People in sub-Saharan Africa rely on a variety of informal mechanisms to gain access to land for urban farming. However, the literature on land tenure focuses on gaining access to land for housing, whereas farming, which is highly visible in the urban landscape of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, requires farmers to negotiate their access in ways distinct from housing. A close examination of four open-space farms in Dar es Salaam reveals that there are different methods of gaining access to land for farming as opposed to housing. Additionally, theorising this access reveals that the landowners who allow farmers on their land for food production also derive benefits. This can provide a framework for current efforts to integrate urban agriculture into the city zoning plans.

Drawing on a twenty-year study, we examine the effects of HIV-related illness and death on villagers in Malawi during 2006. Contrary to unidimensional images of an AIDS disaster, we found people striving for normality – trying to control the abnormal circumstances of the rising toll of HIV-related illness and death. Just over 40% of the sample households had experienced at least one death (certainly or probably) related to HIV, but only about 10% were found to be suffering acute or serious livelihood stress due to HIV deaths. The ability to deal with illness and death depended on households' pre-existing characteristics, particularly income level, and, critically, on their placement in the extended matrilineal family. But increasing pressures on an already severely stressed population, and failure of the current ‘community-based’ approach to deliver needed help, argue for more concerted efforts to link the HIV epidemic to broader-based development.

The history of the past three decades in Africa would seem to confirm that the rôle of the military in political and economic development may no longer be considered transient. Armed interventions have become institutionalised, if not constitutionalised, in many African states. By December 1985 no less than 60 successful and 71 attempted coups d'état had occurred in 37 states since January 1956.1 Just as most of the first generation of African politicians chose ‘socialism’ to explain and justify their policies, so ‘revolution’ has become the rallying cry for the military leaders, even though they have often quickly been content just to ‘take over’, and not to transform, the previous civilian régime.

Two decades after the ‘third wave of democratization’, extensive violence continues to follow elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas national processes connected to pre-election violence have received increased scholarly attention, little is known of local dynamics of violence after elections. This article examines the 2011 Nigerian post-election violence with regard to the ways in which national electoral processes interweave with local social and political disputes. The most affected state, Kaduna State, has a history of violent local relations connected to which group should control politics and the state. It is argued that electoral polarisation aggravated national ethno-religious divisions that corresponded to the dividing line of the conflict in Kaduna. A rapid escalation of violence was facilitated by local social networks nurtured by ethno-religious grievances.

Why does South Sudan continue to experience endemic, low intensity conflicts punctuated by catastrophic civil wars? Reporters and analysts often mischaracterise conflicts in the young country of South Sudan as products of divisive ‘tribal’ or ‘ethnic’ rivalries and political competition over oil wealth. More nuanced analyses by regional experts have focused almost exclusively on infighting among elite politicians and military officers based in Juba and other major cities who use patronage networks to ethnicise conflicts. This paper argues instead that civilian militias known as the Nuer White Army have consistently rebelled against elites who they blame for mounting inequalities between urban areas and the rural communities regardless of their ethnicity. While unable to stop governments and NGOs from funnelling almost all their resources to the cities, these militias have consistently mobilised local resources for violent campaigns that redistribute wealth by pillaging urban areas.

Since 1960, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (N.F.D.) has become the centre of controversy between two African nations—the Somali Republic and Kenya. The area, about 102,000 square miles, includes the dominantly Somali-inhabited Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa Districts and the non-Somali (mainly Galla) districts of Marsabit, Isiolo, and Moyale.1 It consists of a vast, low plateau sloping rather uniformly from 2,000 feet east of Lake Rudolph towards Lamu on the Indian Ocean. Except for the Marsabit mountain region, it is semi-desert, covered by thornbush and useful only for grazing camels, cattle, goats, and sheep. The climate is hot, and the average annual rainfall is less than 12 inches. No commercially exploitable minerals have been found, and the flatness of the land often causes flash floods during and after the two rainy seasons.

Though the issues of the 1989 Senegal–Mauritania conflict were deep-rooted, the unexpected passions unleashed within the respective populations caught both Governments off-guard, leading to a total stand-off and the failure of all attempts at resolution. This occured among states which previously had experienced peaceful relations, were making progress in joint economic development efforts, and whose markets were intertwined through trade and labour migration.

A major challenge for transitioning states is to create a constituency of citizens to support and defend the new constitution. Participatory constitution-making is one of the most often recommended methods for enhancing constitutional legitimacy. This research tests the claim that public participation in the Ugandan constitution-making process built support for the 1995 constitution. Contrary to expectations, multivariate analysis of survey data demonstrates that citizens who were active in the process were no more supportive of the constitution than those who stayed at home. In-depth interviews reveal that local political leaders, not participation, caused citizens to view the constitution as legitimate or illegitimate. Constitutions are difficult for citizens to evaluate, so they rely on political elites for information and opinions. To predict whether participation will strengthen or weaken constitutional support, we must examine the messages that elites communicate to citizens about their participation, the process, and the resulting constitution.

Rapid urbanisation in African democracies is changing the way that political parties engage with their constituents, shifting relations between hosts and migrants. This article examines the strategies that parties use to maintain and build electoral support in increasingly diverse contexts. Drawing on in-depth interviews and ethnographic research in Accra, Ghana, we find that some urban political parties rely on inclusive forms of mobilisation, promoting images of cosmopolitanism and unity to incorporate a broad grassroots coalition. Yet in nearby constituencies, parties respond to changing demographics through exclusive forms of mobilisation, using narratives of indigeneity and coercion to intimidate voters who ‘do not belong’. Two factors help explain this variation in mobilisation: incumbency advantage and indigene dominance. In contrast to most scholarship on ethnicity and electoral politics in Africa, we find that these varying mobilisation strategies emerge from very local neighbourhood-level logics and motivations.

Despite earlier, negative experiences in East Africa, in early 1997 the government of Rwanda embarked on an ambitious programme for villagisation and resettlement. While the Rwanda authorities present the programme as entirely different from its predecessors, a review of those and of the implementation of villagisation and resettlement in Rwanda shows that this statement cannot hold. Nevertheless, the programme gets considerable support from international agencies. This article investigates how international agencies have accepted and upheld the ‘narrative of difference’ of the Rwandan authorities. It argues that, notwithstanding the claims of the government, lessons from the experiences with villagisation in Mozambique, Ethiopia and Tanzania are relevant for the Rwanda case and should be taken into account.

This paper challenges the conclusions of earlier writers regarding the roles of smallholder agriculture, commercial agriculture and wage labour in rural poverty alleviation in Mozambique. We review literature from across Sub-Saharan Africa and use recently collected household level data sets to place Mozambique within this literature. Results show that, as in the rest of SSA, wage labour earnings are concentrated among the best-off rural smallholders; these earnings increase income inequality rather than reducing it. Results also suggest that the same set of households, who are substantially better-off than others, has tended to gain and maintain access to the ‘high-wage’ end of the labour market over time. Key determinants of access to ‘high-wage’ labour are levels of education and previously accumulated household wealth. Income from wage labour plays a key role in lifting out of relative poverty those ‘female-headed’ households that can obtain it, yet only about one in five such households earns wage income. We stress that the rural development question in Mozambique, and elsewhere in SSA, should not be framed as an artificial choice between promoting either wage labour opportunities or commercial agriculture or smallholder agriculture. The issue is what mix of approaches is needed to develop a diversified rural economy with growing total incomes, improving food security and rapid reductions in poverty. We suggest that commercial agriculture and increased rural wage labour are important components in any such strategy, but that this strategy will fail without substantial and sustained increases in the productivity and profitability of smallholder agriculture.

Violence has been a recurring feature of political life in provincial Sierra Leone for a long time. In 1898, two years after the establishment of colonial rule, a mass rebellion, commonly known as the Hut Tax War, and directed against British political authority, took place over a large part of the Protectorate. Thereafter, the violence which periodically disrupted the chiefdoms of the hinterland, during both the colonial and post-colonial periods, resulted predominantly from conflicts amongst the indigenous peoples themselves. This article is concerned with the various disturbances that flared up in the Sierra Leone chiefdoms since the late 1940s.

The 2004 reform of the family code in Morocco has been held as one of the most significant liberal reforms undertaken in the country, and has led scholars and policy makers to argue that this demonstrates the democratic progress Morocco and the King are making. At the same time, the role of the women's movement in getting the reform approved has seemingly confirmed that associational life is crucial in promoting democratisation. This paper, building on theoretical work questioning the linkage between a strong civil society and democratic outcomes, argues that civil society activism does not necessarily lead to democratisation, and may reinforce authoritarian practices. Far from demonstrating the centrality of civil society, the process through which the new family code was passed highlights the crucial institutional role of the monarch, whose individual decision-making power has driven the whole process. Authoritarianism finds itself strengthened in Morocco despite the liberal nature and outcome of the reform.

In this increasingly bloc-competitive world, small countries are generally overlooked. Unless, by dint of fortune, they have some strategic resource, or have leaders who are globally vocal and visible, or are able to link themselves to the fortunes of larger political units, they may very well stand to be economically disadvantaged. Located in the drought-prone Sudano-Sahelian region of West Africa, with a land area that spans only 4,361 square miles (11,295 sq km) and a population currently estimated at about 797,000, The Gambia represents the classic case of a small country. It is surrounded on all sides by Senagal, except for its short Atlantic coastline, and extends 484 km inland, varying in width between 24 and 48 km along the River Gambia. Apart from being a geographical Lilliput, it has few natural resources and lacks the type of controversial leadership that commands world attention.

This comparative analysis examines how large-scale agricultural land acquisitions are implemented in Ghana and Kenya, using embedded case studies of two specific investment projects. We find that insufficiencies in these countries' land governance systems are partly caused by discrepancies between de jure and de facto procedures and that powerful actors tend to operate in the legal grey areas. These actors determine the implementation of projects to a large extent. Displacement and compensation are highly emotive issues that exacerbate tensions around the investment. We also find that large-scale land acquisitions have a feedback effect on the land governance system, which suggests that large-scale land acquisitions can be drivers of institutional change. We suggest there may be a window of opportunity here to reform these land governance systems.

The African continent currently faces severe political and economic crises. Massive debts, unpopular structural adjustment programmes (S.A.P.s), spiralling population growth, democratisation, and régime transformation are all testing national cohesion. Externally, the rapidly changing global environment, marked by the demise of the cold war and the continuing difficulties being experienced in Europe and the Middle East, also provides immense challenges to African policy-makers.

The arrest and prosecution in March 2006 of the former Liberian warlord-President Charles Taylor by the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone, for war crimes including the recruitment and use of child soldiers, and the arrest and prosecution of the Congolese warlord, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, by the International Criminal Court, accused of enlisting child soldiers in the DRC war, have raised expectations that finally international conventions and customary international laws protecting children in conflict zones will now have enforcement powers. But why has it taken so long to protect children in conflict situations despite the volume of international treaties and conventions? What do we know about the phenomenon of child soldiering, and why are children still routinely recruited and used in Africa's bloody wars? This article argues that against the background of unfolding events relating to prosecution for enlistment of child soldiers, the international community is beginning to wake up to the challenge of enforcing its numerous ‘paper protection’ instruments for the protection of children. However, a range of challenges still pose serious threats to the implementation and enforcement of the international conventions protecting children. Extensive research fieldwork in Liberia and Sierra Leone over three years reveals that the application of the restrictive and Western-centric definition and construction of a ‘child’ and ‘childhood’ raises inherent difficulties in the African context. In addition, most war-torn and post-conflict African societies are faced with the challenge of incorporating international customary laws into their domestic laws. The failure of the international community to enforce its standards on child soldiers also has to do with the politics of ratification of international treaties, in particular the fear by African governments of setting dangerous precedents, since they are also culpable of recruitment and use of child soldiers.

There is one sense in which African unity already exists. There is a sentiment of ‘African-ness’, a feeling of mutual involvement, which pervades all the political and cultural life of the continent. Nationalist leaders all over Africa feel themselves to be part of a greater movement; they recognise a special responsibility to the political unit in which they happen to belong, but feel personally involved in the triumphs and set-backs of all other African countries. There is, in other words, an emotional unity which finds expression in, among other things, concepts such as the ‘African personality’, and in a tendency to consult together at international conferences.

This paper enquires into the reasons for Uganda's 1998 intervention in the recent Congo war, arguably the most important impediment to economic and political progress in sub-Saharan Africa. It examines a number of prominent arguments about the intervention, and determines that the Rwanda–Uganda alliance should be at the centre of a ‘thick description’ of the intervention. That is, the Uganda–Rwanda alliance was the key to President Museveni's initial decision in 1998, but other explanations contribute to our understanding of the intervention by providing information about its context, justification and permissive causes. Further, the paper suggests that Uganda's initial reasons for entering Congo differ from its reasons for remaining there after having failed to realise its initial goals.

It is a tragic irony of African nationalism that the potent weapon of democracy, which indigenous politicians wielded so effectively to dislodge European colonialism from the continent, has been misused and perverted in the independence era despite its continuing historical and moral appeal. Although many leaders passionately expressed commitment to the achievement of democracy before attaining state power, their actions thereafter have for the most part proved that they had appropriated this popular concept mainly for its instrumental value; namely, in order to mobilise mass support in the contest for power with the aid of an ideological slogan. Many of the most regrettable acts by African leaders may be attributed either to opportunism and cynicism or to a genuine incomprehension of the principles of democracy, because their implementation ought to have enhanced the human dignity and quality of life of all concerned.