WHAT are the economic conditions for attaining Uganda's ambitious development goal, the doubling of income per capita in 15 years? My purpose here is to discuss the logic of five major structural changes which may be regarded as necessary for a substantial acceleration of Uganda's rate of economic growth. Since each of these changes would require energetic government policies to bring it about within the time- span considered, they can also be thought of as key elements of development strategy. I hope that the logic of these structural changes may be suggestive also for other countries at a somewhat similar stage of development, particularly in Africa.

The ultimate reality in culture change… hinges on the fact that corresponding institutions in two cultures satisfy analogous needs in different ways and with different techniques; but in the process they have to use the same human and natural resources: land, capital, labor, politically organized force, the impulses of human reproduction, and also the standardized emotions, values and loyalties specific to each culture. – Bronislaw Malinowski, Dynamics of Culture Change (New Haven, 1945), p. 71.

Africa's rôle in the international economic order during the last five years has been changing, if in any direction, for the worse. The impact of African statesmen in the negotiations for a new order has been marginal, despite the symbolic presence of General Obasanjo from Nigeria at the Jamaica summit of January 1979. Yet in many quarters, these trends have not been recognised for the vital sign they are: symptoms of the weakness of African states in the creation of new institutions to govern our fragmented international economic system.

In Togo, the opposition movement behind the anti-government protests that broke out in 2017–2018 appears to reflect a greater role for Islam in politics. Tikpi Atchadam, leader of the Parti National Panafricain, was the preeminent figure in the movement, having built a solid grassroots base among his fellow Muslims. This article examines the unique role that Muslim leaders played in these protests, as well as the Faure Gnassingbé regime's strategic response. The ruling party made spurious claims against Muslim opponents, associating them with a dangerous wave of political Islam. I argue that by portraying Atchadam as the leader of a radical ethnic and religious movement with Islamist goals, Faure Gnassingbé and his supporters sought to weaken this emerging challenger and deter members of the public from backing calls for political change. The strategy also helped garner support from Western countries while simultaneously driving a wedge between Muslim community leaders.

Israel shares the distinction, together with only a handful of other nations, of being a ‘newsworthy’ country. Even before the recent war, hardly a week passed without at least a reference to Israel in either the daily or periodical press. Various American, British, and European weeklies consistently carry articles on Israel. On a per capita basis, probably no other country receives as much world press attention as Israel. Yet, despite this profuseness of printed material, very few articles and fewer books present competent analyses of the Israeli polity and foreign policy.

The Recent resumption of popular protest signals a new phase in South Africa's internal opposition, characterised notably by the rising political engagement of black labour unions and their federations. Membership in these unions has reached over a million workers, reflecting the dramatic expansion of South Africa's industrial manufacturing sector in the last 20 years. With severe restrictions placed on the leading national and local political organisations since 1985, the unions have developed beyond their initially narrow concerns for their members into the forefront of opposition to established economic and political order. As a result, class consciousness and working-class organisation have increasingly been combined with, and taken precedence over, previous conceptions of opposition based on racial and national identity. This development has exacerbated both remaining ideological divisions and pressures for united action within the union movement.

Unaccompanied child and youth migrants negotiate with local host communities in their attempts to find a place to belong to, yet research has generally neglected their participation in the making of relationships with the people around them. Providing a perspective of the longue durée, the Zimbabwean–South African borderland teaches us that time is critical in young migrants’ ability to negotiate their positioning and actively shape relationships with host communities, based on mutual interest. While at the beginning of their stay, unaccompanied children and youth were at the mercy of others, time enabled them to accumulate knowledge and develop skills that were in demand, shifting their place in society and setting the ground for conviviality.

What Southern Africa will look like a generation from now is an immediate problem for the South African Government's top policy makers, who realise the precarious nature of apartheid. These planners have rejected both the do-nothing approach of the right-wing elements (e.g. the Republican Party) in South Africa and the multi-racial society solution pressed by Mrs Helen Suzman, the only Member of Parliament of the (relatively) left-wing Progressive Party. Between these two alternatives a host of partition schemes have been advocated, and one of them has been accepted: the ‘Bantustan’ proposals. By geographical isolation of each of the non-White ethnic groups into separate homelands or ‘Bantustans’, leaving the remainder of the territories of South Africa and South-West Africa to the Whites, the Nationalist Government is proceeding to change the face of Southern Africa.

Seen as one of Africa's most visionary and enlightened autocrats, Paul Kagame's presidency is often contrasted with the violence and ethnocentrism of his discredited predecessors. Drawing on rarely analysed primary sources, this article disputes this simplified narrative by revealing striking continuities in the ruling elite's rhetorical repertoire in the late colonial period (1956–1959) and present-day Rwanda. Both then and now, rhetorical calls to remove ethnic labels from public discourse in the name of national unity are key resilience strategies designed to shape regime relations with domestic and international audiences in ways that reinforce power concentration by a small (largely Tutsi) elite. Changes in the distribution of power and the scale of anti-Tutsi violence (most notably in 1994) help explain why a similar rhetorical strategy failed to prevent the dismantling of the Tutsi oligarchy in 1961 while strengthening its contemporary counterpart.

In November 1963 the inhabitants of the Transkeian Territories, the largest block of Bantu reserve in the Republic of South Africa, went to the polls to elect representatives for a Legislative Assembly, upon whom the responsibility for the government of this, the first so-called ‘Bantustan’ to achieve a limited form of self-government, is to be laid. The election was the culminating point in a series of changes in the administrative structure of the area which have been characterised by an emphasis on the institution of chieftainship as the basis of local government. After approximately 60 years of rule through magistrates (later supplemented by a system of district councils) the Bantu Authorities Act of 1955 was introduced, giving greatly enhanced powers to the Chiefs, who now became the heads of the tribally-structured Bantu Authorities.

The World Federation of Trade Unions (W.F.T.U.) was one of the most hopeful ventures of all the Communist front organisations. Unlike some of the other fronts the Russians did not create it. They captured the W.F.T.U. after it was established, and had a good start. Once captured, however, the W.F.T.U. represented merely an extension of the pattern of the earlier Red International which had been created by the Comintern following World War I as a vehicle to reach the working masses of the world and rally them to Moscow. But like its predecessor—dissolved in 1937—the W.F.T.U. has also failed to make significant inroads among the workers in western countries and win control over them. While it has affiliates in the west, the French Confédération Générale du Travail (C.G.T.) and the Italian Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (C.G.I.L.) being the most outstanding examples, the W.F.T.U. does not at all dominate these movements. Rather, control for the most part is exercised through the local Communist parties, some of which, while still very much an integral part of an international apparatus, have won some measure of autonomy from Moscow.1

Nation-Building implies integration on a variety of levels, but the converse is not true. Integration may result in a dependency, but does not imply the mental awareness of unity. Because of the ethnic interaction that has taken place over the centuries before and during the era of colonialism, there exist greater and lesser degrees of functional integration in Africa. Because of this interaction, Ronald Cohen and John Middleton have stated that ‘ethnic units as clear-cut entities are sociological abstractions ’1 However, one would be hard pressed to find anything approaching the breadth and depth of integration so necessary for us to ignore ethnic identity and diversity within any modern African state. Nation-building indicates a movement from simple interaction, through varying degrees of systems integration, to an ultimate awareness of membership in a common polity.

During mid-1985 a combined team of expatriate consultants and Swaziland experts examined in some detail the water-development options in the Komati river basin.1 This short article presents the abbreviated macro-economic ‘home’ that we constructed, because our policy and investment recommendations had to be consistent with the Government's overall development objectives. The incentive to publish our findings was prompted by the dearth of relevant data in the existing literature, and there may be others in a position similar to that in which we found ourselves – namely, that virtually nothing was readily available. Our 1986 draft was updated in 1988 to take advantage of the latest statistics.

The governments of Africa, in planning for economic and social development, have become increasingly aware that they can no longer afford to treat population as an exogenous variable. They have begun to study the component variables of population change, and their interrelationships, and have paid special attention to the critical role of fertility.

Most of the world's developing nations are primarily rural and agricultural. Therefore, governments have tended to place a policy emphasis on development in those sectors, usually as a result of employing the relatively straightforward argument that they should focus on the needs of the largest proportion of the inhabitants. The movement of population is generally seen in the light of rural–urban migration, although there is some evidence and opinion that this is not per se as massive as usually estimated. In addition, Rakesh Mohan has developed an economic model that suggests a close linkage between the success of rural development policies and an expansion in urbanisation, based on the assumption that the former increase both demand for and awareness of urban goods and services, resulting in a greater propensity for people to move to those places where these resources are most readily availabe. Thus, the more it has to turn its attention to the urban consequences.

The term Falasha is derived from the Ge'ez or Amharic word maflas, ‘to remove’, and denotes people without land or roots, strangers, and will be used in this article because of its wide international recognition, although most Ethiopian Jews now prefer to be known as Beta Israel. According to their tradition, the Falasha have lived in Africa for more than two-and-a-half millennia, for the most part unaware of the existence of other Jews in the world. In recent years, an increasing number have felt impelled to seek a permanent home in Israel, and by June 1991 as many as 43,000 had managed to achieve this goal. Although most of these Ethiopian Jews must have anticipated that emigration would not be easy, it is very unlikely that they, or anyone else, could have known just how difficult would be their ordeal.

Two years after the centenary of Heinrich Barth's death on 25 November 1865, a big volume dedicated to him was published in Germany. Seven West German scholars, two East Germans, one Austrian, three British, and two French contributed to this book:— Heinrich Barth, ein Forscher in Afrika. Leben-Werk-Leistung Eine Sammlung von Beiträgen …, edited by Heinrich Schiffers (Wiesbaden, Steiner Verlag, 1967, pp. 540). A British centenary edition of Heinrich Barth's Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa (London, Cass, 3 vols, 1965) actually appeared in the centenary year.