An extensive literature on the ‘resource curse’ posits that abundant natural resources ‘curse’ countries possessing them with negative economic, social and political externalities. Usually, scholars identify tangible resources like oil, diamonds or timber, rarely questioning whether other kinds of resources might have the same impact, and under what conditions. This paper examines how little-studied Djibouti's non-tangible resources – geo-strategic location and aid-inspiring poverty – have produced ‘curse’ effects; with an economy dominated by US and French military spending (and concomitant aid) and rents on trade passing to and from Ethiopia, tiny Djibouti suffers from this curse. It draws four conclusions. First, resource curse effects can derive from non-traditional sources. Second, leaders' policy decisions matter at least as much as the presence or absence of resources. Third, advanced countries' spending patterns in their less-developed allies often produce unintended consequences. Finally, even tiny countries can provide scholars and policy makers with new insights.

Equity is complementary to the pursuit of long-term prosperity. Greater equity is doubly good for poverty reduction. It tends to favour sustained overall development, and it delivers increased opportunities to the poorest groups in a society. (François Bourguignon, speech at the launching of the World Development Report, 2006)

This paper studies the Rwandan case to address some of the challenges and pitfalls in defining pro-poor strategies. The paper first looks at the danger of a purely growth-led development focus (as in Rwanda's first PRSP), and evaluates the extent to which the agricultural sector has been a pro-poor growth engine. It then studies Rwanda's current rural policies, which aim to modernise and ‘professionalise’ the rural sector. There is a high risk that these rural policy measures will be at the expense of the large mass of small-scale peasants. This paper stresses that the real challenge to transform the rural sector into a true pro-poor growth engine will be to value and incorporate the capacity and potential of small-scale ‘non-professional’ peasants into the core strategies for rural development. The lessons drawn from the Rwandan case should inspire policy makers and international donors worldwide to shift their focus away from a purely output-led logic towards distribution-oriented rural development policies. In other words, the challenge is to reconcile efficiency in creating economic growth with equity, and perhaps, to put equity first.

This essay examines the ‘posthumous career’ of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the late leader of the Yoruba of Nigeria. It focuses on why he has been unusually effective as a symbol in the politics of Yorubaland and Nigeria. Regarding Awolowo as a recent ancestor, the essay elaborates why death, burial and statue are useful in the analysis of the social history of, and elite politics in, Africa. The Awolowo case is used to contest secularist and modernist assumptions about ‘modernity’ and ‘rationality’ in a contemporary African society.

Governance reform practice has mostly focused on building up and transforming central state institutions. Furthermore, the politics of aid has often constructed a very ‘introverted’ politics based in large cities. This article explores the means through which governance ideas are implemented outside this ‘governance realm’, by looking at the ways in which the Lushoto District government in Tanzania has mediated a range of policy changes that have emanated from the state/donor centre. Identifying three distinct but inter-related repertoires of political practice, it argues that governance at the local level has been largely about financial management, and that this aspect of reform is in tension with local developmentalism and is more starkly opposed to local veranda politics.

Due to its four decades of high long-term economic growth and democratic system, Botswana has been depicted as an exceptional success story in a region full of economic and political failures. In this article, a structural analysis is applied, and it is argued that Botswana's success should be understood as one of pre-modern growth without development. It is claimed that although the country may be a growth miracle, it has not yet experienced ‘modern economic growth’, characterised by structural change in patterns of production as well as in social and political institutions. Such analysis also offers an explanation for the duality of Botswana's economy and society, since pre-modern growth, as opposed to development, allows for significant poverty rates and extremely unequal resource and income distribution to prevail in the midst of plenty.

China's engagement with African countries is growing rapidly, spanning trade, investment and development cooperation. Some observers have suggested that poor operating standards among Chinese investors may contribute to the social ills associated with extractive industries and undermine host countries' sustainable development. Drawing on case study data from the copper mining sector in Zambia, this paper argues that the economic and political context surrounding Chinese investment risks undermining the effectiveness of local environmental, social and fiscal regulation. The analysis first explores particular characteristics of large-scale Chinese investment, including the prevalence of state-led financing and the challenges of effectively monitoring overseas Chinese projects. It proceeds to place these characteristics within the host country regulatory context, which in the case of Zambia features significant capacity constraints, political interventionism and a pervasive lack of transparency. The paper argues that, within a weak regulatory setting, Chinese investment may pose significant challenges for effective business regulation. Yet the resulting state-firm dynamics are by no means exclusive to Chinese investment. Rather, it is host country regulatory characteristics, in combination with certain features of investors' corporate governance, that together herald a new set of challenges for business regulation in developing African countries.

Liberian ex-combatants are generally seen as uprooted urban youths with a history of unemployment, underemployment and idleness. The data that form the basis of this article suggest another picture. What caused the Liberian youth to fight were mainly security concerns, suggesting that the effects of ‘idleness’ and ‘unemployment’ are overstated with regards to people joining armed groups. They went to school, worked and lived with parents or close relatives prior to the war. They are not Mkandawire's (2002) uprooted urban youths or Abdullah's (1998) ‘lumpens’. They lived quite ordinary Liberian lives, and based their decision on whether to join an armed group on the security predicament that they believed that they and their families were facing. This suggest that disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation approaches are in need of re-thinking that links them more directly to social cohesion and societal security.

This paper presents some results from the largest rural labour market survey yet conducted in Mozambique. Evidence from three provinces shows that labour markets have a significant impact on the lives of a large number of poor people, and that employers exercise considerable discretion in setting wages and conditions of casual, seasonal and permanent wage employment. The evidence presented comes from a combination of a quantitative survey based on purposive sampling with other techniques, including interviews with large farmers. The findings contrast with ideas that rural labour markets are of limited relevance to poverty reduction policy formulation in Africa, and the paper concludes with methodological, analytical and policy recommendations.

Despite decades of police assistance and the recent introduction of reform plans, Nigeria's public police remain notoriously brutal and corrupt. This raises the question of whether even flawed reforms in a relatively democratic environment can make a significant difference to policing standards and practices. Based on developments in the Nigeria Police since 2005, this article suggests that reform can make a normative and organisational difference, but that in the absence of fundamental socio-political change, its effects tend to be superficial, localised and temporary. Reform's dynamic is better understood as a classic dialectic than a serial succession of movements.

During the last years the DRC has made itself known in the world for terrible acts of violence committed by armed men – militia and the regular army – against the civilian population. The voices of the soldiers and combatants have so far been absent in the accounts of this violence. This silence is problematic, both because it makes it harder to understand such violence, but also because it reinforces stereotypes of African warriors as primitive and anarchic, driven by innate violence and tribal hatred. Enquiry into the particular discursive as well as material circumstances of the armed conflict in the DRC, which might better redress the complex and interrelated context in which ‘people in uniforms’ commit violence, is consequently impeded. The story we recount here emerges from soldiers within the main perpetrator of violence in the DRC today: the Integrated Armed Forces. The soldiers' interview texts challenge the dominant representation of soldiers and combatants in the DRC. The soldiers made sense of the prevalence of violence (in which they too had participated) in several interrelated ways, none of which reflected any expression of ‘natural’ (if dormant) violent tendencies, hatred or vengefulness for the enemy.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are sensitive issues in relations between donor agencies and recipient governments, especially in a time when the responsibility for implementing aid activities is shifting towards recipients. This paper deplores that, so far, donors and recipients have adopted an overly technocratic approach to M&E, largely disregarding broader institutional and systemic issues. Using case study material from Rwanda, we illustrate that assessments regarding the quality of a country's M&E efforts may differ sharply depending upon one's perspective. At the core of the matter is ‘the denial of politics’, one of the most serious flaws in the new aid paradigm promoted in the OECD's 2005 ‘Paris Declaration’. We argue that while a narrowly defined technocratic vision of M&E may seem ‘politically neutral’, in fact it may jeopardise M&E's functions of ‘accountability’ and ‘feedback’. This can eventually undermine the effective implementation of some of the key principles of the ‘new aid approach’.

The idea has gained ground in recent years that, as conflicts in the countries of the Great Lakes Region are strongly interlinked, regional approaches are necessary to resolve them. This interest in regional dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding also gains currency in other parts of the world. Attention to regional approaches is reflected in the efforts of international organisations and donors to promote civil society peacebuilding. They assume that regional cooperation and exchange between civil society organisations contribute to peace, and provide an alternative to single-country interventions or regional diplomatic initiatives. This paper explores how such assumptions work out in practice. Experiences in the Great Lakes Region show that local and international organisations have difficulty in analysing the regional character of conflict and arriving at collaborative regional strategies. Moreover, local civil society organisations are deeply embedded in the politics of regional conflict. Consequently, the shift to regional peacebuilding approaches remains more theoretical than practical. This paper suggests that international supporting organisations need to adjust their ambitions in regional peacebuilding, but nonetheless have roles in fostering regional identification among civil society organisations.

The removal of the governing Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) from power through the ballot box in 2007 represents a watershed moment in the growth and maturation of Sierra Leone's teething electoral democracy. This is because the peaceful alternation of political parties in power tends to strengthen democracy and nurture public confidence in elections as mechanisms of political change. In contrast to what happened in 1967, when the SLPP derailed the country's first post-independence democratic experiment by orchestrating a military coup after losing power in parliamentary elections, the SLPP in 2007 found itself isolated both internally and externally, and could rely neither on the support of a restructured army and police nor on external patrons like the United Kingdom which, among other things, suspended budgetary support for the government pending the satisfactory conclusion of the elections. The emergence of the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), whose membership consists largely of disaffected former SLPP members and supporters, and the electoral alliance forged between the PMDC and the All People's Congress (APC) in the presidential run-off, doomed any chance the SLPP may have had of holding on to power. The elections were referenda on the SLPP, which lost both the presidency and the legislature because its rogue leadership squandered the goodwill of the public, misappropriated donor funds with impunity, and failed to deliver basic social goods and services.

Sierra Leone has recently emerged from a long period of political instability and civil war, and is ranked among the world's poorest countries. Thousands of displaced people are in the process of returning to their villages to rebuild their mainly farming-based livelihoods, and many are growing food crops for the first time in a decade. With pressure on food production increasing in rural areas, the inland valley swamps have been identified by the government as a vital resource for sustaining rural livelihoods and achieving food security through the production of rice and other commodities. However, previous government policies directed at enhanced wetland production have largely failed to achieve their goals, and have been criticised for neglecting the institutional challenges of development. Drawing on recent fieldwork carried out in two rural communities in the Eastern Province, this paper considers how institutional arrangements function in Sierra Leone's swamp wetlands, and explores how stresses associated with a post-conflict environment are shaping land-use decisions and mediating access to resources in new ways. The findings of the enquiry have implications for Sierra Leone's recently adopted commitment to decentralisation, a move that has, in theory, seen the state strengthen its position at the local level, and will allegedly create new spaces for increased interaction between state agencies, traditional leaders and communities. Two institutional challenges are examined – access to land and access to labour – that must be addressed if decentralised reforms to resource management are to be effective for wetland rice production. The analysis concludes by considering one recent initiative at the forefront of efforts to decentralise the Ministry of Agriculture, the ‘Agricultural Business Unit’ (ABU) initiative, to elucidate some of the challenges faced in post-conflict wetland rehabilitation.

This article addresses the topic of the recent boom in mobile phones in Burkina Faso. Mobile phones are placed in the theoretical framework of domestication and, more particularly, of cultural appropriation. They are therefore regarded not only as devices to communicate, but also as material objects which cause economic problems and may affect social relations through the uneven disposition over such objects. As in many other African countries, the growth of mobile phone usage in Burkina Faso is higher than in Western countries, reflecting the particular appreciation of these devices. This development contrasts sharply with the difficult economic situation of many of the users. This context may explain some particular patterns of usage, and is discussed against the background of the communication principles ruling in societies still adequately described as ‘oral societies’. Domestication leads to a partial usage of the devices' technical possibilities. Nevertheless, it transforms mobile phones into socially meaningful means of communication.

This article examines the ethnic character of Ituri's complex emergency. It considers the local context in which the IDP predicament has unfolded, asking questions about the prospect of, and responsibilities for, post-conflict reintegration. As militia disarmament and peace are linked but not coterminous, it is argued that militant ethnic agendas at the core of the conflict must be scrutinised for their ongoing significance. Revealing the past to be a contested terrain, these agendas call for an apartheid-style solution along lines of segregation first envisaged by Belgian colonialists. To move towards ethnic reintegration, Iturians face the challenge that they must create a common history freed from the stranglehold of extremist interpretations.

Since Nigeria's transition from military to civilian rule in 1999, the country's Supreme Court has risen from a position of relative political obscurity and institutional vulnerability into a prominent and independent adjudicator of inter-governmental disputes in this chronically conflicted federation. Examined here is the Court's arbitration, during President Olusegun Obasanjo's two civilian constitutional terms (1999–2007), of fifteen different federal-state litigations over offshore oil resources, revenue allocation, local governance and public order. The Court's federalism decisions were remarkably independent and reasonably balanced, upholding the constitutional supremacy of the Federal Government in several findings, tilting towards the states in some declarations, and simultaneously underwriting federal authority and state autonomy in other rulings. Despite the Court's important and independent role, however, the Nigerian federation was vexed by violent conflicts, underscoring the structural, political and constitutional constraints on judicial federalism in this notoriously complex and divided country.

Poor farmers often lack credit to purchase agricultural inputs, and rely on their buyers to provide it. This paper considers the effects of mobile phones on traders of perishable foodstuffs operating between Tanzania's Southern Highlands and Dar es Salaam's wholesale market, with a particular focus on the importance of credit in the relationship between potato and tomato farmers and their wholesale buyers. It argues that the ability to communicate using these new information and communication technologies (ICTs) does not significantly alter the trust relationship between the two groups. It also suggests that farmers, in effect, often have to accept the price they are told their crops are sold for – irrespective of the method of communication used to convey this message – because their buyers are also their creditors. In this situation, many farmers are unable to exploit new mobile phone-based services to seek information on market prices, and potential buyers in other markets. Doing so runs the risk of breaking a long-term relationship with a buyer who is willing to supply credit because of their established business interaction. It is suggested that, under a more open system than currently exists in Tanzania, mobile-payment (‘m-payment’) applications should target these creditor-buyers as key agents in connecting farmers to the credit they so often require.

This article examines political corruption and political party financing in multiparty Kenya. It uses the Goldenberg and Anglo-Leasing mega-scandals to demonstrate the existence of political corruption, particularly campaign financing, arguing that it has increased under multiparty rule and affected the nature of governance. It has adversely affected political participation and competition, the rule of law, transparency and accountability. Illegal funds to finance the Kenya African National Union's elections in the 1990s were raised through the Goldenberg Affair, whereas those aimed at financing the National Rainbow Coalition's elections in December 2007 were to be raised through the Anglo-Leasing scandal. Corrupt campaign financing, therefore, poses a threat to democracy in the country. The democratic space created and expanded by multipartyism has, however, provided new opportunities for waging the war against corruption. It is in the context of these arguments that the conclusion raises broader issues for corruption and democracy in Africa.

In this article Eritrea is discussed as a developmental state based on biopolitics. Taking the example of higher education, it is shown how the biopolitical project as applied to education policies and human resource development at first succeeded in terms of reinforcing personal nationalism, while at the same time opening up spaces for the fulfilment of personal aspirations. Of late, however, the biopolitical project has turned ‘pernicious’ and has become a tool of oppression. These developments, if they are to continue, will not only jeopardise the state's developmental agenda but may lead to the Eritrean polity in its present form becoming unviable.