Analyses of pension funding effects on economic growth should differentiate between ‘carve-out’ pension privatization in Latin America and Eastern Europe and typical ‘add-on’ pension funding in Western Europe and North America. We find no evidence that pension privatization in Latin America and Eastern Europe was associated with higher economic growth. The result is robust across both continents and several alternative econometric specifications. Positive growth effects are particularly unlikely in countries resorting to debt-financed privatization. Furthermore, we note the lack of positive pension privatization effects on savings in Eastern Europe, with limited evidence of positive savings effects in Latin America. These findings suggest that cost-containment parametric reforms should be given priority over carve-out pension privatization when considering options for restoring financial sustainability of public Pay-As-You-Go systems.

In 1981 Chile adopted its new multi-pillar system, which featured privately managed individual accounts. Starting in 1983 payouts from the accounts were permitted and detailed rules about payouts were put in place. The Chilean scheme therefore gives us an opportunity to examine how pensioners and pension providers react when individual accounts replace DB systems, and how detailed regulations shape these reactions.

Retirees in Chile have a choice between early versus normal retirement (before or after age 65M/60W) and between annuitization versus programmed withdrawals; lump sum withdrawals are largely ruled out. Almost two-thirds of all retirees have annuitized – a very high proportion compared with other countries. This paper argues that this high rate of annuitization is the result of guarantees and regulations that constrain payout choices, insure retirees through the minimum pension guarantee, eliminate other DB components, and give a competitive advantage to insurance companies selling annuities. The minimum pension financed by the government provides insurance to workers with small accumulations, who retire at the normal age with programmed withdrawals, while those with large accumulations retire early and must purchase annuities to acquire longevity and investment insurance. Insurance companies further induce annuitization by marketing aggressively, facilitating early retirement for those who annuitize and offering a high money's worth ratio for price-indexed annuities. We find evidence of adverse selection based on asymmetric information about short-run health status, but this does not seem to deter the high rate of annuitization.

Considering the substantial systematic longevity risk threatening annuity providers’ solvency, indexing benefits on actual mortality improvements appears to be an efficient risk management tool, as discussed in Denuit et al. (2011) and Richter and Weber (2011). Whereas these papers consider indexing annuity payments, the present work suggests that the length of the deferment period could also be subject to revision, providing longevity-contingent deferred life annuities.

We calculate the present value of state pension liabilities under existing policies and separately under policy changes that would affect pension payouts. If promised payments are viewed as default free, then it is appropriate to use discount rates given by the Treasury yield curve. If plans are frozen at June 2009 levels, then the present value of liabilities would be $4.4 trillion. Under the typical actuarial method of recognizing future service and wage increases, this figure rises to $5.2 trillion. Compared to $1.8 trillion in pension fund assets, the baseline level of unfunded liabilities is therefore around $3 trillion. A 1 percentage point reduction in cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) would lower total liabilities by 9–11%; implementing actuarially fair early retirement would reduce them by 2–5%; and increasing the retirement age by 1 year would reduce them by 2–4%. Dramatic policy changes, such as the elimination of COLAs or the implementation of Social Security retirement age parameters, would leave liabilities around $1.5 trillion more than plan assets. This suggests that taxpayers will bear the lion's share of the costs associated with the legacy liabilities of state DB pension plans.

In this paper, we present a preliminary estimate of the financial impact of the recent reform of the Spanish pension system. After updating the projections of pension expenditure constructed in de la Fuente and Doménech (2010) for the period 2008–2060, we analyze the impact on this variable of raising the retirement age from 65 to 67 years, extending from 15 to 25 years the period over which wages are averaged to calculate the starting pension and increasing from 35 to 37 the number of contribution years required to obtain a ‘full pension.’ Conditional on a series of assumptions about the evolution of employment, productivity and demographics, our estimates suggest that these measures will reduce pension expenditure by up to 1.4 percentage points of GDP once the reforms have been fully implemented in 2027, thereby stabilizing pension expenditure at a bit over 9% of GDP during the transition period and preventing the emergence of a structural deficit in the system before the end of the next decade. On the other hand, the existing uncertainty about the future evolution of the relevant variables suggests that it would be desirable to bring forward in time the introduction of the periodic evaluation of the system (the so-called sustainability factor) so as to have in place a mechanism that can be used to modulate the rhythm and scope of the reform if the system's financial situation requires it before the end of the transitional period.

We provide new empirical evidence on the importance of defined contribution pension wealth in England, and the nature of annuitization decisions taken by older adults who retire with such sources of wealth. Other things equal, financial literacy, and numeracy in particular, are important factors governing individuals’ choices over whether to shop around for an annuity as opposed to taking the ‘path of least resistance’ option and purchasing from their original pension fund provider. This has important policy and welfare implications given that buying an annuity on the open market has significant financial benefits for most people. In the context of the increasing reliance on private provision for retirement, the importance of individuals having the financial literacy to successfully navigate complex financial decisions late in life should not be underestimated.

This paper discusses the valuation of wage-indexed pension liabilities. Valuation of these contingent claims by replication is typically not possible as the wage index cannot be hedged perfectly with financial market instruments. This paper discusses several methods to find a value in such incomplete markets and advocates utility-based valuation. This approach implies a simple adjustment on the discount factor.

We report analysis of voluntary switching from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) plans in an environment best characterised as benign. Using a large Australian fund database we identify socio-demographic correlates and the macroeconomic circumstances associated with DB to DC switching. The age of participants is an important correlate of switching behaviour, suggesting a degree of risk tolerance previously not recognised in the literature. It is also noted, however, that this type of switching behaviour may involve secondary behaviour such that uncertainties of DC investment performance are managed by reference to an asset allocation formula that maps to the previous DB investment strategy.

We investigate the relationship between pension fund governance and investment performance. For this purpose, we develop the Swiss Pension Fund Governance Index (SPGI) which is a standard metric for the governance quality of Swiss pension funds. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 96 pension funds with total assets of more than CHF 190 billion. We find evidence for governance issues in the area organization and target setting. Our results support the widespread hypothesis of a positive relationship between pension fund governance and investment performance.

Empirical analyses of annuities markets have been limited to a few developed countries and restricted by data limitations. Chile provides excellent conditions for research on annuities due to the depth of its market and the availability of data. The paper utilizes an extensive dataset on individual annuities to examine econometrically a measure of market performance – money's worth ratios (MWRs), or the ratio of the expected present value of annuity payments to the premium. The results show that annuitants in Chile have generally got a good deal for their premiums, as indicated by MWRs higher than one and also higher than those estimated for other countries. The difference between Chile and other countries is striking considering that annuities in Chile are indexed to prices. The wide range of indexed instruments in Chile, allowing providers to hedge their risks while extracting higher returns, helps explain the difference. The high degree of market competition has also contributed to this outcome. Efforts to improve market transparency through a new electronic quotation system have decreased the dispersion of MWRs. Finally, MWRs tend to decrease for contracts with longer durations, reflecting pricing for higher longevity and reinvestment risks. These results are consistent with separate research on the annuity rate, and indicate the need to ensure competition and market transparency, as well as to develop appropriate financial instruments for providers in order to ensure good outcomes for annuitants.

The reform of the pension system of the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) in 1997, limited the growing fiscal cost of the previous pay-as-you-go scheme. Sixteen years on from its creation, the Retirement Savings System (SAR) has had favourable macroeconomic effects for Mexico, as it has significantly increased financial savings and encouraged the development of local financial markets.

However, the employment and pension coverage has not developed as hoped, due to the high rate of informality in the labour market. In addition, the replacement rates (RR) forecast for old-age pensions from the defined-contribution scheme will be low, due to problems exogenous to the pension system, such as low contribution rates and low contribution densities. The main objective of this study is to develop a macroeconomic and actuarial projection model to simulate the expected coverage and RR for the period 2012–2050, within the framework of a demographic and economic forecast that will allow a detailed diagnosis of the current conditions of the pension system. The results reveal the unpromising scenario that the pension system has and will continue to have in the long term, with limited improvements in coverage rates. The possibility of obtaining adequate pensions will be restricted to those who have socioeconomic conditions with a long employment history, who can thus make contributions to their individual accounts.

Taking into account this baseline projection scenario, we simulate the expected effects of applying a set of proposals with the aim of tackling the main problems, such as the low coverage, low RR, and low level of participation by young people in the system.

Unemployment periods and other career breaks have long-term scarring effects on future labour market possibilities, permanently affecting workers' retirement income and standard of living as pensioners. Previous literature has focused on the impact of job loss on working careers with little attention to its impact on pension wealth, particularly the extent to which longevity heterogeneity amplifies unemployment scars. This paper investigates the effect of single and multiple unemployment spells on the lifetime pension entitlements of earnings-related contributory pension schemes, considering the timing and duration of breaks, alternative lifecycle labour earnings profiles, scarring and restoration effects on labour market re-entry, the existence of pension credits and pension accruals for periods spent outside the labour market, longevity heterogeneity, and the accumulation and decumulation redistributive features of the pension scheme. Pension entitlements are estimated using a backward-looking simulation approach based on the actual Portuguese public pension system rules and stylized labour market profiles identified in the SHARE Job Episodes Panel data using a sequence analysis. Longevity heterogeneity is modelled using a stochastic mortality model with a frailty model. Our results show that the timing and duration of unemployment periods is critical, that scarring effects amplify pension wealth losses, that minimum pension provisions, pension credits and pension scheme redistributive features can partially mitigate the impact of unemployment periods on future entitlements, and that the presence of positive correlation between lifetime income and longevity career breaks can amplify the asymmetry in the distribution of pension entitlements across income groups.

We argue that the appropriate discount rate for pension liabilities depends on the objective. In particular, if the objective is to measure pension under- or overfunding, a default-free discount rate should always be used, even if the liabilities are themselves not default-free. If, instead, the objective is to determine the market value of pension benefits, then it is appropriate that discount rates incorporate default risk. We also discuss the choice of a default-free discount rate. Finally, we show how cost-of-living adjustments that are common in public pensions can be accounted for and valued in this framework.

Based on a sample of university students, we provide evidence that a small-scale training intervention has both a statistically and economically significant effect on subjective and objective assessments of financial knowledge. We also show that the intervention increases self-assessed more than actual financial knowledge. The intervention consists of measuring financial literacy before and after a small on-line course and is administered through an on-line platform.

The aim of this paper is to explain the ‘annuities puzzle’ in greater depth by introducing the bequest motive. It will try to determine whether this motive really is a relevant feature influencing the demand for life annuities from married couples. With this aim in mind, we develop an optimization model of the utility provided by purchasing a life annuity with contingent survivor benefit or a joint survivor life annuity. Our model is based on that first put forward by Brown and Poterba (2000), to which we have added elements from other models, such as Friedman and Warshawsky's (1990) and Vidal and Lejárraga's (2004), which include the bequest motive. This will enable us to calculate the annuity equivalent wealth and the optimal percentage of wealth to annuitize in various contexts: the possibility of access to actuarially fair annuity markets, the inclusion of so-called market imperfections, and the assumption that couples already have part of their wealth in pre-existing life annuities. Numerical results are presented for the case of Spain. The bequest motive is found not to be a significant factor influencing the demand for annuities from couples. Indeed very few couples would be willing to purchase them once we take into account the combined effects of market imperfections, the possibility of pre-existing annuities and the bequest motive. These findings have repercussions for policy makers regulating defined contribution capitalization systems, which are complementary to defined benefit systems.

Knowledge of the distribution function of the stochastically compounded value of a series of future (positive and/or negative) payments is needed for solving several problems in an insurance or finance environment, see e.g. Dhaene et al. (2002a,b). In Kaas et al. (2000), convex lower-bound approximations for such a sum have been proposed. In case of changing signs of the payments however, the distribution function or the quantiles of the lower bound are not easy to determine, as the approximation for the random compounded value of the payments will in general not be a comonotonic sum.

In this paper, we present a method for determining accurate and easy computable approximations for risk measures of such a sum, in case one first has positive payments (savings), followed by negative ones (consumptions).

This particular cashflow pattern is observed in ‘saving–consumption’ plans. In such plans, a person saves money on a regular basis for a certain number of years. The amount available at the end of this period is then used to generate a yearly pension for a fixed number of years. Using the results of this paper we can find accurate and easy to compute answers to questions such as: ‘What is the minimal required yearly savings effort, α, during a fixed number of years, such that we will be able to meet, with a probability of at least (1−ε), a given consumption pattern during the withdrawal period?’

Employers are beginning to search for ways to elicit more labor supply from older adults as the population ages, the ability to work in later life increases, and younger workers become relatively scarce. Many employers are turning to hybrid pension plans, such as cash balance plans and pension equity plans. Whereas traditional defined benefit plans often subsidize workers who retire early and penalize those who remain at work beyond the plan's retirement age, most hybrid plans reward work at older ages. This paper documents the impact of population aging on the labor market and changes over time in work capacity at older ages. It then shows how movement toward hybrid pension plans, among other types of private and public retirement plan reforms and redesigns, can be used to increase work incentives for older adults.

This paper employs a lifecycle model from the consumption–savings literature to examine the tradeoffs between defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans. We examine the effects of varying risk aversion, varying initial income and financial wealth, and varying wage processes (that may be correlated with returns on the risky asset).

Results indicate that wage-indexed claims are not an optimal vehicle for retirement policy if the decision to participate is made early in life, because individuals hold most of their wealth in their human capital and would not wish to increase their exposure to income shocks. Later in life, after most of a worker's human capital has been converted to financial assets, defined benefit pension plans help increase diversification by reducing exposure to financial market risk. The access that defined benefit plans provide to annuities markets and possible guaranteed rates of return over the risk-free rate increase the value of defined benefit plans to workers. The model also predicts that wage-indexed claims will be more valuable when equity markets provide low expected returns or are highly variable and when annuity markets are inefficient.

The model illustrates two economic functions performed by defined benefit plans. Firstly, DB plans pool individual wage risks. This allows older workers to buy a wage-linked security that increases their exposure to wage risks. Secondly, they create a group annuities market that reduces the cost of adverse selection.

Financial regulators are weighing up the effectiveness of different templates for communicating investment risk to retirement savers since welfare depends on comprehension of risk information. We compare nine standard risk presentations using a discrete choice experiment where subjects choose between three retirement accounts. Switching between graphical or textual presentations, or between formats that emphasize benchmarks rather than return ranges or values at risk, affects predicted choices more than large changes in underlying risk. Innumerate individuals are more susceptible to presentation, and those with weak basic financial literacy are insensitive to increasing risk levels, regardless of presentation. Presentation effects are moderated but not eliminated as financial literacy improves.

As one possible solution to the well-known financing crisis of unfunded social security systems, an increase in the retirement age is a popular option. To induce workers to retire later, it has been proposed to strengthen the link between retirement age and benefit level. The present paper is devoted to analyzing the long-run financial implications of such a reform. We show that with actuarial adjustments the long-run contribution rate is an increasing function of the retirement age chosen by workers. Moreover, the implicit tax paid to the pension system by a participant can increase in the long run if the retirement age rises in response to a ‘steep’ adjustment rule. In this sense, the proposed ‘cure’ may worsen the disease. Finally, we show how the negative effects can be avoided by forming a capital stock from the additional revenues due to later retirement.