied by increased education attainment at origin.

The main aim of this paper is to decompose the effects of social security on private savings and quantify to what extent each factor that impacts saving behavior account for the effects of social security. For this purpose, I estimate a stochastic dynamic model in which households facing income and survival uncertainty choose optimal levels of consumption, asset holdings and labor supply. In this model, social security pensions reduce private assets by less than 10%. Bequest and precautionary savings motives are the main reasons of this partial offset. Uncertainty on future benefits has no role to play on the effect.

Since 1990s, substantial changes in the role of the state in the social security schemes can be observed in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). While the general framework of social benefits in the CEE countries is still defined by the state, more and more often the task of provision of social security is transferred to the private entities. Such privatization of social policy makes the need for protection mechanism and some state guarantees even stronger. It is still the state that is responsible for the final outcome of social security systems so that is why governments are directly providing or indirectly creating safety mechanisms built-in the private market mechanism used for social purposes. The paper surveys various types of the protection mechanisms in selected CEE countries that exist in the important and already most privatized element of the social security system – the pension system. While describing the safety measures and possible guarantees, special attention is paid to the new forms that have been built up recently. The paper covers both mandatory and voluntary pension markets and identifies present and possible threats in the existing frameworks that can harm the social security. The paper concludes with general assessment and policy recommendations.

This paper argues that a substantial portion of the risks associated with the defined benefit (DB) pension schemes operated by regulated utilities in the UK will, in practice, fall on customers via the tariffs that they pay for regulated goods and services. It examines the assumptions made by regulated companies in their FRS 17 valuations. These assumptions generate parameters that systematically understate both the present value of pension liabilities and current service costs. These are re-estimated using the risk-free real rate of discount and compatible assumptions. On this basis, the total pension deficit for the sample increased from £12.7 billion to £56.3 billion in 2009, equivalent to about 110% of regulated revenues. Further, the cost of current service for 2008–09 was 20% higher than total contributions in the year, despite large top-up contributions. If contributions were increased to cover current service costs and to eliminate pension deficits over a period of 10 years, the additional contributions would amount to 235% of actual contributions or 13% of regulated revenues implying a significant increase in regulated charges. Companies in the communications and transport sectors face the largest adjustments in addressing the problems of underfunded pension schemes.