In this paper, we address the issue of determining the optimal contribution rate of a defined benefit pension fund. The affiliate's mortality is modelled by a jump process and the benefits paid at retirement are function of the evolution of future salaries. Assets of the fund are invested in cash, stocks, and a rolling bond. Interest rates are driven by a Vasicek model. The objective is to minimize both the quadratic spread between the contribution rate and the normal cost, and the quadratic spread between the terminal wealth and the mathematical reserve required to cover benefits. The optimization is done under a budget constraint that guarantees the actuarial equilibrium between the current asset and future contributions and benefits. The method of resolution is based on the Cox–Huang approach and on dynamic programming.

We evaluate how financial education provided to college students influenced their financial knowledge and planning in a quasi-experimental setting where we control for student motivation to enroll in the course. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, we show that financial education led to an increase in financial knowledge and planning. Specifically, we find that financial education improved students’ financial knowledge score by 11%, and financial planning score by 16%. No statistically significant effects are detected for student levels of financial prudence, discipline, or outcomes related to credit card usage.

Over the last half century UK defined benefit pension schemes have followed the cult of the equity by investing a large proportion of their assets in equities. However, since the turn of the millennium this cult has faced two serious challenges – the halving of equity prices, and the complete rejection of equity investment by the Boots pension scheme in 2001. This paper summarises the history of the cult in the UK and the arguments advanced at the time to support its adoption. It then presents the case for the cult (excluding taxation, risk sharing and default insurance). This is followed by a detailed consideration of the validity of this case, including an examination of the relevant empirical evidence. It is concluded that, in the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance, the asset allocation is indeterminate; and depends on the risk-return preferences adopted by the trustees.

In this paper we reconsider the idea of an earnings-related pension system with reserves invested in indexed government bonds as a mechanism to both ensure financial sustainability and improve security. The paper starts by reviewing the characterization of the sustainable rate of return of an earnings-related pension system with pay-as-you-go financing. We show that current proxies for the sustainable rate, including the Swedish ‘gyroscope’, are not stable and propose an alternative measure that depends on the growth of the buffer-stock and the pay-as-you-go asset. Using a simple one-sector macroeconomic model that embeds a notional account pension system we then show how GDP-indexed government bonds, if combined with the right measure for the sustainable rate of return on contributions, could be used to generate a sustainable and secure earnings-related pension system, without becoming a fiscal burden. The proposal is particularly attractive for countries considering reforms to earnings-related systems that have accumulated a large implicit pension debt. In this case, the government bonds allow the financing of this debt in a transparent way. The proposed mechanism can also facilitate the transition to a fully funded pension system when the government bonds are allowed to be traded.

The theory of equalizing differences predicts that workers trade pay for benefits, but empirical confirmation of such tradeoffs is rare. This study investigates the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) trade pay for pension benefits. For a sample of S&P 500 CEOs, I find that an additional dollar of pension benefits is associated with a 48 cent decrease in pay. Although the tradeoff estimate is significantly different from zero, it is also significantly less than the anticipated rate of dollar-for-dollar, especially for CEOs with relatively more bargaining power over their boards of directors. This implies that the implicit price of pension benefits decreases with the CEO's bargaining power, so pooling datasets on CEOs with varying degrees of power blurs the size of the pay–pension tradeoff.

Increasing the minimum retirement age is a widespread option chosen by policy makers to reduce spending in financially constrained public pension systems. Yet, the effectiveness of such a reform strongly depends on the ability of individuals to postpone their withdrawal from the labor force. In this paper, we study the immediate impact of the 2010 reform of the French pension system by carrying out a short-term evaluation on the increase of the statutory eligibility age from 60 to 61. We use a differences-in-differences methodology, comparing the trajectories from work to retirement for succeeding generations facing a different statutory age. Using a detailed social security administrative database, we provide a global assessment of the effects of the reform, accounting for the potential substitution effects from old-age insurance toward unemployment, sickness or disability insurance schemes. Our findings suggest that despite a sizable effect on the employment rate, the reform also strongly increased unemployment and disability rates.

Demographic change causes an undersupply of financial old age benefits within the statutory pay-as-you-go pension system in Germany. Therefore, the provision of occupational as well as private pensions has to be enhanced. However, there seems to be an undersupply of occupational pension provision particularly in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Using survey data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the German SAVE survey, the present paper studies econometrically the determinants of occupational pension provision in Germany. It shows that occupational pensions depend not only on supply-side factors such as firm size and industry, but also on demand-side factors such as individual sociodemo-graphic attributes and people's savings motives.

Conventional wisdom holds that pension reforms from pay-as-you-go to fully funded systems spur the development of stock markets through a corporate governance channel, i.e. pension funds become large shareholders of publicly traded firms and therefore have the incentives to monitor managers and improve investor protections. This paper reviews the literature on the corporate governance channel associated with pension reforms in developing countries, and asks what we know and need to know about it. We know that pension funds are not yet large shareholders of publicly traded firms in developing countries. However, econometric results suggest that pension reforms lead to stock market development, but do not allow us to identify and separate the corporate governance channel. We know that pension reforms are followed by pro-investor legislation, but there is no convincing evidence that the pro-investor laws are enforced. We need to know more about the effects of pension reform on stock prices and performance of publicly traded firms, and whether pension fund management companies act in the best interest of pensioners. The paper also reviews the political economy explanations of the links between pension fund specific capital controls and the corporate governance channel, and suggests that there is a trade-off between the objectives of pensioners' welfare maximization, and corporate governance reform and stock market development.

In this paper we analyze automatic adjustment factors that can be used to keep the budget of a PAYG pension system balanced when cohort sizes fluctuate. The adjustment factors are defined in a way that is similar to their real-world counterparts and they differ in the relative weight they put on changes in the contribution rate and in the pension level. We show how the internal rate of return of the PAYG system depends on the fluctuations in cohort size and on the choice of the adjustment regime. We find that fluctuations in the cohort size have the smallest impact on the internal rate of return if the relative weight of the adjustment parameters directly corresponds to the length of the retirement period relative to the length of the working period. For reasonable numerical values, this weight is close to the actual choice in the German system.

Virtually all state and local government employers in the United States offer workers some sort of retirement benefits today but there is significant variation in the characteristics of those plans. There is also a great deal of public angst about the level and timing of commitments made in these plans. The literature on retirement plans suggests that they are important elements of compensation that plan sponsors use in meeting their human resource goals. But public retirement plans are created and operated in a public policy environment and forces other than local labor market considerations may be brought to bear in the organization and operation of these plans. This paper explores some of the possible explanations for the variation in state retirement plans. Public disclosure data is used to develop a model that explains relative generosity of benefits based on the characteristics of participants and the marketplaces in which the plans are offered. The final section of the paper places the issues explored in a forward looking context. The public disclosure environment recently put in place for public retirement plans is likely to have a more profound effect on state pension operations than any other development in recent history.

Since 2002, the German government has been attempting to increase private old-age provisions by introducing incentives such as supplementary subsidies and tax credits. Since then, the so-called ‘Riester pension’ has grown in popularity. Apart from subsidized pension plans, unsubsidized private pension insurances have – already in the past – been a very important instrument among old-age provision schemes. With data of the German SAVE study for the years 2005–2009, we analyze whether the decision for a ‘Riester pension’ is independent of the decision for unsubsidized private pension insurance using methods for simultaneous equations. Our estimates indicate that decisions on ‘Riester’ and private pensions are not independent and the proposed random parameters bivariate probit model results in efficiency gains compared to separate probit estimations. Regarding governmental subsidies, we find positive incentive effects of child subsidies, whereas low income earners are not seen to increase their old-age provisions. Further, there is strong evidence for a ‘crowding-in’ among alternative assets, i.e., that individuals holding various assets make additional investments in ‘Riester pensions’ or private pension insurances. Finally, when subsidies are given, these subsidies are a clearly stronger saving motive than the aim to make provisions for old age, a result confirmed by the additional fixed-effects estimations.

Over the past 15 to 20 years, many companies have converted their traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance or pension equity plans. In a cash balance plan, the worker's ‘account’ is based on an annual contribution rate for each year of employment, plus accumulating interest on annual contributions. A pension equity plan defines the benefit as a percentage of final average earnings for each year of service under the plan. Both types of plans specify the benefit as a lump sum payable at termination. In contrast, traditional defined benefit plans specify benefits in terms of an annuity payable at retirement. From the employees' perspective, cash balance and pension equity plans look somewhat like defined contribution plans. However, they are funded, administered, and regulated as defined benefit plans.

A pay-as-you-go pension scheme is associated with positive externalities of having children and providing them with human capital. In a framework with heterogeneity in productivity, and stochastic and endogenous investment in fertility and education, we discuss internalization policies associated with child benefits in the pension formula. The second-best scheme displays both a benefit contingent on the contributions of children and a purely fertility-related component.

We administered the FINRA Foundation's National Financial Capability Study questionnaire to members of the RAND American Life Panel in 2012 and 2018. Using this unique, longitudinal data set, we investigate the evolution of financial literacy over time and shed light on the effect of financial knowledge on financial outcomes. Over a six-year observation period, financial literacy appears to be rather stable, with a slight tendency to decline at older ages. Importantly, financial literacy has significant predictive power for future financial outcomes, even after controlling for baseline outcomes and a wide set of demographics and individual characteristics that influence financial decision making.

We calculate the risk faced by defined benefit plan providers arising from uncertain aggregate mortality – the risk that the average participant will live longer than expected. First, comparing the widely cited Lee–Carter model to industry benchmarks that are commonly employed by plan providers, we show that these benchmarks appear to substantially underestimate longevity. The resultant understatement of liabilities may reach 12.2% for typical male participants in defined benefit plans and may reach 22.4% for male workers aged 22. Next, we consider consequences for plan liabilities if aggregate mortality declines unexpectedly faster than is predicted by a putatively unbiased projection. There is a 5% chance that liabilities of a terminated plan would be 3.1% to 5.3% higher than what is expected, depending on the mix of workers covered.

Singapore has a publicly managed central provident fund (CPF) system, which is compulsory and based on individual accounts with an explicit link between contribution and benefits. This paper assesses the adequacy of the CPF saving to meet the retirement needs of the elderly in Singapore. Instead of emphasizing the mechanism of accumulation, we focus on the expenditure side of the lifetime budget of the elderly and estimate the present value of retirement consumption (PVRC). The estimated PVRC is obtained by simulations through three major components: calibration of subsistence and medical expenses of the elderly; forecast of cohort survival probability by age and by sex; and generation of yield curves to discount the future cash flows. Our results indicate that the existing CPF-decreed minimum sum is inadequate to meet the future consumption needs of the female elderly. The inadequacy becomes more severe when medical expense is set at higher growth rates. Moreover, the monthly payouts of a single premium deferred annuity are computed as illustrative examples.

Rising elderly life expectancies imply the need to accumulate sufficient savings for retirement. This paper investigates the role of recent changes in the investment menu of the Singaporean Central Provident Fund (CPF) system. Our research explores the investment patterns of CPF participants and articulates their implications for policymakers. We find that most investors use their money for housing purchase and default the remainder to the CPF investment pool. The bulk of non-housing saving sits in bank accounts paying a low return. A fraction of workers does elect outside investment products, with high-income earners and males taking more risk than low-income earners and females. Since workers who default their money to the CPF fund receive a guaranteed 2.5% return on the Ordinary Account and 4% on the Special Account, hurdle rates for money market and equity funds are substantial. These high hurdle rates help explain why few CPF account holders invest outside the default government investment pool, though inertia probably explains why many employees let their funds sit in bank accounts earning low interest rates. More attention could be devoted to lowering fund expenses and commissions, including the myriad of fees, expenses, loads, and wrap charges; it might also be beneficial to streamline and rationalize the investment menu offered to participants.

We present the results of a survey experiment where the treatment group was provided with an information brochure regarding recently implemented changes in the Norwegian pension system, whereas a control group was not. We find that those who received the information are more likely to respond correctly to questions regarding the new pension system. The information effect is larger for those with high education, but only for the most complex aspect of the reform. Despite greater knowledge of the reform in the treatment group, we find no differences between the treatment and control group in their preferences regarding when to retire or whether to combine work and pension uptake.

This paper develops and estimates a model for the bonus-crediting mechanism in relation to with-profits policies issued by Danish life insurance and pension companies. The market for pension and life insurance savings contracts is generally highly opaque, but our proposed model explains a significant part of the variation in actual bonus distribution by Danish market participants. The main determinant of bonus policy is a measure of the degree of solvency which we construct from a unique data set that contains information compiled from several public as well as non-public sources. The data set spans the ten-year period from 1991 to 2000 and the model is estimated by way of maximum likelihood.

In this paper, I study how pay-as-you-go pension systems of the notional defined contribution type can be designed such that they remain financially stable in the presence of increasing life expectancy. For this to happen three crucial parameters must be set in an appropriate way: the notional interest rate, the adjustment rate and the annuity conversion factor. I show that there exist two main approaches to implement a stable system. The first uses period-specific annuitization and indexation rates that correct for labor force increases, which are only due to rises in the retirement age which are necessary to ‘neutralize’ the increase in life expectancy. The second approach uses cohort-specific annuitization and indexation rates that are larger than in a stationary situation. This is due to the fact that a continuously increasing life expectancy leads to higher internal rates of return that can be passed on via the indexation.